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Abstract: 
Hannah Arendt contends that one can find in Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles 
a “pure” form of politics, unadulterated by the advent of philosophy in general and of 
liberal political philosophy in particular. Periclean political practice, Arendt argues, is 
therefore a superior alternative to liberalism—superior because it is more authentic and 
hence more satisfying to permanent human political longings.  
After clarifying Arendt’s claims about the pre-Socratic understanding of politics 
embodied in Pericles’ statesmanship, the dissertation proceeds to test that account against 
a close reading of Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles. Arendt’s claim that Pericles’ 
political practice is driven by a desire to escape the futility of human existence by 
creating an “immortal” story of his fame or glory proves to be unsubstantiated by 
Thucydides’ account. To be sure, Pericles does seek glory, both for himself and for 
Athenians in general. But Arendt overlooks Pericles’ preoccupation with deserving glory. 
Pericles’ concern with cultivating Athenian citizens who can claim responsibility for their 
actions, and hence deserve praise for those actions, forces him to confront the 
complexities of human moral freedom and practical judgment in ways that Arendt 
ignores or overlooks.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Pericles’ praise of Athens in his Funeral Oration is widely recognized as one of 
the most moving tributes to political life at its peak. Garry Wills describes it as “the most 
famous oration of its kind, a model endlessly copied, praised, and cited” (1992, 41). The 
Athens that Pericles praises is, according to Voltaire, among the four historical epochs in 
which “the greatness of the human mind” fully flourished (1901, 5). Pericles himself is 
praised as a “visionary,” who “saw the opportunity to create the greatest political 
community the world had ever known” (Kagan 1991,136). Indeed, Western nations still 
appeal to Pericles’ words to inspire courage and pride in our political aspirations. During 
World War II, rousing excerpts from Pericles’ oration graced the sides of buses in 
London (Roberts 1994, 259); after 9/11, a U.S. Congressman appealed to Pericles’ speech 
to conjure the image of strength in adversity (Harloe and Morley 2012, 11); and in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on Paris in 2015, a sign in the Place de la Republique 
displayed a famous line from the oration: “Il n’est point de bonheur sans liberté ni de 
liberté sans courage” (“There is no happiness without freedom and no freedom without 
courage” [II.43.4])—and the quotation was attributed, rightly, to “Périclès.”1 Above all, 
perhaps, Hannah Arendt argues that Pericles’ words are so moving because he presents 
the great alternative to the liberal politics that we practice in the West today, but to which 
                                                
 
1 A picture of the sign appears in a 2015 article in Al Jazeera by Anealla Safdar, “France 
likely to close more than 100 mosques.”  
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Westerners are still deeply attracted: a politics that satisfies the human longing to be part 
of something potentially more immortal than oneself, rather than a politics tailored to the 
satisfaction of individual wants and needs. This dissertation takes seriously Arendt’s 
claim that Pericles presents an understanding of politics that speaks to “democracy’s 
discontents”2 in the age of liberalism. Simply put, if Arendt is correct, a close study of 
Thucydides, and his presentation of Pericles in particular, will be useful for those who 
feel such dissatisfactions.  
In Arendt’s reading, Pericles’ speech is a celebration of his city’s collective 
longing for “everlasting fame” and, ultimately, for immortal remembrance won through 
selfless dedication to a cause beyond oneself, which is the “highest and most divine way 
of life for mortals” (1978, 133-134). She argues that this speaks to a human longing to 
overcome our individual mortality that liberal politics either ignores or attempts to 
suppress. Insofar as this is the case, reflecting on Pericles’ vision for Athens forces us to 
consider what we really long for from a strong community, and what assumptions we 
must make about the world and our place in it for that longing to be satisfied. It helps us 
consider the nature of the desire for a robust community in which one can aspire to 
“immortal fame” or “ageless praise.”3 And, indeed, that desire (in a tamer form, perhaps) 
                                                
 
2 The phrase is borrowed from Michael Sandel’s book of that name.  
3 The phrase “ageless praise” comes from Pericles (τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον: II.43.2). It 
echoes his own words elsewhere, such as the phrases “everlasting memorials” (µνηµεῖα 
[…] ἀίδια: II.41.4) and “ever-remembered fame” (δόξα αἰείµνηστος: II.64.5), and evokes 
the Homeric tradition, which Pericles is both implicitly and explicitly challenging (cf. 
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is alive today and is at the heart of many criticisms of liberal society, particularly those 
leveled by the “communitarian” movement.   
 
Communitarianism and the Search for “Meaning” in Politics  
The various intellectual and political movements that may be grouped under the 
banner of “communitarian”4 are united by their dissatisfaction with liberal citizenship and 
by their consequent concern with reviving a more robust form of political life, one that 
makes real demands on citizens, requiring civic virtue and devotion to the community.5 
                                                                                                                                            
 
II.41.4). Recall that Achilles’ famous choice was between a long life with no glory and a 
short life with “imperishable glory” (κλέος ἄφθιτον: Iliad 9.413). The similarity of the 
above phrases with one another as well as with a passage in Heraclitus’ Fragment B29 
(κλέος ἀέναον) and Diotima’s commentary on Achilles in the Symposium (208d) allows 
Arendt to claim generally that the longing for “immortal fame” characterized pre-Socratic 
Greek thought and was epitomized in Pericles’ Funeral Oration (see The Human 
Condition 19, 193, 197; and The Life of the Mind 133-134). 
4 Communitarian authors are also sometimes grouped as “antiliberals,” since they all 
share in the effort to recover the primacy of the community over and against the liberal 
affirmation of the primacy of the individual and most reject the title “communitarian” 
(Holmes 1993). As will become clear, however, it is also important that many 
“antiliberal” communitarian thinkers are largely sympathetic to liberalism.   
5 The classic authors in this genre include Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael 
Walzer, and Charles Taylor. More recent notable contributors to this tradition include 
 	   4	  
These authors claim that modern liberalism is based on a false understanding of the self 
as fundamentally “unencumbered” or “atomistic” (see Sandel 1996, 6, 12; Taylor’s essay 
“Atomism” in Taylor 1985; Walzer 1980, 68-69; Arendt 1998, 9, 13). Communitarians 
claim, instead, that we are in very important ways political beings who are at home and 
flourish only in particular communities.  
They argue, for example, that our sense of “meaningful” existence arises from 
knowing that we are situated within “narratives” that inform us of our origins and ends, 
and that anticipate our existence and remember us when we are gone. We are 
“storytelling” beings who “rebel against the drift of storylessness” (Sandel 1996, 351). 
The demands of our unchosen, inherited traditions situate us; those demands give us 
direction and comfort in the world. Moreover, in spite of the attractive image of total 
liberation that unencumbered liberal citizenship may sometimes present, we are in fact 
encumbered beings, and it is these very unchosen ends that we may value above all. To 
deny the worth of unchosen ends is to deny that “we can ever be claimed by […] ends 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Amitai Etzioni and Robert Bellah. I include Hannah Arendt in the broad category because 
she is also prompted to embrace the primacy of the community by a fundamental 
dissatisfaction with liberal citizenship. One should keep in mind, however, that even if 
she has been a source of influence for the communitarian movement, there are also 
important differences in her thought (see Beiner 2000). It is also worth noting that these 
authors tend to avoid describing themselves as communitarians and many explicitly reject 
the term (cf. MacIntyre 2007, xiv).  
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given by nature or God, for example, or by our identities as members of families, 
peoples, cultures, or traditions” (Sandel 1996, 322).  
To take seriously the value of our unchosen ends, however, would require that we 
tailor our politics accordingly. Our existence as situated beings requires a public “space 
of appearance,” in the words of Hannah Arendt, in which communal remembrance and 
“storytelling” can take place (Arendt 1998, 50, 199-212). “For us, appearance—
something that is being seen and heard by others as well as ourselves—constitutes 
reality” (Arendt 1998, 50, see also 204). It is on account of “meaningfulness,” understood 
as the human aspiration to “connec[t] one’s life up with some greater reality or story” 
(Taylor 1989, 43), that the community must take precedence over the individual, if only 
because that individual’s deepest longings can be satisfied solely through devotion to a 
robust community. 
The interpretation of our desire for robust citizenship as a longing for “meaning” 
through participation in a shared public “narrative” is the most politically respectable 
account of the phenomenon today. For the virtue of a “narrative”—as opposed to, for 
instance, a “true account”—is that multiple narratives can coexist peacefully. The 
alternative is to insist on the truth of one account and the falsity of all others. Hence, 
though the concrete meaning of the narrative account of the self—that I am, for instance, 
an American or an Englishman, a Christian or a Muslim, because I exist within particular 
“narratives”—is far from frivolous, the language seems tailored to gloss over the most 
fundamental point: we also believe or hope that our narrative is a true account (or rather 
the true account), and that we can come to know that it is true. It is for this reason that 
most communitarians are not so hostile after all to liberalism’s emphasis on the 
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individual’s right to choose to live by those beliefs that appear to him or her to be true. 
For the communitarian, too, sees that our narratives are not important only because they 
are ours, but also because we choose to accept those narratives in the belief that they are 
true accounts of the world and our place in it.    
Indeed, as Ronald Beiner has persuasively argued, most communitarians accede 
to some version of the primacy of individual choice insisted on by liberals (Beiner 1992, 
17-20). Steven Kautz summarizes the predicament that the contemporary communitarian 
faces as follows:   
 
Whatever else might trouble us about liberal politics, most of us will not 
now repudiate this aspect of liberal rationalism: we insist that we must be 
permitted to see for ourselves—and not only to be told by authorities—
what is good for us. So any communitarian (or new liberal) alternative to 
the prevailing liberal interpretations of contemporary liberal politics must 
somehow accommodate the continuing vigor of this liberal rationalism. 
(1995, 39-40)  
 
However much the communitarian wishes to value community over the individual, that 
value could never be asserted over and above the individual’s right to “see for himself” 
and hence choose among communities. The contemporary communitarian, then, is apt to 
advocate that we respect the sanctity of the community within liberal society, or that we 
aspire to augment our sense of citizenship only insofar as this is consistent with liberal 
society.  
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Consider Michael Walzer’s position. He recognizes and admires the fact that 
citizens of the Greek polis had “a public life more vital than that of ordinary Americans,” 
yet he argues that “[i]n the United States today, community will have characteristically 
modern forms, or it won’t exist at all” (Walzer 1980, 15). The “characteristically 
modern” feature that Walzer has in mind is precisely the contemporary concern with the 
individual. The recovery of community must acknowledge that people “have learned to 
think of themselves as individuals” and therefore that project must be framed to 
“accommodate liberated men and women” (13; see also Kautz 1995, 21). The problem, 
Walzer goes on, is that the cold, impersonal nature of liberal citizenship today has left us 
dissatisfied; it lacks “emotional rewards”—“And so contemporary dissatisfaction takes 
the form of a yearning for political community, passionate affirmation, explicit 
patriotism” (1980, 68). But, he is quick to point out, “[t]hese are dangerous desires, for 
they cannot readily be met within the world of liberalism” (ibid.). Hence, Walzer 
recognizes and in some ways welcomes the fact that our entrenched liberalism precludes 
a return to the vital public life of the polis. His alternative is a pluralistic liberal society, 
which invites diverse individuals into the common political discourse in the belief that a 
“spontaneous and free” solidarity can emerge from the experience of robust participation 
among heterogeneous citizens. Democratic participation, Walzer hopes, can revive a 
stronger sense of citizenship, but “without a full-scale attack on private life and liberal 
values, without a religious revival or a cultural revolution” (68-69). 
Walzer’s position might sound like a watered-down version of communitarianism, 
but we should not for that reason reject it as unserious. The convergence of 
communitarianism and liberalism in Walzer’s account does not reveal a failure to 
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embrace fully the potentially antiliberal sentiment at the heart of the longing for robust 
citizenship. Rather, it reveals that there is a deep tension between the longing to transcend 
our individuality by giving ourselves up to the demands of a community and the need to 
“see for ourselves,” which often forces us to question those demands—and that tension is 
as alive for communitarians as it is for many liberals.  
 
The Vita Activa 
We also should not reject the contemporary search for meaning as backward, 
parochial, or romantic. As Charles Taylor observes, many of our longings for “fullness” 
in modern life are, like “premodern” longings, “forms of a craving that is ineradicable 
from human life” (1989, 44). Hence, Taylor finds continuity between the contemporary 
desire for communal remembrance and “premodern” longings, such as the eternal life for 
which Francis of Assisi longed and the immortality through fame that the Athenians 
strove for under the Pericles’ leadership (43). “The modern aspiration for meaning and 
substance in one’s life has obvious affinities with longer-standing aspirations to higher 
being” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Hannah Arendt finds that “striving for immortality” is 
the “spring and center” of active citizenship at its highest peak, the vita activa (1998, 21).  
For Arendt, “reality” is found only in public life. It is, to repeat, “something that 
is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves” (1998, 50). Only public life 
can transcend our otherwise ephemeral lives and provide us some respite from the futility 
of existence. Unlike the private world of the individual, the “world” properly speaking—
that is, the reality constituted and confirmed by the plurality of people in the public 
“space of appearance” (204-5)—can aspire to immortality and guarantee that great words 
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and great deeds are not in vain. Yet, according to Arendt, the modern focus on the 
individual subverts the public space and reduces great human longings to vices.     
 
It is the publicity of the public realm which can absorb and make shine 
through the centuries whatever men may want to save from the natural 
ruin of time. [… And t]here is perhaps no clearer testimony to the loss of 
the public realm in the modern age than the almost complete loss of 
authentic concern with immortality […] testified to by the current 
classification of striving for immortality with the private vice of vanity. 
(1998, 55-6) 
 
Hence, Arendt reverses the modern focus, in which the state exists to provide for the 
individual, arguing that individual concerns are low and slavish insofar as they are 
biologically determined and directed toward mere life, which will pass regardless. The 
household is where we are meant to satisfy these biological necessities so that we can 
emerge into the public realm of freedom, an emergence that constitutes a 
“transfiguration” from need-bound, biological, subjective animals into potentially 
immortal, free, spontaneous, human participants in an inter-subjective public world (50). 
Striving to preserve the body is an ultimately futile (if necessary) task; the striving for 
free, memorable, public action is the only thing that prevents human life from being as 
futile as biological existence. Hence, the modern indulgence in the subjective pleasures of 
the private realm comes at the expense of this grander public possibility:  
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The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear 
assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves, and while the intimacy 
of a fully developed private life, such as had never been known before the 
rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline of the public realm, 
will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective 
emotions and private feelings, this intensification will always come to pass 
at the expense of the assurance of the reality of the world and men. (Ibid.)  
 
For Arendt, the assurance that we obtain from “reality” so understood is more than just a 
sense of “belonging” or the feeling that we have “meaning” or “identity.” Rather, it is 
what makes possible a fully human—in contrast to animal—existence; it is necessary for 
the full development of specifically human capacities.  
In the absence of the political community, for example, not only do speech and 
action cease to fulfill the desire to transcend mortality, but those very capacities also 
cease to flourish (49). Hence, the robust citizenship of Periclean Athens represents for 
Arendt the peak of human flourishing and our highest individual satisfaction.       
 
The task and potential greatness of mortals lie in their ability to produce 
things—works and deeds and words—which would deserve to be and, at 
least to a degree, are at home in everlastingness, so that through them 
mortals could find their place in a cosmos where everything is immortal 
except themselves. By their capacity for the immortal deed, by their ability 
to leave non-perishable traces behind, men, their individual mortality 
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notwithstanding, attain an immortality of their own and prove themselves 
to be of a “divine” nature. (19) 
 
The realization of this “‘divine’” nature and the highest satisfaction of our transcendent 
longings, then, are made possible through the robust citizenship lived in the ancient city.   
Because the full realization of human greatness is available only in and through 
political life, Arendt seeks to articulate and thereby recover what has been lost by the 
modern ranking of the individual above the community. She claims that the polis as 
realized in Periclean Athens is the historical example of public life at its peak. The 
imperial city ensured that otherwise ephemeral words and deeds would gain everlasting 
remembrance and offer inspiration to those yet unborn (197-8). “[T]he polis was for the 
Greeks […] their guarantee against the futility of individual life, the space protected 
against this futility and reserved for the relative permanence, if not immortality, of 
mortals” (56).  
 
Thucydides’ Pericles 
I will argue, however, that Arendt’s interpretation, for all its undeniable power, 
overlooks a crucial aspect of Pericles’ funeral speech: Pericles praises the Athenian 
citizens for their dedication to the polis, to be sure, but he also explains to them why they 
are truly deserving of the praise they seek. And they deserve such praise not only because 
they undertake great personal risks for the sake of Athens’ grandeur, but also because 
they do so with eyes wide open. What is most remarkable about the Athenians, according 
to Pericles, is their capacity to act deliberately and knowingly, without false hopes or 
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illusions. In Pericles’ words, the Athenians alone are at the same time “both most 
courageous and [most] calculative,” while in citizens of other cities, “confidence comes 
from ignorance”—literally, lack of learning (ἀµαθία)—“and calculation brings 
hesitation” (II.40.3).6 Hence, what is striking about the Athenians is not so much their 
devotion to Athens as the fact that they pair that devotion with an equally robust capacity 
or desire to act rationally.      
This more nuanced reading of Pericles’ praise reveals an important theoretical 
feature of the longing to live a “noble and good” life, a truly praiseworthy life. For the 
Athenian desire to act rationally and deliberately is connected to their desire to win glory 
through selfless acts on behalf of Athens. The longing to deserve “ageless praise,” unlike 
the longing simply to attain it, requires the capacity to claim responsibility for one’s 
actions, and one can claim responsibility for one’s actions only to the extent that those 
actions are deliberate and freely chosen, and the consequences intended. Hence, the 
cultivation of what one may call practical judgment and an insistence on moral freedom 
are necessary concomitants to the pursuit of truly praiseworthy nobility. This is why the 
tension between the liberal insistence on individual choice and the communitarian 
insistence on the primacy of community that we saw in Walzer’s account is important: at 
the heart of that tension is the intuition that any serious desire to be part of a robust 
community cannot be fully separated from the desire to “see for oneself” and deliberately 
                                                
 
6 Translations are my own, using the Oxford Classical Texts edition (Thucydides 1942, 
1958, 1987) and Rusten 2001. 
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choose to fulfill the demands of that community, if only to be truly worthy of the honor 
one seeks.   
Arendt and those thinkers who fall in the “antiliberal” tradition praise the 
Athenian concern for noble or robust citizenship, but when they turn to Thucydides they 
fail to see Pericles’ constant effort to balance the Athenians’ longing for a noble or 
praiseworthy life with their implicit concern with deserving the praise they seek and 
therefore for acting with deliberation and choice. By recovering Pericles’ more 
problematic or nuanced understanding of Athenian politics, we begin to see that robust 
communities are not all equal. For if indeed we wish to be part of a community in which 
our virtues can be praised and in which that praise redounds to the truly deserving, then 
to be serious about robust citizenship one must also be serious about cultivating the 
individual capacity to be deserving of praise: the capacity to act deliberately and freely.  
 
The Dissertation in Brief 
In Chapter I, I analyze in more detail Arendt’s understanding of the alternative to 
liberalism as articulated by Thucydides’ Pericles. However, this dissertation is not about 
Hannah Arendt, and I focus primarily on interpreting Thucydides rather than on 
analyzing contemporary democratic theory. Hannah Arendt argues passionately that the 
long intellectual history that informs contemporary scholarship has crippled modern 
efforts to understand what is most important about human political longings, and that one 
should therefore return to pre-philosophic authors if one wishes to find adequate answers 
to the serious dissatisfactions that many have found in modern political life. This 
dissertation takes seriously the possibility that Arendt might be right, and therefore I turn 
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to Thucydides rather than to Arendt’s contemporaries and successors to see if, indeed, the 
pre-philosophic tradition as embodied in Thucydides’ great text contains insights that 
subsequent philosophic developments have obscured for us today.  
In Chapter II, then, I turn to my own analysis of Thucydides’ depiction of Pericles 
and his Athens. I argue that there are two prominent, and contradictory, themes in 
Pericles’ speeches. On one hand, Pericles indulges the Athenian love of nobility, 
exhorting them to take risks on behalf of the city even contrary to what is prudent or 
rational. On the other hand, he also encourages them to act prudently—even with the 
coolest of cold calculation—and not to let their volatile passions corrupt their capacity for 
calm deliberation. Seeing how these two themes fit together in a coherent whole—if 
indeed they do fit together—is one of the main puzzles to solve in understanding the 
character of Pericles’ leadership.   
In Chapters III and IV, I follow these two threads of Periclean rhetoric—his 
appeals to reason, on one hand, and to the Athenian concern for nobility, on the other—in 
his first speech (in which he details his war strategy) and in the Funeral Oration. I argue 
throughout that beneath Pericles’ exhortations to nobility there is an equally clear and 
consistent prudential purpose to his speeches. I point out, for instance, the obvious (if 
frequently overlooked) fact that Pericles praises Athenians’ noble indifference to danger 
while simultaneously urging them not to fight but rather to hide behind the walls of 
Athens, precisely because facing the Spartans in the field would be too dangerous.  
In Chapters V and VI, I turn to the philosophical foundations that ground Pericles’ 
confidence in reason. Pericles envisions an Athenian citizen who sees clearly the world 
around him and his place in it, and who can therefore judge and act well. But this degree 
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of awareness requires (among other things) answering correctly a most fundamental 
question that proves to be central to Thucydides’ book: are there divine beings who 
intervene in human affairs in order to reward the just and punish the wicked? Is the world 
such that the just or noble succeed and the unjust fail, in accordance with the wish or will 
of the gods? As we will see, Pericles denies that the world is of this character, and his 
confidence in human foresight (and the confidence that he attempts to inspire in the 
Athenians) even rests on that denial. According to Pericles, the world operates according 
to natural necessity and “ignorant” chance (I.140.1). But this view of the world is both 
theoretically and psychologically difficult to accept fully, to say the least. For, in what 
proves to be the opinion of many of the Athenian elite, the view that natural necessity 
governs the world is incompatible with the human moral freedom that Pericles elsewhere 
insists on. And the Athenian demos, despite Pericles’ guidance, are not always willing to 
give up their hopes or beliefs that there are superintending gods who reward the just and 
punish the wicked. Moreover, how does Pericles know that his understanding of the 
world is true? 
The Pericles that emerges from this analysis is not the single-minded glory seeker 
whom Arendt praises. Though she admires those who strive to “deserve” immortality 
(1998, 19), she focuses her analysis too much on the desire for immortality and not 
enough on the concern with desert. A closer look at Thucydides and his Pericles shows 
that it is the desire to deserve immortality—or an immortal remembrance, at least—not 
the desire for immortality simply that animates Athenians, at least as Pericles envisions 
them.  
 	   16	  
Chapter 1 
Arendt and the Love of Distinction 
 
 
Arendt claims that the modern, liberal turn that instigated the demise of robust 
politics is depriving human beings of their most meaningful form of activity. In her 
account, the essence of politics is the aspiration to immortality, an aspiration that has 
been mutilated and subverted to the extent that politics has turned its attention to the task 
of administering to bodily needs and away from inspiring, and honoring, great deeds. 
According to Arendt, the desire for immortality points naturally to the desire for 
distinction, to set ourselves apart from the crowd and gain fame so that the memory of 
our virtue might outlive our bodily existence. Yet Arendt’s account of virtue is 
ambiguous, and our examination of her work will lead us to question her claims about the 
connection between virtue and the longing for immortality. What ultimately distinguishes 
Arendt’s understanding of Pericles from mine is that Arendt’s analysis leads her to praise 
virtue as the capacity to say and do things that are novel, while Thucydides’ Pericles 
praises virtue as the capacity to say and do things that are needful based on a clear 
understanding of nature or necessity.  
 
Background 
The broad purpose of The Human Condition is to inspire a reexamination (or 
recovery) of the original articulations of what Arendt calls the vita activa. Arendt is 
concerned that the fundamental distinctions among basic types of human activities—
labor, work, and action—are being forgotten. This results from two related historical 
 	   17	  
events. First, by Plato’s pen (and the Christian theologians and philosophers who 
followed), the life of contemplation was decisively established as the highest human life. 
And from the perspective of the vita contemplativa, the distinctions among types of 
activities cease to be important. All activities are distractions from one’s highest purpose, 
and in that sense they are equal and equally unremarkable. The only important distinction 
becomes that between action and leisure. Hence, since the time of Plato, the vita activa 
has come to represent the undifferentiated mass of both necessary and idle activities from 
which the life of contemplation is distinguished (Arendt 2000, 167-168).  
Second, Plato—or Plato’s Socrates—not only established the dignity of 
philosophy but also brought philosophy to bear on politics. This began a tradition of 
political philosophy that culminated in Karl Marx’s radical reversal of the traditional 
hierarchy of activities, which reduced the status of both thought and action. In Marx, 
labor achieved a dignity that would have been unimaginable in the age of Pericles but 
that is unchallenged today. We have become, in Arendt’s estimation, a nation of laborers 
that can no longer think beyond the categories of labor (2000, 168-170). Hence, Arendt’s 
project is to recover the original articulations of the vita activa from the triumph of labor 
as well as from the leveling gaze of philosophy, and by doing so to revive the waning 
richness of human life. It is for this reason that she must cast back to the self-
understanding of pre-philosophic Athens, to a time before the meaning of the vita activa 
was obscured by Plato (or Socrates) and his successors.  
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Meaningfulness 
The most important purpose of Arendt’s work, and the reason that we are 
concerned with it here, is to reestablish the dignity of action, which prior to Plato was the 
highest human activity. Periclean Athens was, in Arendt’s view, the archetypal locus of 
action in the fullest sense of the word. However, it is important to emphasize that 
Arendt’s intention in The Human Condition is to uncover the meaning of action. Action 
deserves dignity because action is meaningful. But what does that in turn mean?  
As Arendt argues in The Life of the Mind, the “quest for meaning” is distinct from 
the quest for truth (1978, 15). Questions of truth are “in principle all answerable by 
common sense experience,” for the quest for truth is the quest “to see and to know the 
world as it is given to the senses” (58). Questions of meaning, on the other hand, cannot 
be answered by common sense experience. They go beyond what is presented to the 
senses. “[O]ur mind is not capable of certain and verifiable knowledge regarding matters 
and questions that it nevertheless cannot help thinking about,” such as “what we now 
often call the ‘ultimate questions’ of God, freedom, and immortality” (14). The quest for 
meaning concerns these “ultimate questions.” 
In The Human Condition, of course, Arendt’s purpose is not to recover the 
distinction between thinking, which properly concerns the “ultimate questions,” and 
knowing, which concerns truth—that is the purpose of the first volume of The Life of the 
Mind. Rather, The Human Condition is an exercise in thinking about the meaning of 
activities—meanings that may not be apparent to the actors themselves. Arendt’s 
proposition in The Human Condition is “to think what we are doing” (1998, 5). That is, 
she wants to make apparent the answers to the “ultimate questions” that our activities 
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implicitly provide, and which therefore guide how we actually live. But thinking about 
the assumptions of our activities is, as the proposition suggests, only possible after 
acting: we are already “doing,” and the task at hand is now to think about what we are 
doing—to discover the large, implicit “why” behind our activities that is usually not 
apparent to us as doers.  
For example, consider what Arendt calls “biological” activities. We are driven to 
eat, sleep, and procreate by urges or instincts. There is no conscious intention; rather, we 
become conscious of the intentions of those activities only after we reflect on them. They 
are the facts that lead us to speculate on the purposes of nature that we unconsciously 
carry out. Similarly, Arendt would argue that our urge to participate in politics is just 
that: an urge. We are driven, and we have yet to think clearly enough about that driving 
force.  
To clarify the distinction between truth and meaning, Arendt illustrates it with an 
example. According to the assumptions of science, the birth of any particular individual 
is a random occurrence. Yet a poet may assert, to the contrary, that that particular 
individual “was meant to be” (1978, 60-61). At the heart of the disagreement is a 
question not about the truth of the individual’s birth—that is, whether he was in fact 
born—but about its meaning—whether there was any cosmological significance to his 
birth. The scientist assumes or implies that the world is governed by mechanistic 
necessity; the poet implies that there are cosmic purposes. Both are attempting to derive 
from the visible world of events an account of the whole in which those events make 
sense.  
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Similarly, Anselm’s ontological proof “is not valid and in this sense not true, but 
it is full of meaning” (1978, 61). A proof of God’s existence need not be true for it to 
reveal what is of concern to Arendt. The very attempt to prove God’s existence reveals a 
human longing for cosmological significance that guides Anselm’s activities. Hence, 
when Arendt speaks of the “meaning” of activities, she is attempting to capture how our 
activities are significant, i.e., how they signify an account (logos) of the cosmos and 
man’s place in it, which may or may not be a true account (1978, 58).  
Arendt does not suggest, however, that metaphysical assumptions are arbitrary or 
that one is free to construct one’s own conception of human meaning. On the contrary, 
this would imply what Arendt denies—that the meaning of an activity is found in the 
conscious choice that precedes it. She claims the opposite—that we become aware of the 
meaning of our activities only after acting. Moreover, one of the main tasks of The 
Human Condition is to show how the human concern for meaning is shaped by the (more 
or less permanent) human condition. Hence, though she refuses to speak of "human 
nature" (cf. Pangle 1990, 50), her account of the human condition amounts to an account 
of what is "natural" to human beings, insofar as our condition is more or less permanent. 
For example, one of the conditions that shapes human life is mortality, and the task of 
The Human Condition is to show how our activities reveal that the aspiration to 
individual, worldly immortality is an inevitable response to that condition. Perhaps by 
speaking of the human “condition” rather than of human “nature” Arendt is leaving room 
for the possibility of escaping mortality through technology, say, which would alter 
human life as we know it by altering the fundamental conditions that shape our lives. But 
for the purposes of The Human Condition, our mortal condition is a natural fact to which 
 	   21	  
humans have a natural response. The deepest underlying hope of all human activities, 
Arendt claims, is that we might yet overcome death. 
This hope means that activities can be more or less “meaningful” depending on 
how well they accord with our fundamental longing. The activity of prayer is 
“meaningful” because it affirms the eternal cosmological significance of individual 
human beings. Yet, Arendt’s return to the ancients is in part motivated by her claim that 
our hope is for worldly—i.e., mortal—immortality, which casts doubt on the adequacy of 
otherworldly responses to that longing. The activity of labor, by contrast, is not “humanly 
meaningful” at all (1998, 106, my emphasis). Because labor has an ultimate purpose 
shared by all animals—the preservation of the species—and because it is dedicated not to 
reproduction, strictly speaking, but to the production of new individuals, the activity 
implies no striving after individual immortality; biological individuals are significant 
only as undifferentiated members of the species that fulfill that species’ need to propagate 
itself (1998, 8, 97-98, 106).  
 
The Urgency of Life 
This longing for immortality is the primary point of contact between Hannah 
Arendt and Thucydides. For Arendt finds this longing expressed most fully in Pericles’ 
Funeral Oration. Modern politics, by contrast, is characterized by “the complete loss of 
authentic concern with immortality” (1998, 55). Yet, without “potential earthly 
immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no common world and no public realm, is 
possible” (1998, 50).    
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To understand this last assertion, it is helpful to review her criticism of the claim 
that life—mere life—is “the highest good,” which has become “the ultimate point of 
reference in the modern age” (1998, 313). The pagans had no such reverence for mere 
life, and therefore the alternative that they present embodies what is missing from modern 
politics. In Athens, one entered the polis not for the sake of safety but to demonstrate and 
make use of one’s mastery over—and hence freedom from—the necessities of bodily 
preservation.7 From this point of view, “too great a love for life […] was a sure sign of 
slavishness” (1998, 30-31, 36). Thus, in Arendt’s view, the triumph of the view that life 
is the highest good was “disastrous for the esteem and dignity of politics” (1998, 314).  
For Arendt, the modern emphasis on the priority of life threatens to collapse the 
ancient distinctions between the public and the private and between the human and the 
animal. The division between the activities of “the common world” and those pertaining 
to “the maintenance of life,” Arendt insists, was one “upon which all ancient political 
thought rested as self-evident and axiomatic” (1998, 28). The private realm and the 
public realm both had their forms of community. But the “togetherness” of the private 
realm was based on necessity—the needs of the body—that of the public realm on 
freedom—freedom from those same needs. Her critique of both modern political theory 
and contemporary political practice is that the kind of togetherness that was once only 
                                                
 
7 Hence, in her interpretation of Aristotle’s famous assertion that human beings come 
together for the sake of living but stay together for the sake of living well, Arendt 
understands “living well” to mean engaging in activities that require freedom from the 
necessities of mere living (Arendt 1998, 36-37; cf. Aristotle Politics 1252b25-30).   
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appropriate in the private realm of the household has now become a matter of public 
concern. She calls this deviant form of politics “society.” “Society is the form in which 
the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public 
significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to 
appear in public” (1998, 46). The public realm strictly speaking—the political realm, in 
contrast to the social—is where one goes to participate in activities that require freedom 
from the strictly private interest in the necessities of self-preservation.  
The activities of political life therefore also constitute the distinction between 
animals and humans. All activities of animals are determined by the need to preserve the 
species, including all social behaviors. Human beings, however, enter political life only 
after “mastering the necessities of life in the household,” which frees them for other, 
“humanly meaningful” activities (1998, 30-31, 106, my emphasis). Yet, as Arendt 
laments, in modern regimes, “the only thing people have in common is their private 
interests” (1998, 69).  
This modern glorification of the life devoted only to the production and 
consumption of things that serve private needs and wants—the life of the laborer—came 
from Marx, most of all, but it began with Locke and Hobbes (1998, 93; 112, 105, 56-57). 
Their revolution capitalized on the urgency of the needs of the body.  
 
The difference between what we have in common and what we own privately is 
first that our private possessions, which we use and consume daily, are much 
more urgently needed than any part of the common world [… They have] a 
driving force whose urgency is unmatched by the so-called higher desires and 
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aspirations of man [… And so they will] always be the first among man’s needs 
and worries. (1998, 70, see also 87)  
 
In taking their bearings by the most urgent and most private needs, the early liberal 
political philosophers brought a new seriousness to laboring for one’s daily bread (1998, 
127). The concerns of the laborer—not just for survival but also for making life easier 
and longer—became the standard against which all other activities were measured (1998, 
208). The resulting demotion of the political life as it was formerly understood followed 
as a matter of course. For, “[f]rom the standpoint of ‘making a living,’ every activity 
unconnected with labor becomes a ‘hobby’” (1998, 128). And such ambitious “hobbies” 
as the striving for immortality were consequently reduced to mere vanity (1998, 21). 
Arendt’s critique of the liberal position is simple: what is most urgent for human 
beings is not what is most important to them.  
 
[L]ife, which for all other animal species is the very essence of their being, 
becomes a burden to man because of his innate ‘repugnance to futility.’8 This 
burden is all the heavier since none of the so-called ‘loftier desires’ has the same 
urgency, [none] is actually forced upon man by necessity, as the elementary needs 
of life. (1998, 119)  
 
                                                
 
8 Quoting Thorstein Veblen, according to Arendt’s note.  
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For Arendt, the most politically significant human “driving force” is not the fear of death 
or the desire to acquire, as Hobbes or Locke would insist, but the “repugnance to futility.” 
The problem with the life devoted to comfortable self-preservation is that nothing can 
remove “the essential worldly futility of the life process” (1998, 131). All humans die. 
Hence, the fundamental condition of human existence is each individual’s awareness that 
her worldly existence is linear: it has a beginning and an end (1998, 19). The urge not to 
meet one’s end is therefore an essential byproduct of human self-consciousness.   
Yet, Arendt also worries that we are forgetful. She worries that our great success 
in the production of things for consumption has created a society of comfortable laborers 
on the brink of forgetting “the futility of a life that ‘does not fix or realize itself’”9 in 
something more enduring than the human body (1998, 135, see also 121). Arendt wishes 
to warn us of our contemporary apathy toward futility because the stagnation of our 
highest capacities will come with the slumber of our deepest longings (1998, 49). She 
therefore wishes to be our gadfly and remind us of our inherent “repugnance to futility” 
in order to awaken us to her alternative view of the value of politics.  
 
Worldly Immortality  
 In contrast to the view that life is the highest good and therefore that the 
preservation of life is the proper object of politics, Arendt claims that the “striving for 
immortality” is the “spring and center” of all action, especially political action (1998, 21, 
see also 55). The Greek polis did not aim to make life long and comfortable, as do 
                                                
 
9 Quoting Adam Smith, according to Arendt’s note. 
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modern regimes. The purpose of the polis was twofold. First, it was meant to “multiply 
the occasions to win ‘immortal fame,’ that is, to multiply the chances for everybody to 
distinguish himself” (1998, 197). Second, and related, it was meant to “offer a remedy for 
the futility of action and speech” (ibid.). The purpose of the polis was not to preserve 
people from an early or painful death but to preserve from futility those aspects of human 
life that otherwise leave no permanent trace. It did this by providing a venue in which the 
great deeds and words of excellent individuals might be remembered. To quote at length: 
 
The polis—if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral Oration—gives 
a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to become the scene of their 
daring will not remain without witness and will need neither Homer nor anyone 
else who knows how to turn words to praise them; without assistance from others, 
those who acted will be able to establish together the everlasting remembrance of 
their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and future ages. In 
other words, men’s life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the 
most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most 
ephemeral of man-made “products,” the deeds and stories which are their 
outcome, would become imperishable [… It is] a kind of organized remembrance. 
It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will 
never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, 
appearing before an audience of fellow men […]. (1998, 197-198)  
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This, according to Arendt, is what “the Greeks themselves thought of [the polis] and its 
raison d’être” (ibid.).  
 It is important to note, however, that Arendt’s claim is not just that the longing for 
immortality animates political life; it animates all activity. Our laboring satisfies the 
needs of our bodies, and by means of preservation and procreation we can achieve a kind 
of immortality in the perpetuation of the species. As we have seen, this is the lowest and 
most futile form that our immortal longings take, since it is an activity that we share with 
animals and it preserves only the species (1998, 84). Despite the hope that one’s offspring 
will be a second self, carrying on one’s image, that child is in fact a “‘foreign life’”10 with 
its own individual identity (Arendt 2000, 170; 1998, 106). Procreation cannot satisfy the 
longing for individual, worldly immortality. Our “mortality is not compensated by […] 
the species’ ever-recurring life cycle” (1998, 7). Moreover, there is nothing remarkable in 
labor because it results from natural necessary. “Labor, unlike all other human activities, 
stands under the sign of necessity, the ‘necessity of subsisting’ as Locke used to say, or 
the ‘eternal necessity imposed by nature’ in the words of Marx” (2000, 171; also 1998, 
30, 83-84). Because our longings are not satisfied by what our biological nature has 
provided for our perpetuation, Arendt is even willing to claim that from a certain 
perspective humans are “not natural” (1998, 97-98).11 Arendt’s higher alternative to 
                                                
 
10 Quoting Karl Marx, according to Arendt’s note. 
11 This may be the deeper reason why she chooses not to speak of human nature. In her 
view, if humans have a nature it is their animal nature, which is unremarkable and 
therefore not fully human.  
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biological procreation is accomplished through action among other human beings. By 
"action," Arendt means the capacity “for beginning new and spontaneous processes 
which without men never would come into existence” (1998, 231). Human deeds are 
fundamentally unpredictable and unique, and therefore they have the capacity—unlike 
the activities determined by our common biological nature—to distinguish us as 
individuals, each with a peculiar story that might become worthy of remembrance.  
 Arendt’s account of this more “human” capacity for immortality depends on her 
claim that the world is “phenomenal,” or her rejection of the distinction between Being 
and Appearing. To be a human being means to be something that appears among other 
human beings. This is what Arendt calls the condition of plurality. A human without 
other humans would be a fundamentally different thing, nothing more than an animal. 
Hence, from the human perspective, to die is “‘to cease to be among men’” (1998, 7-8). 
For Arendt, social death is the same as (or worse than) physical death. We are perceived 
and perceiving beings, “equipped to deal with a world in which Being and Appearing 
coincide,” i.e., a world in which what we are is constituted by what we appear to be 
(1978, 20). Our “identity”—the sameness that unifies our daily life into one story with 
one agent rather than a biological process of coming to be and ceasing to be, in which 
change is the only constant—is constituted by the sameness of the objects that we 
encounter and the persistence of the “web of relationships” within which we act (1998, 
181-188). For Arendt, our more fundamental “reality” is not the one confirmed by self-
consciousness and clarity about the world around us but that confirmed by perceiving 
others and being perceived in turn, all within a political community (1998, 50). We 
should not forget, Arendt reminds us, that the private life is privative, meaning that it 
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involves “the consciousness of being deprived of something essential in life” (1998, 60). 
To live a private life means to be deprived of the public, which “guarantees [one’s] 
‘objective’ reality” (1978, 19).  
Moreover, just as the significance of death is that we cease to be among others, so 
there is a “birth” more significant than our biological birth, constituted by our emergence 
into the world of others (1998, 176). Arendt uses the metaphor of play-acting to sum up 
her point. On the most fundamental level, to live does not mean to eat and breathe and 
procreate but to make one’s appearance on stage, as it were (1978, 21). What follows 
from this, of course, is the crucial importance that there be a stage on which to appear and 
that there be an audience for whom to make a display. This is the public realm, in 
Arendt’s account, and it is for this reason that to be deprived of the “space of 
appearance”—the polis—is “to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically 
speaking, is the same as appearance” (1998, 199). To repeat, this “second birth” into the 
political community is important to us not because we are vain; it is of fundamental 
importance because the words and deeds that are heard and seen by others constitute a 
public “story” potentially more permanent than our bodily existence. The meaning of 
action in the public realm is found in the aspiration to individual, worldly immortality 
available through “eternal remembrance”: fame.  
Hence, Arendt argues that a “specifically human life” is not the same as life 
simply (zōē), which refers only to the natural processes of living in which all animals 
partake. The specifically human life is a life (bios), which as such can be told as a story 
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(1998, 97).12 Because human beings are peculiarly aware that “[l]iving things make their 
appearance like actors on a stage,” they are “possessed by an urge toward self-display” 
(1978, 19, Arendt’s emphasis). That is, human beings have an urge to reproduce an 
appearance of themselves through action on public display that is more one’s own 
distinct image than is one’s offspring, and that achieves a “relative permanence” by 
making an impression on a public realm that is potentially more enduring than oneself 
(1998, 56).  
To be the author of deeds is therefore the higher alternative to being a parent to 
offspring—higher in that it better satisfies our peculiarly human longing. In The Life of 
the Mind, Pericles again emerges as Arendt's spokesman for “the highest and most divine 
way of life for mortals” in pre-philosophic Greece, a way of life based on the view “that 
all mortals should strive for immortality” (1978, 133-134). Here is her account in that 
book: 
 
Compared to other living beings, man is a god; he is a kind of “mortal god”13 […] 
whose chief task therefore consists in an activity that could remedy his mortality 
and thus make him more like the gods, his closest relations. The alternative to that 
is to sink down to the level of animal life. “The best choose one thing in place of 
                                                
 
12 Arendt here follows Aristotle in making the distinction by reference to the two Greek 
words for “life.”  
13 Quoting Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, II, 13, according to Arendt’s note. 
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all else—everlasting fame among mortals; but the many are glutted like cattle.”14 
The point here is that it was axiomatic in pre-philosophical Greece that the only 
incentive worthy of man qua man is the striving for immortality: the great deed is 
beautiful and praiseworthy not because it serves one’s country or one’s people but 
exclusively because it will “win eternal mention in the deathless roll of fame.” As 
Diotima points out to Socrates, “Do you suppose that Alcestis would have died to 
save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus . . . if they had not believed that 
their excellence [aretē],15 would live for ever in men’s memory, as in fact it does 
in ours?”16 (1978, 134) 
 
In the public realm one can find a “guaranty against the futility of individual life” by 
giving birth, as it were, to the potentially immortal memory of the deeds that constitute 
one’s “life-story” and hence one’s unique self (1998, 19 and 180). Like the miracle of 
birth in nature, action is the “miracle-working faculty of man” in the public realm (1998, 
294). Arendt sums up both of these procreative aspects of human life with her term 
“natality.”  
 
 
 
                                                
 
14 Quoting Heraclitus, fragment B29, according to Arendt’s note. 
15 The Greek is Arendt’s addition, as is the preceding ellipsis. 
16 Quoting Plato’s Symposium, 208c, according to Arendt’s note. 
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Natality  
Like Diotima in Plato's Symposium, Arendt links the urge for biological 
procreation to the longing for immortality through fame (cf. Symposium 208c-d). And 
like Diotima, Arendt does this in order to show that the human need to act greatly, to do 
something new and remarkable, is a productive urge that stems from a natural “pregnancy 
of soul” (Symposium 208e). She coins the term natality to distinguish such procreative 
human needs or urges from those needs associated with preservation. The needs of 
preservation stem from our poverty: we are hungry, naked, frail beings, who need to 
consume in order to live. The needs of procreation stem from our superabundance: we are 
beings with an urge to beget, to create, who need to give in order to be satisfied (cf. 
Bloom 2001, 139).  
This distinction allows Arendt to shed more light on the importance of politics 
that the modern world fails to recognize. “[N]atality, and not mortality,” is “the central 
category of political . . . thought” because the urge to overcome mortality through 
immortal deeds is at the heart of all action, not the urge simply to preserve oneself 
(Arendt 1998, 9). Biologically, mortality and natality correspond to the desires of 
preservation and procreation, both of which are responses to the fact of death. But these 
responses point in opposite directions, for giving birth to and protecting one’s offspring 
often leads to self-sacrifice, while preserving oneself does not. Arendt insists on retaining 
this commonsense distinction. Similarly, in political life we strive not only to preserve 
what is past through tradition and remembrance, but also to procreate—to sow our seeds 
in the political soil, as it were—through remarkable deeds that are worthy of 
remembrance and that often require self-sacrifice. This is the life of politics. As Arendt 
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puts it, “[t]o be alive means to be possessed by an urge toward self-display” (Arendt 
1978, 21). 
Arendt’s coinage of “natality” is meant to capture this positive aspect of the 
human condition in order to balance what she thinks is an undue emphasis on mortality, 
or the fear of death, that pervades modern political theory. As we have already discussed, 
the elevation of mere life to its status as the highest worldly good—an idea promoted first 
by Christianity’s focus on the sanctity of life and then by the liberal political 
philosophers’ emphasis on comfortable self-preservation—was “disastrous for the esteem 
and dignity of politics,” which originally “derived its greatest inspiration from the 
aspiration toward worldly immortality” (1998, 314). It was only by raising the status of 
the most urgent needs, such as the “need for food,” to new heights that Hobbes could 
demote the less urgent needs, such as “the need for public admiration,” to the status of 
“vainglory” (1998, 56-7). In doing so, Hobbes embraced the position that Diotima 
marked out in the Symposium for those who do not understand “erotics”: those for whom 
actions in the pursuit of honor are “irrational,” since such actions disregard the urgency 
of self-preservation (208c). Arendt would say, similarly, that Hobbes' reduction of glory 
to vainglory stems from his blindness to the political importance of natality.    
From Arendt’s perspective it is Hobbes who is irrational. Self-preservation is 
always ultimately futile. Everyone dies, if not violently. It is only by deadening our 
“repugnance to futility”—which modern technology threatens to accomplish by removing 
pain and effort from life, thereby making our futile existence easy, comfortable, and 
untroublesome—that human beings might go gently into a “lifeless life” (Arendt 1998, 
119-120). To seek immortality through fame is at least to face up to and embrace the 
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necessity of bodily death. Hence, “whoever consciously aims at […] leaving behind a 
story and an identity which will win ‘immortal fame,’ must not only risk his life but 
expressly choose, as Achilles did, a short life and premature death” (1998, 193).   
Thus, in Arendt’s account, natality accounts for both our actual, bodily birth and 
our “second birth,” by which we “insert ourselves into the human world” with action 
(1998, 176). Bodily procreation is the form of our natality that contributes to the 
immortality of the species. Yet, what we really long for is an individual immortality in 
response to our awareness of individual mortality. The second urge is therefore 
specifically human and higher. Only human beings long to give birth to a second self, a 
public self. And this second self, unlike the first, is capable of individual immortality 
because it exists in the potentially immortal remembrance of the political community.  
By emphasizing natality rather than mortality, Arendt means to counter the liberal 
tradition that emphasizes our decay and death, in light of which we seek preservation, 
above all else. That tradition overlooks that we are born and grow, that in life we have the 
experience of replacing the old with the new, and that the natural response to our 
mortality is not fearfully to seek preservation but boldly to produce things that will 
outlast our mortal nature and provide a “remedy for […] futility” (1998, 197): children, 
worldly objects, and, most importantly, “immortal deed[s]” (19). 
 
Immortality and Excellence 
 In Diotima’s account of the pursuit of fame in Plato's Symposium, those 
individuals who are particularly concerned with noble action seek “an immortal memory 
of their virtue” (208d, my emphasis). This proves also to be the case for Arendt. She 
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laments that the disappearance of the public realm marks the end of excellence.17 For 
“society equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality is only the political 
and legal recognition of the fact that society has conquered the public realm, and that 
distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual” (1998, 41). The 
public realm, properly understood, “was reserved for individuality,” where “everybody 
had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds or 
achievements that he was the best of all” (ibid.). The equality among citizens in 
democratic Athens was not an end; it was the precondition for excellence, since 
excellence means to distinguish oneself from one’s peers (1998, 49; see also 95, 176). 
The public realm is a goad to action, and action is “highly individualistic” (194). It is the 
attempt to impress one’s superiority on the minds of one’s peers and thereby to win 
“immortal fame” (193-194). 
 But it is unclear in Arendt’s account whether virtue is instrumental—as a means 
by which to distinguish oneself and thereby to win immortal fame—or a good in itself 
that requires the possibility of worldly immortality as a goad. As we saw earlier, what is 
distinctive and “axiomatic” about the assumptions of pre-philosophic Greece is that “the 
only incentive worthy of man qua man is the striving for immortality” (1978, 134). As 
Arendt reads in Heraclitus, to be human means to “‘prefer immortal fame to mortal 
things’” (1998, 19). Yet, what she seems to lament about the absence of that incentive in 
the modern world is the consequences it has on human excellence, rather than, say, the 
                                                
 
17 Arendt uses the terms virtue and excellence (as well as aretē and virtus) synonymously 
(1998, 48-49; though cp. 208n40).  
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despair over our futility that should result from acknowledging our mortality. She 
concedes, after all, that the sheer comfort of modern life may cause us to cease being 
troubled by futility. But she specifically laments the deleterious effects that the 
contemporary absence of a public realm has on the human capacities for great words and 
deeds:  
 
[O]ur capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former quality since the 
rise of the social realm banished these into the sphere of the intimate and the 
private […] No activity can become excellent if the world does not provide the 
proper space for its exercise. Neither education nor ingenuity nor talent can 
replace the constituent elements of the public realm, which make it the proper 
place for human excellence.” (1998, 49) 
 
Nothing measures up to the “agonism” of the public realm for producing what is “great 
and radiant” in human beings: “the polis is there to inspire men to dare the extraordinary” 
(1998, 206; cf. 194, 41). 
 Arendt’s critique of Christianity is particularly telling. She does not claim that 
Christianity failed to satisfy the human longing for individual immortality, but that it 
satisfied that longing in a way that no longer required—that even condemned—the desire 
to win immortality by distinguishing oneself in this world.  
 
Aspiration toward immortality could now only be equated with vainglory; such 
fame as the world could bestow upon man was an illusion, since the world was 
 	   37	  
even more perishable than man, and a striving for worldly immortality was 
meaningless, since life itself was immortal. (1998, 314) 
 
What she regrets is that Christianity prepared the way for the liberal concern with self-
preservation—and the consequent diminution of the scope of our political ambitions—by 
relaxing the “repugnance of futility” that drove human flourishing. That is, by rejecting 
the supreme importance of this life and affirming that actual immortality in another is 
available to the humble who, among other things, avoid the sin of pride, Christianity 
teaches that there is no necessity to seek distinction in this life—indeed, one is even 
encouraged to avoid distinction and pursue self-abnegation.   
 Arendt’s rejection of Christianity as a solution to the problem of the human 
condition seems to indicate that virtue or distinction is the purpose of politics, rather than 
immortality. Yet, it is still unclear whether virtue is an end in itself, or whether it is just a 
means by which to win “immortal fame.” That ambiguity, however, is a necessary 
consequence of her understanding of politics. For, as she presents it, excellence is 
fundamentally yoked to “public performance” (1998, 49). To repeat, virtue means 
distinction for Arendt: one requires the presence of peers—a public—both from which to 
distinguish oneself and for whom to distinguish oneself. The Christian virtue of 
“goodness” or “good works,” which “hide[s] from being seen or heard,” is an “essentially 
non-human, superhuman quality” (1998, 73-78). The Christian virtues are not 
excellences; they are not virtues in the ancient sense, according to Arendt. Hence, for the 
Greeks, the pursuit of immortality required the same public space and the same 
distinguishing actions as the pursuit of excellence. Proving one’s excellence and winning 
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immortal fame in this account are coextensive and indistinguishable. For what wins 
eternal remembrance are precisely those actions that strike the public memory as distinct, 
extraordinary, new. 
 But this connection between public performance and excellence has the further 
consequence of denying the relevance of any measure of excellence beyond novelty. As 
is evident in her rejection of Christian goodness as a virtue, fame requires making a 
public impression, nothing more and nothing less. Hence, “to act well” cannot mean to 
act morally or to act effectively or to do what is necessary or needful; it must mean to act 
uniquely, creatively, innovatively. In Arendt’s reading, only the amoral criterion of 
“greatness” captures the end toward which human action aims: “acting is judged by 
greatness, by its distinction from the commonplace” (1998, 205n. 33). 
  
What is outstandingly clear in Pericles’ formulations […] is that the innermost 
meaning of the acted deed and the spoken word is independent of victory and 
defeat and must remain untouched by any eventual outcome, by the consequences 
for better or worse. Unlike human behavior—which the Greeks, like all civilized 
people, judged according to ‘moral standards,’ […]—action can be judged only 
by the criterion of greatness because it is in its nature to break through the 
commonly accepted and reach into the extraordinary, where whatever is true in 
common and everyday life no longer applies because everything that exists is 
unique and sui generis. Thucydides, or Pericles, knew full well that he had broken 
with the normal standards for everyday behavior when he found the glory of 
Athens in having left behind “everywhere everlasting remembrance […] of their 
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good and evil deeds.”18 The art of politics teaches men how to bring forth what is 
great and radiant—ta megala kai lampra, in the words of Democritus; as long as 
the polis is there to inspire men to dare the extraordinary, all things are safe; if it 
perishes, everything is lost. Motives and aims, no matter how pure or how 
grandiose, are never unique […]. Greatness, therefore, or the specific meaning of 
each deed, can lie only in the performance itself and neither in its motivations nor 
its achievement. (1998, 206) 
 
                                                
 
18 One hears echoes of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Pericles’ Funeral Oration in The 
Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, Section 10: “It is the noble races that have left behind 
them the concept ‘barbarian’ wherever they have gone; even their highest culture betrays 
a consciousness of it and even a pride in it (for example, when Pericles says to his 
Athenians in his famous Funeral Oration ‘our boldness has gained access to every land 
and sea, everywhere raising imperishable monuments to its goodness and wickedness’). 
This ‘boldness’ of noble races, mad, absurd, and sudden in its expression, the 
incalculability, even incredibility of their undertakings—Pericles specially commends the 
rhathymia [ease of spirit] of the Athenians—their indifference to and contempt for 
security, body, life, comfort, their hair-raising cheerfulness and profound joy in all 
destruction, in all the voluptuousness of victory and cruelty—all this came together, in 
the minds of those who suffered from it, in the image of the ‘barbarian,’ the ‘evil enemy,’ 
perhaps as the ‘Goths,’ the ‘Vandals’” (Kaufmann 1967, 41-42). 
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In Arendt’s view, the polis both inspires and preserves “the greatest achievements of 
which human beings are capable” by eliciting and remembering public performances that 
are ends in themselves (1998, 206). And by the “greatest achievements” she means, 
specifically, the most remarkable or novel achievements.   
 In Arendt’s analysis, the public is by default the ultimate judge of what is worthy 
of remembrance, and consequently the only criterion of virtue is distinction in the city. 
Yet, in Thucydides’ account, nearly every statesman worthy of distinction found himself 
in exile either by the will of the people or voluntarily, in fear of the judgment of the 
people. Pericles and perhaps Diodotus are the obvious exceptions, but they are exceptions 
that prove the rule: they are permitted to practice their virtue in the city only under the 
cover of public lies.19 This leads us to ask whether, as Arendt insists, the public realm is 
indeed the “proper place for human excellence” (1998, 49). I will argue that Pericles’ 
standard of excellence points beyond the city, to impressive Athenians such as 
Themistocles or Demosthenes, who were as independent as possible of public opinion—
Themistocles because he thrived outside of the city, after being rejected by the people; 
Demosthenes because he is presented as an Athenian statesman who is truly worthy of 
                                                
 
19 Diodotus tells the Athenian demos that their distrust of clever speakers makes it 
necessary for those who wish to do some good for the city—like himself—to lie to them 
in order to gain their trust (III.43.2). Thucydides praises Pericles’ ability to manage the 
emotions of the demos through speech (II.65.9), which does not necessarily mean that he 
lies. However, he certainly stretches the truth in order to get the people to follow his 
advice, as I will argue below.    
 	   41	  
praise, though in fact his successes are mistaken for good fortune or overshadowed by 
Nicias’ reputation. In both cases, the reader is conscious of Thucydides’ attempt to 
distinguish what is praised from what is worthy of praise. That distinction is impossible 
in Arendt’s account.  
 Moreover, Arendt’s insistence on the centrality of public appearance and her 
consequent identification of Appearing with Being forces her to overlook what is most 
remarkable about Pericles’ vision of Athens. Unlike Arendt, Pericles has an independent 
standard of human excellence. Human excellence is the capacity to perceive what is 
needful and to act accordingly. Pericles’ vision of human excellence, at bottom, attempts 
to do full justice to the human regard for nobility, or what is truly praiseworthy. As we 
shall see, Pericles insists that truly praiseworthy actions must be noble in the traditional 
sense of being characterized by an unconcern with one’s safety or immediate self-
interest, but must also be characterized by a full consciousness of oneself and the world 
in which one acts. And this vision of excellence is not meant to be a Periclean 
fabrication: he is only clarifying what is implicit in all human praise. Only when we 
knowingly face dangers, for instance, can we be praised for the nobility of our courage, 
which means that the nobility of courage depends upon our clarity regarding that action. 
These two aspects of Pericles’ standard of excellence—courage and judgment, in short—
may be in some tension with each other, but this does not mean that he is wrong about the 
human regard for the noble. And an important consequence of Pericles’ understanding of 
virtue, contra Arendt, is that it is inseparable from the capacity to see a reality that 
transcends the “reality” of the city, and consequently the purpose and value of that 
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standard cannot be dependent on public opinion or reducible to the desire for public 
praise.  
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Chapter 2 
Calculation and Nobility 
 
 
As we have just seen, Arendt’s call for the resuscitation of the vita activa issues 
from her claim that “meaningfulness” lies beyond the human capacity to work or to 
create: it lies in the capacity to act, and in particular in the capacity to act politically 
(Arendt 1998, 176, 155). The meaningfulness of life for human beings resides in their 
specifically human power to perform and speak about rare, new, and perhaps even 
miraculous deeds (42, 178). To repeat, “[t]he task and potential greatness of mortals lie in 
their ability to produce things—works and deeds and words—which would deserve to be 
and, at least to a degree, are at home in everlastingness” (19). It is because such deeds 
require, “at least to a degree,” an everlasting home that the action in question is political 
action. For the everlasting home that she has in mind is the city, the polis. 
Hence, the possibility of meaningfulness in human life, according to Arendt, 
stands or falls with the possibility of the immortal city. And that most resplendent 
possibility is at the heart of her reading of Pericles’ Funeral Oration. “The polis—if we 
trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral Oration—gives a guaranty […] that the 
most futile of human activities […] would become imperishable” (198). Arendt reads in 
Pericles’ Funeral Oration an emphatic call for the production of meaning through grand 
political action. To participate in grand politics is to create an enduring “reality” that both 
elicits greatness and preserves the memory of otherwise ephemeral human beings. The 
city guarantees that our speeches and deeds in this life will not be mere “dreams,” which 
are “intimately and exclusively our own but without reality” (199). Our desire for 
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“meaning,” according to Arendt, finds its fullest satisfaction in participation—
“extraordinary” participation—in a common “reality” that resides beyond ourselves and 
is for that reason free from our mortal fragility; the city provides our chance to participate 
in a kind of immortality (197-199).  
But to take Pericles’ speeches only as calls to pursue immortal glory is to ignore 
Pericles’ equally remarkable calls to act with calculation or good judgment. It is to reduce 
Pericles to an uncomplicated imperialist. And even if we accept Arendt’s image of 
Pericles, it would be hard for us to walk away from reading Thucydides’ history with 
admiration for that image. As W. Robert Connor remarks, “the view that greatness is self-
justifying, not dependent upon its social or human effects or its conformity to justice or 
any other moral standard,” though perhaps “deeply rooted in Greek culture,” cannot be 
taken seriously by the reader of Thucydides (Connor, 1984, 74). For in the rest of the 
book, “the sense of loss is so vivid, the emphasis on the suffering of the war is so intense, 
and the implications of the words [of Pericles] for Athens so ironic” that we are forced to 
conclude that that view is “explored, subverted, and finally repudiated” by the larger 
work (ibid.).  
Of course, if Arendt’s view of Athenian greatness is on display in the speeches of 
Pericles only to be repudiated by the narrative of Thucydides, as Connor suggests, then 
we might conclude that Arendt’s understanding of Thucydides’ Pericles is accurate and 
that Thucydides disagreed with both Arendt and his heroic statesman. But that conclusion 
is hard to square with Thucydides’ final praise of Pericles in II.65. There, Thucydides 
presents Pericles as a model statesman. He ruled in a “measured way” (µετρίως), leading 
Athens both to greatness and to safety, and his unparalleled foresight, patriotism, and 
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esteem permitted him to defend caution and prudence even when it angered the people 
(II.65.5-8). Because this unexpected coda in defense of Pericles’ moderation concludes 
Thucydides’ depiction of the seemingly hawkish statesman, all readers of Thucydides 
struggle to pin down Pericles’ character. Is he the “adventurous imperialist” revealed by 
his speeches or the “prudent strategist” whom Thucydides praises (Gomme, 1951, 75)? Is 
he a “radical imperialist” or a “careful conservative” (Bloedow 2000, 307)? “What is 
incontrovertible,” Edmund Bloedow concludes, “is that the historian in fact presents us 
with two Pericles [sic], without resolving the contradictions between them” (308). 
Yet it is impossible to resist the urge to resolve the Periclean contradiction. Some 
reconcile the two images of Pericles by arguing that Pericles does not call, after all, for 
the kind of self-sacrificial devotion on behalf of the city that Arendt finds so attractive. 
Sara Monoson, most notably, argues that the Funeral Oration  
 
presents a view of democratic citizenship that prizes reciprocal mutual exchange 
between city and citizens and not, as an anachronistic and romantic reading of the 
[erastes] metaphor20 in translation might suggest, the selfless devotion of the 
individual citizens to the good of the city. (Monoson 1994, 254)  
 
                                                
 
20 Monoson is referring to Pericles’ exhortation that Athenians become “lovers” of their 
city at II.43.1. Her essay is an extended analysis of the metaphor of citizens as lovers and 
the city as the beloved, in which she argues that the “lover”—the citizen—is not 
selflessly devoted but one partner in a mutually beneficial “exchange” (Monoson 1994). 
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On this reading, the citizen does not overcome his narrowly self-interested desires and, 
embracing his repugnance to futility, devote himself to Athens in pursuit of eternal fame; 
rather, he “conceive[s] of his interest in a relationship with the city to be rooted in his 
own felt desires and willful actions” (265-266). The citizen’s deeds on behalf of the city 
are not noble sacrifices but “ways in which they ingratiate themselves with the city and 
which enable them legitimately to expect to receive, in return, certain favors” (267). 
Individuals accept their duties as citizens in the best case, according to Monoson’s 
Pericles, in a perfectly rational pursuit of self-interest by means of mutually beneficial 
exchange. Similarly, Ryan Balot argues that Pericles’ rhetoric is meant to instill in the 
Athenian a “correct apprehension of his own [materialistic] self-interest as a citizen.” 
(Balot 2001, 520 with 510; cf. Sharples 1983). And most recently, Rachel Templar has 
supported this reading by appealing to Pericles’ much narrower statements on the duties 
of the citizen in his third speech, at II.60.2-4 (Templar 2015, 169; cf. 160-164).  
 Other scholars are not so willing to infer from Thucydides’ praise of Pericles as 
“measured” that the statesman was “actually” concerned only with the citizens’ self-
interest or material wellbeing. They conclude, instead, that Pericles’ moderation is 
tactical, and that therefore his apparent restraint does not contradict his underlying 
ambition to make Athens great even at the expense of Athenian lives and prosperity. 
Edmund Bloedow, for example, concludes that Pericles’ caution was only strategic, even 
though he insists that there are “contradictions” in Thucydides’ presentation of the 
statesman. And Martha Taylor agrees, arguing that Thucydides’ seemingly contradictory 
presentations serve as a rhetorical device, rather than as a conclusive judgment, and that 
the contradiction is meant to lead readers to reach for themselves the very conclusion that 
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Bloedow draws (Taylor 2009, 90). W. Robert Connor also argues that Thucydides’ praise 
of Pericles should not be accepted as the author’s final judgment. Like Taylor, he argues 
that the seeming contradiction between Thucydides’ “apparent defense” of Pericles and 
his preceding presentation of Pericles serves a rhetorical purpose: it is meant to prevent 
the reader from dismissing Pericles too quickly (Connor 1984, 74). But what in his 
presentation of Pericles does Thucydides wish for us not to miss—especially if Pericles 
is, after all, just a calculative but ultimately reckless imperialist that brings Athens to 
ruin?  
We certainly should not dismiss Pericles too quickly. But I suggest that we shift 
the focus of the debate over the Periclean contradiction. When Thucydides claims that 
Pericles ruled in a “measured” or “moderate way” (µετρίως), he does not mean that 
Pericles himself was moderate as opposed to being radical; he means that Pericles was 
capable of moderating opposing forces, or of bringing disparate parts into balance or 
harmony. This is the sense of the word that is expressed in Pericles’ complaint that it is 
difficult to speak in a measured way to those who disagree with one another—it is 
difficult to “strike a balance,” as it were, that satisfies both parties (II.35.2); or when 
Thucydides or his characters describe policies as “moderate” because those policies 
recognize the claims of the weak as well as the strong (III.46.4; IV.81.2, 105.2, 108.2); or 
when Thucydides praises the “moderation” of the Rule of the 5000 in Athens because it 
was a regime based on a balance of the few and the many (VIII.97.2). This last example 
anticipates Aristotle’s endorsement of “measured” regimes, which contain a large middle 
class that helps keep in balance the extreme tendencies of the few and the many and so 
prevents the injustices of each (Politics 1295b1). This understanding of “moderation” as 
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a characteristic of the city that Pericles is responsible for, rather than a description of his 
own character, shifts the focus away from Pericles himself as a moderate ruler and 
toward the object of his moderation. We should be asking, “How did Pericles balance or 
moderate the discrete forces in the city?”  
There is no question that Pericles had to balance a variety of factions, despite his 
tendency to speak of Athenians monolithically. There were city-dwellers and country-
dwellers, the old and the young, and the oligarchs and the democrats, among others. But 
Pericles’ larger moderating purpose is more theoretical. His goal is to unify these groups 
by giving an account of the Athenian citizen that harmonizes selfless devotion with clear-
sighted calculation. He wants to balance the pursuit of nobility, or virtue more generally, 
with the pursuit of reason. And his attempt to balance these two visions of human 
flourishing is most evident in his accounts of courage. Indeed, as we will see, Pericles 
presents two conceptions of Athenian courage: one based on their trust in their own 
virtue, which goes together with the qualities that Arendt praises, such as their sense of 
nobility and longing for immortal praise; and one based on a rational calculation of their 
superior resources, which is prudent but unheroic. One kind of courage prizes boldness of 
action; the other, safety.   
 
The Nobility of Athenian Courage 
Pericles’ praise of Athenian virtue in the Funeral Oration reaches a climax in a 
striking statement on true strength of soul. “He would justly be judged strongest of soul 
who knew most clearly the terrible and the pleasant things and did not turn away from 
danger on account of these [διὰ ταῦτα]” (II.40.3). The statement contains an ambiguity 
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that captures well the two strains of Pericles’ understanding of courage. The syntax of the 
phrase marks it as an unreal and perhaps even impossible standard, but nevertheless as 
the standard in light of which Athenians ought to live their lives.21 But the precise 
meaning of the statement is not clear. How, in short, are we to understand the 
prepositional phrase “on account of these”?  
There is a long tradition of scholarship suggesting that this prepositional phrase 
ought to be interpreted causally. For example, Gomme asserts that we should understand 
Pericles to mean that the courageous face danger “‘on account of this knowledge’” (1956, 
123). He denies that such an interpretation would require the singular of the 
demonstrative pronoun—i.e. διὰ τοῦτο rather than διὰ ταῦτα. On this reading, we would 
say that the strong of soul do not “turn away from danger on account of [their clear 
knowledge of] these [terrible and pleasant things].” Their claim to be “strongest of soul,” 
in this case, becomes a claim to knowledge. It is for this reason that commentators since 
at least the late 19th century have argued for a “Platonic”—or Socratic—reading of this 
                                                
 
21 It is a “less vivid” future conditional. The judgment clause is the apodosis; the 
circumstantial participles form the protasis (Smyth 2322, 2329-32, 2344). Thus, the 
syntax implies an “if” in the protasis to complement the optative mood in the apodosis: if 
he knew the terrible and the pleasant and did not turn away from dangers, only then 
would he be justly judged strongest of soul. The “less vivid” construction is used to 
represent anything that is “supposable,” even if it is “physically impossible” or “contrary 
to fact” (Smyth 2329a).  
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passage: true courage is knowledge of what is truly terrible (Marchant 1961, 176; 
Gomme 1956, 123; Sharples 1983, 139-140; Hornblower 2003, 306-7).22  
Despite the scholarly suggestions, nearly all translators have concluded that the 
prepositional phrase should be rendered with a concessive meaning: despite knowing 
clearly what is terrible and pleasant, the strong of soul do not “turn away from danger on 
account of these [terrible and pleasant things].” Thomas Hobbes translates the phrase: 
 
And they are most rightly reputed valiant who, though they perfectly apprehend 
both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted 
from adventuring. (Grene 1989, 111, my emphasis )  
 
Richard Crawley renders it: 
 
But the prize for courage will surely be awarded most justly to those who best 
know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to 
shrink from danger. (Strassler 1996, 114, my emphasis)  
 
                                                
 
22 Hornblower describes these readings as “Platonic” and identifies the 19th century 
authors who give this interpretation (2003, 306-7). For Socrates’s definitions of political 
and individual courage, see Republic 429c-430c and 442c. See also Protagoras 360d4-5. 
Nicias makes a similar statement at Laches 194e-195a, which Socrates takes up in that 
text (cp. 199a10-b1).      
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And, most recently, Jeremy Mynott writes: 
 
The bravest spirits are rightly judged to be those who see clearly just what perils 
and pleasures await them but do not on that account flinch from the danger. 
(Thucydides 2013, 113, my emphasis)23 
 
If the causal reading of the phrase is “Platonic,” the concessive reading, too, is not absent 
from the pages of Plato. For it hinges on a commonsense objection to the “Platonic” 
position that also features in the dialogues, namely, that courage must be distinct from 
knowledge, because he who enters battle only when he foresees certain victory cannot be 
considered courageous (cf. Laches 193a.). He faces an apparently dangerous task only 
because he knows that it is not actually dangerous. Insofar as knowledge diminishes 
danger, to that extent it obviates the need for courage to face that danger. Knowledge 
seems to make “courage” unheroic. To take it one step further, the courageous also 
cannot be without knowledge simply, since ignorance, too, diminishes danger (at least 
one’s awareness of danger) and therefore ignorance also obviates the need for courage. 
The truly courageous person must therefore be one who faces great dangers while 
knowing that he is indeed facing them—one whose courage is diminished neither by 
knowledge that he faces no real danger nor by ignorance of the risks that he runs. The 
                                                
 
23 See also Smith 1991, 329. I have found no translation that fully embraces the causal 
interpretation of this phrase. Susan Collins and Devin Stauffer (1999, 27) and Benjamin 
Jowett (Thucydides 1998, 130) at least preserve the ambiguity.   
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underlying thought is that courage is something noble, meaning that it has the character 
of self-conscious risk or self-sacrifice.24 This is the idea captured by the concessive 
reading of the phrase.  
 Translators perhaps prefer this rendering because of the context. Pericles has just 
asserted that, unlike “others,” the Athenian is able to unite within himself both daring and 
calculation in whatever task he undertakes. “For others,” Pericles goes on, “it is 
ignorance [ἀµαθία] that brings over-boldness while calculation brings hesitation” 
(II.40.3). What is new or remarkable is that Athenians remain firm in danger despite their 
clarity of thought, despite their full awareness of the dangers they face. Moreover, 
Pericles will state in the immediate sequel that Athenians benefit others “fearlessly,” 
which he specifies means not from a calculation of the advantages to be gained from 
beneficence but from their “trust in liberality” (II.40.5). Their fearlessness comes from an 
abiding trust in their own virtue—a trust that may lead them to confer benefits, it is 
implied, even in spite of what a rational assessment of their interest might recommend. 
Similarly, Pericles states that Athens opens her city to citizens and strangers alike, even 
                                                
 
24 In Arendt’s terms, courage is “the political virtue par excellence” because devotion to 
the affairs of the city means living beyond the household where “one is primarily 
concerned with one’s own life and survival” (Arendt 1998, 36). Hence, to enter the 
political realm, the potential citizen must be “ready to risk his life” (ibid.). This courage, 
according to Arendt, constitutes the freedom of the Athenian citizen, for true freedom is 
inherently risky; “too great a love for life obstruct[s] freedom” (ibid.). The noble freedom 
of the citizen consists in his capacity to act even against his own private interest or desire.   
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though her enemies benefit from the city’s lack of concealment (II.39.1). Again, Pericles 
explains that Athenians place their “trust” in their own “goodness of soul in action” rather 
than in the anticipatory “preparations” and “deceptions” that any calculation from 
security would surely recommend (II.39.1). In each of these cases, Pericles presents the 
Athenians as confident in their virtues despite knowing that their actions very well might 
cause them harm. Indeed, their knowledge of the risk enhances the nobility of their trust 
in virtue even as it exposes them to accusations of imprudence or recklessness.  
 Recently a third interpretation of this passage has been suggested, meant to 
reconcile the causal (rational) interpretation and the concessive (noble) interpretation of 
Pericles’ praise. This new reading argues that the knowledge in question is “knowledge 
of values,” which may require courage to pursue only because they are distant goals, 
which, as such, are not always clear or compelling in the moment to the common citizen 
(Sharples 1983, 140). As Ryan Balot has put it, “Pericles holds a composite view of 
courage that requires both the knowledge of value and a daring character that has been 
properly trained to act in accordance with one’s judgments” (2001, 509). This argument 
offers an “Aristotelian” reading, which rests on the claim that Athenian courage is 
composed of a habituated character in addition to the intellectual capacity to grasp both 
“ultimate values” and prudential calculations. Through shame, the argument goes, 
Pericles has habituated Athenians to act on their “long-term values” from character rather 
than from intellect, and through deliberation they do this prudently (513). “[C]ourage is 
in Pericles’ view the virtue that permits courageous people to put into practice their 
underlying values in the appropriate way” (518).  
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 Yet, though the strongest proponent of this view, Ryan Balot, acknowledges that 
Aristotelian courage is practiced for the sake of τὸ κᾶλον—the noble, beautiful, or fine 
(cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1115b12-14)—his thesis depends on reducing the true end of 
courage first to the vague idea of “values,” and then to “individual flourishing” 
understood as the “rational and prudent” devotion to Athens for the sake of one’s own 
gain (Balot 2001, 510-512). The preservation of Athens “in turn preserves the long-term 
materialistic, and even hedonistic, values of the mass audience [that Pericles] is 
addressing—in particular, continued enjoyment of the fruits of empire” (510). Hence, 
though the argument seems to preserve something of the sacrificial element of courage by 
its appeal to ultimate ends that require perseverance and stability of character to attain, 
the interpretation is ultimately in agreement with the causal reading of Pericles’ 
statement. For in this interpretation “the knowledge of the fearful and pleasant” is 
synonymous with knowledge of the city’s individualistic “core values” (515-516, 521; cf. 
Sharples 1983, 140; Monoson 1994, 254). The implication is that avoiding what is truly 
fearful and attaining what is truly pleasant is the highest goal of the Athenian citizen. 
Shame, accordingly, is only a means by which Pericles encourages the citizens to pursue 
their individual good (Balot 2001, 513). What is noble, it follows, is only the reflection of 
future prosperity that the citizen can rationally expect to enjoy: it is the “correct 
apprehension of his own self-interest as a citizen,” i.e., his “long-term materialistic, and 
even hedonistic, values” (520, 510).25  
                                                
 
25 It is important to keep in mind that the relevant question here is not whether Pericles 
himself affirms a view of self-interest rightly understood but whether the Athenian 
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 But the equation of what is pleasant—even what is truly pleasant—with what is 
noble is, as the Athenians themselves assert, not the Athenian view but the Spartan view. 
Even the most thoroughgoing Athenian “realists” ridicule this conflation, stating that the 
Spartans, “most conspicuously of those whom we know, believe the pleasant things to be 
noble” (V.105.4). The Athenian speakers seem to accept, instead, what they suggest is the 
more common view, namely, that “the noble is accomplished with danger” (V.107.1; cf. 
II.42.4). Athenians, in short, balk at reducing a daring pursuit of the noble to a prudential 
pursuit of one’s own interest or pleasure. And this Athenian refusal to reduce the noble to 
what is advantageous or pleasant needs to be taken seriously.  
 The simplest solution to interpreting Pericles’ statement, then, is to maintain—as 
the Athenians do—the distinction between what is good or pleasant and what is noble 
(which is not to deny that the noble person can take pleasure in being noble). Knowledge 
of what is terrible and pleasant is not inconsistent with a noble understanding of courage 
for the Athenians because, at least in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, what is good for oneself 
is not the only measure of what is choiceworthy. Courage is choiceworthy because it is 
noble, and it is the courageous man’s knowledge of what is terrible and pleasant that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
citizens would accept that what is noble is equivalent to their long-term interest. For we 
are attempting to understand how the Funeral Oration was meant to be understood by the 
citizens. If Pericles appeals to nobility in order to make long-term self-interest more 
attractive to the citizenry, the thing that we want to understand is not his sobriety so much 
as the revelation inherent in this rhetorical necessity that prudential calculations from 
self-interest must not be sufficiently compelling on their own. 
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brings both the noble and its priority for him into relief. For doing what is noble or 
beautiful is most conspicuous when it requires one to endure harm or pain. Consider 
Aristotle’s gloss on the noble in the Rhetoric: 
 
… And all those things for which the prize is honor are noble; and all those for 
which it is honor rather than money. And all those things someone accomplishes 
by choice but not for his own sake; and the things that are good simply, both all 
the things someone does on behalf of the fatherland while overlooking himself 
and the things that are good by nature; and the good things that are not for him 
himself—since such things are for the sake of himself. And all those things more 
capable of existing after one has died than while one is living—for the things one 
has in life are more for the sake of oneself. And all deeds done for the sake of 
others—for these are less for oneself. And all good deeds done for others but not 
for oneself, and [good deeds] done for those who have acted well—for that is just. 
And things done out of kindness—for these are not for oneself. (1366b35-
1367a8)   
 
We should not assume that Thucydides’ account of the noble is identical to Aristotle’s. 
But Aristotle’s intention in this passage is not to give a precise definition of the noble. 
Rather, his intention is to state the endoxa about it in order to identify its power in 
speech, the effect an appeal to nobility would have had on an audience of more or less 
Thucydides’ time (Art of Rhetoric 1369b31-33). The frequent refrain of “not for one’s 
own sake” in Aristotle’s statement makes clear that noble deeds are most resplendent 
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when they appear most selfless. Indeed, our own experience of admiration for such deeds 
makes this immediately intelligible to us today. Hence, the noble is most evident when it 
is set off against those human goods that we would otherwise pursue because they are 
obviously good for us: beneficial things rather than terrible ones and pleasant things 
rather than painful ones. Sacrifice and risk reveal or bestow nobility. For Arendt, it is 
these self-transcendent deeds that are at home in the “reality” beyond the individual—and 
hence beyond individual mortality—that can be and deserve to be “imperishable” through 
“everlasting remembrance” (Arendt 1998, 197-198).  
 Thucydides’ remarks confirm that the human concern for the noble entails a 
willingness to risk or sacrifice oneself for something greater than oneself.26 It is tied to 
both piety and lawfulness as well as to great deeds that benefit or impress others, and 
which entail risk—sometimes simply because they are beyond what human beings have 
yet accomplished. Moreover, the concern for the noble as Thucydides presents it seems to 
be natural and ineradicable. For instance, during the extreme suffering of the plague, 
concern for the noble seems to disappear, only to return in another form. During that 
episode, “no one had the heart to persevere in what was held to be noble, considering it 
unclear whether they would be destroyed before attaining it,” with the result that “no one 
was restrained by fear of the gods or by the laws of men” (II.53.3). The self-restraint 
necessary to forego one’s immediate desires in the name of justice or piety appears to rest 
                                                
 
26 For a useful, brief discussion of the noble in Thucydides see Bartlett 2001, 95-96. I 
follow his lead in taking my bearings from Thucydides’ remarks on the noble in the 
contexts of the plague in Athens and Syracuse’s victory over Athens.  
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on one’s opinion that that noble sacrifice of self-interest will be rewarded (or will permit 
one to escape punishment). Witnessing the plague destroyed that hope, since both noble 
and ignoble people perished alike. The result, however, was that “whatever was 
immediately pleasurable or beneficial to that end, this came to be both noble and useful” 
(II.53.3). In their most extreme despair, the Athenians did not just pursue pleasure instead 
of the noble; they allowed themselves to pursue their pleasure by calling it noble. Not 
even in the most trying times do human beings fully abandon their concern for nobility. 
 Thucydides gives an equally revealing example of the persistence of the noble in 
his remarks on Syracuse’s victory over Athens in Sicily. The Syracusans, inhabitants of 
the largest city in Sicily, originally mustered their forces to repel the Athenians in 
desperation and fear for their very survival (VI.69.3). Nevertheless, with their decisive 
and somewhat unexpected triumph over the Athenians—at sea, no less—the Syracusans 
experience significant mission creep. 
 
They no longer took care only over their own salvation, but also over how to 
prevent the others [from escaping], [… for] if they were able to conquer the 
Athenians and their allies both by land and by sea, their achievement would come 
to light in the eyes of the Greeks as noble: for the rest of the Greeks would 
immediately be freed or released from fear […] and they themselves, being held 
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to be the cause of these things, would be admired both by the rest of mankind and 
still more by those yet to come. (VII.56.2; cf. VII.59.2)27  
 
The Syracusans, it seems, cannot help but turn immediately from considerations of self-
preservation to those of nobility. Having been compelled to fight out of fear for their 
preservation, they conclude their fight by desiring praise for their stunning service to 
mankind. And they believe themselves worthy of admiration not least because they 
volunteered their own city to “brave the first dangers” (προκινδυνεῦσαί: VII.56.3) in the 
common fight against the Athenians. 
But, as this last remark implies, the noble is not only accomplished with danger: it 
also requires choice. As Aristotle draws to our attention, we praise people for the choices 
they make and therefore “one must attempt” in a speech of praise, such as a funeral 
oration, “to show that one was acting by choice” (Art of Rhetoric 1367b23-24). That is, 
only actions that are done deliberately are truly noble and hence worthy of praise. It is for 
this reason that Pericles is especially concerned with establishing the self-awareness of 
the noble Athenians. And it is for this reason that the roots of Athenian rationalism can be 
traced to their seriousness about nobility. If they are “realists,” it is not because they are 
                                                
 
27 The repetition of the phrase καλὸν ἀγώνισµα σφίσιν is the other half of an embedded 
ring composition framed around the catalogue of allies that have come to participate in 
the war in Sicily on either side (Connor 1984, Appendix 9). Marchant suggests, “the 
Greeks are here spectators of the contest” and that it is meant to evoke an Olympic 
competition (cf. VII.66.1, 68.3, 70.7; Marchant 1893, 175; Hornblower 2010, 652).  
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dismissive of justice or piety or nobility, but precisely because they take these seriously. 
Pericles insists that the praiseworthiness of what is noble both requires the cultivation of 
judgment, or “calculation,” while at the same time refusing to reduce what is noble to 
mere calculations from self-interest. This is the tension at the heart of Pericles’ standard 
for true excellence.     
From all this I conclude that the heroic (concessive) reading of Pericles’ statement 
is apt: this captures Pericles’ intention of praising those who self-consciously distinguish 
between what is good for themselves and what is noble—i.e., what is good simply, or 
good for others, or, in this case, what is needful (τὰ δέοντα)28 for Athens—and who 
deliberately choose the latter “even when” it exposes them to harm or pain. The rational 
(causal) reading collapses what is noble into what is pleasant and fails to distinguish 
between things that are choiceworthy because they are good simply and things that are 
choiceworthy because they are good for us. Proponents of the causal reading therefore 
fail to do justice to the fact that some things appear most choiceworthy especially when 
they appear bad for us in certain respects. Indeed, some noble things—perhaps even the 
most dazzling noble things—come to sight as choiceworthy and hence good especially 
insofar as they come to sight as bad for us, like a noble death. Courage would cease to be 
attractive if it ceased being risky. Only by keeping the distinction between the noble and 
the good in mind can we appreciate the particular power of speech to “balance one thing 
against another,” as we do, for instance, in saying, “if it was harmful at least it was 
noble” (Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric 1416a13-14). 
                                                
 
28 See the appendix for a discussion of Thucydides’ use of this important term.  
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It is because we seem to have forgotten this distinction between what is noble and 
what is good (that is, good for the preservation or material wellbeing of the individual) 
that Arendt insists on our modern blindness to the “gulf between the sheltered life in the 
household and the merciless exposure of the polis” (1998, 35). In the eyes of the 
Athenians, Arendt claims, the division between the common world of noble deeds and 
the private world of self-interest was “self-evident and axiomatic” (28).  
 
The Courage of the Fallen 
The brief statement in the Funeral Oration in which Pericles praises the fallen—
those for whom the funeral is being held—illustrates the noble character of Athenian 
courage articulated above. Pericles takes every opportunity in that short passage to 
emphasize the deliberate and sacrificial nature of those soldiers’ deeds. By repeatedly 
emphasizing their deliberations as they first grasped the need for action and then chose to 
heed that call rather than pursue their own good, Pericles heightens the grandeur of their 
sacrifice. Moreover, the abundance of terms connoting their thoughtfulness (italicized in 
the passage below) reveals the role that self-conscious choice plays in the virtue of these 
men, at least in Pericles’ telling. Pericles shows us that they were deeds freely chosen in 
full awareness of the risks involved and hence worthy of praise. And while knowledge of 
what was needful for Athens was necessary for these soldiers in order to act on her 
behalf, that knowledge is not reducible to a calculation of the soldiers’ long-term self-
interests. Knowledge of what is needful only provides the occasion for noble action. 
 
 	   62	  
Of these [men] here, none were softened through preferring the continued 
enjoyment of wealth, nor, with the hopes of the impoverished, did any put off the 
danger, on the grounds that he could yet become rich by fleeing it. But holding 
revenge on our opponents to be more desirable than these [considerations of 
prosperity], and at the same time considering this the noblest risk, they wished 
with this [risk] to be avenged on these [opponents] and to long for those [riches], 
leaving to hope the uncertainty of future prosperity [or success: κατορθώσειν], but 
thinking it worthy for them to trust29 in themselves with action concerning what 
was already being perceived by them.30 Deeming it fit31 to defend and suffer 
rather than to be saved through giving in, they fled the shame of speech, and 
                                                
 
29 Intransitive active forms of πείθω have a passive sense (LSJ, s.v. πείθω). See Homer, 
Iliad 4.325 for a close parallel, where Nestor regrets that he is no longer among the young 
and brave who “trust in bodily strength.” Because of his age, he says, he must resign 
himself to the task of guiding the young with counsel and speeches.    
30 In the Greek, the parallel emphasizes acting on that which is visible (the present) and 
merely hoping for that which is invisible (the future). While the passage as a whole 
emphasizes the deliberateness of the action, there are indications that the choice was in 
the heat of the moment and therefore not only free of desperate hopes but perhaps also 
lacking in foresight.    
31 LSJ cites this passage as the example of a use of ἡγέοµαι that has the sense of “ἡγοῦµαι 
δεῖν” without the δεῖν: “think fit, deem necessary” to do something (LSJ, s.v. ἡγέοµαι 
III.4). 
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submitted to the deed with their bodies, and through the smallest moment of 
chance and at the same time in the acme of renown rather than fear, they were 
delivered. (II.42.4, emphasis mine)  
 
As knowers of what is pleasant and what is terrible for them as well as of what is needful 
for Athens, these soldiers chose to do the latter, and simply “to long for” their own future 
prosperity.32  
 
Pride and Disdain 
To claim that Pericles’ statement on strength of soul is meant to depict the 
Athenians as more noble than calculative is appropriate to the nature of the speech. After 
all, the Funeral Oration is an epideictic speech (a speech of praise or blame), and the 
purpose of epideictic rhetoric is to put on display “what is noble or shameful” (Aristotle, 
Art of Rhetoric 1358b29; cf. II.34.6). So far, Hannah Arendt’s reading of Pericles is 
faultless. The deeper problem comes when we note that this turns the Funeral Oration 
into a speech that seems to stand in insoluble tension with the mundane, prudential 
concerns of Pericles’ other speeches, and even with the role of calculation and self-
awareness emphasized in the Funeral Oration itself.  
How do we reconcile, for instance, Pericles’ disparate statements on citizenship? 
In the Funeral Oration, Pericles encourages the citizen to think of himself as an erastes, a 
                                                
 
32 For more on the conscious choice emphasized in Pericles’ praise here, see Lowell 
Edmunds (1975, 60; also 44-46, 66-67) and Jeffrey Rusten (1986, 66, passim). 
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lover of the city, who is explicitly urged to reject “considering the benefit [of defending 
the city] by reason alone,” presumably because this would only reveal those more 
mundane, tangible goods that come from the city which are obvious to any sensible 
person, such as security and prosperity (II.43.1). To become a lover of the city means to 
transcend the concern with these basic goods. As Gregory Crane notes, Thucydides has 
Pericles exhort his fellow citizens in this passage to “gaze upon” (θεάοµαι) the city and 
fall in love with it. It is one of only three passages in which Thucydides uses the word 
θεάοµαι to speak about vision. Elsewhere Thucydides prefers words for vision with 
rationalistic connotations, like “examine” or “investigate.” Θεάοµαι, by contrast, captures 
“the fascinated gaze” that, to Greek ears, evokes “self-deluding foolishness”: “Its effect is 
emotional, and thus subverts rational analysis” (Crane, 245). Yet, despite this vision of 
the Athenian citizen presented in the Funeral Oration, in Pericles’ third speech the citizen 
becomes precisely that mundanely sensible individual with a clear understanding of the 
dependence of his own interest on the preservation of the common good. The defense of 
the city is in everyone’s interest, Pericles argues there, because, should the city be 
destroyed, even the prosperous individual will suffer, and, should it be preserved, even 
the one suffering may yet fare well (II.60.2-4).33 
                                                
 
33 As noted above, Sara Monoson tries to reconcile these statements by arguing that the 
erastes metaphor evokes an idea of citizenship that holds the citizen and city to be in a 
reciprocal relationship based on mutual advantage rather than the romantic idea that 
citizens ought to be selflessly devoted to the city (1994, 254, passim). Rachel Templar, 
following Monoson, appeals to Pericles’ third speech to support that view (2015, 169; cf. 
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We will best appreciate this tension among Pericles’ statements by considering 
more fully his insistence in the Funeral Oration that Athenians place their trust in virtue 
rather than calculation, for this is the opposite of his express position elsewhere. In his 
first speech, Pericles encourages the Athenians to embrace the impending war by 
reckoning up for them their vast superiority in resources—their preparedness, which he 
so disdains in the Funeral Oration (II.39.1; I.141.2-6, 142.1; see also II.13.2-9). As he 
argues in his first speech, wars—especially wars of attrition—are won with money, not 
men, and he ridicules the Spartans for their naiveté (I.141.5).34 They are farmers who 
know nothing of the accumulation of capital, since they live off the land, and who 
consequently are “more willing to make war with their bodies than with money, since 
                                                                                                                                            
 
160-164). Ryan Balot also attempts to reconcile the striking rhetoric of the Funeral 
Oration with the mundane remarks in Pericles’ third speech (2001, 512). None of these 
arguments stand up to Gregory Crane’s incisive textual analysis of the statement in the 
Funeral Oration. The “romantic” reading that Monoson and others reject is, in fact, the 
correct one.  
34 Archidamus, in a characteristic Thucydidean reversal, sounds more like an Athenian 
than a Spartan in his first speech, which is in many ways complementary to Pericles’ first 
speech. After making nearly the same calculation of resources as Pericles and coming to 
the same conclusion—namely, that Athens has vastly superior resources—he asks the 
rather un-Spartan question: “and trusting in what do we rush to embrace war thus 
unprepared?” (I.80.3).  
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they trust that these [bodies] might yet survive the dangers, while they are not certain that 
they will not use up [their money]” (I.141.5).  
In his final speech, Pericles returns to this assertion and develops more fully why 
trust in money is more stable than trust in “bodies.” He again instills confidence in the 
citizenry by stressing—even exaggerating—Athens’ superior resources: her material 
losses are negligible when one considers that the Athenians are the unrivalled masters of 
the sea (II.62.2-3). This consideration, he asserts, should urge them to confront their 
enemies not with “pride alone” but with “disdain” (II.62.3). Pride, he contends, is 
perfectly consistent with ignorance (ἀµαθία), since one can boast of superiority even 
when success comes through mere chance. The distinguishing feature of “disdain” is that 
it belongs to one who “trusts his judgment” that he is superior to his opponent (II.62.4). 
“Intelligence,” Pericles explains, “produces boldness with a strength augmented by its 
sense of superiority, since it trusts less in hope, the strength from which resides in want 
[or perplexity: ἀπόρῳ], than in a judgment based on existing resources, the foresight from 
which is steadier” (II.62.5; cf. II.22.1). Pericles seems here fully to embrace the 
“unheroic” view of courage identified above—confidence based on the knowledge of 
one’s nearly certain success, i.e., knowledge that the seemingly terrible things are not 
truly terrible. It is simply naïve, Pericles here insists, to face dangers trusting only in 
one’s “body,” with no resources to speak of and hence with no reliable expectation of 
success. This is only the empty hopefulness of the desperate or confused, or of the 
ignorant buoyed by fortune. 
To bring the example full circle and confirm Pericles’ willingness to alter his 
speech radically depending on the occasion, we can return to the Funeral Oration and 
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observe there the man of pride cast in the opposite light. For the pride, hopefulness, and 
trust in bodily action rather than rational preparation that came together in the deficient 
form of boldness scorned in Pericles’ first and third speeches are precisely the qualities 
that Pericles exhorts the citizens to emulate in the Funeral Oration. 
 
Judging happiness to rest in freedom and freedom to rest in goodness of soul,35 do 
not consider anxiously the risk of war. […] For the evil in being made soft is 
more painful for the man having pride than the coming, with strength and shared 
hope at the same time, of unperceived death. (II.43.6)  
    
Here, hopefulness and pride in the exercise of strength—even or especially when death 
results, i.e., when success is far from certain—come to sight as the characteristics of 
those who are truly happy and truly free. The distant and uncertain hope of success 
through action far outweighs the immediate fear of loss that might otherwise recommend 
hesitation before the risks of war. Just before this passage, Pericles praised these same 
men for embracing the “noblest of risks”: “turning over to hope the uncertainty of future 
success,” these men decided to “trust in themselves with action … and submitted to the 
deed with their bodies” (II.42.4). This, Pericles asserts, is the virtue that was revealed in 
these men by their deaths (II.42.2). They did not reckon up their superior resources in 
order to render their future success certain before confronting the enemy with contempt, 
                                                
 
35 Cf. II.39.1: Pericles asserts that Athenians choose to eschew defensive preparations and 
deceptions, trusting instead in their own “goodness of soul” in action, as noted above.  
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safe in the knowledge that they were not really facing anything terrible. Rather, these 
were men of pride, who, precisely because the future for them was uncertain, hoped for 
future goods but placed their trust in noble deeds.    
If we embrace the heroic reading of Pericles’ statement on strength of soul, as I 
am arguing we should, and face up to the seemingly insoluble contradictions between the 
claims in the Funeral Oration and those in Pericles’ other speeches, then we are left with 
a puzzle. Why does Pericles—the man who boasts of an unmatched stability and 
consistency of judgment (I.140.1; II.13.2; II.61.2)—alter his speech so radically 
depending on the situation? While I have argued that the Funeral Oration is meant to 
appeal to the listener’s sense of nobility, which accords with Hannah Arendt’s attraction 
to the passage, the fact that his appeal there is in tension with his other speeches—and 
even with other statements within that speech—makes it far from clear whether we can 
“trust” his “famous words” (Arendt 1998, 198). 
 
Periclean Rhetoric 
Of course, it is not difficult to see at least one reason why Pericles is so willing to 
alter his speech. Pericles’ modulations in speech need not reflect any confusion or 
variability on his part; rather, they result from the changing circumstances in which his 
speeches take place. Not least, they reflect the variability of the Athenian people, to 
whom his speeches are addressed. This is Pericles’ own explicit judgment of the situation 
(I.140), and Thucydides confirms that judgment by praising Pericles both for the 
accuracy of his foresight and for his ability to tailor his speeches to the mood of his 
audience. “For whenever he perceived them being made confident by hubris in some 
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inopportune way, by speaking he would strike them back into a state of fear; and again, 
[whenever he perceived them] being irrationally fearful, [by speaking] he would return 
them once again to confidence” (II.65.9; cf. II.59.3, II.65.1). This facility at speaking 
allowed Pericles “to control [or hold back: κατεῖχε] the multitude freely, and he was not 
led by them but rather he led them” (II.65.8; also I.139.4). He could afford to eschew 
flattery and even to court the anger of the people by contradicting them because of his 
peculiar ability to regulate, with speech, the passions that animated them (II.65.8). 
Specifically, Pericles was able to balance the Athenian regard for the noble against their 
good judgment; that is, he moderated them by balancing their trust in virtue against their 
trust in calculation (II.40.3). This is the balance Pericles captures when he says that 
Athenians philosophize without softness and love the noble with frugality (II.40.1).    
This seemingly simple suggestion—that Pericles’ modulations in speech are 
meant to regulate Athenian passions—has the virtue of taking Thucydides’ praise 
seriously. But it is complicated by the fact that it forces us to question the prudence of 
Pericles’ rhetoric in the Funeral Oration. For is it not clearly imprudent to glorify the 
sacrifices of those who died nobly fighting the Spartans while, at the same time, holding 
fast to a policy of non-confrontation with that same enemy? It is tempting to conclude, 
with Gomme, that Pericles was “playing with fire,” for “it was taxing the people’s 
patience to the utmost to tell them of their power and daring and at the same time warn 
them not to use these assets to the utmost in war” (1951, 77).  
Let us, then, turn to Pericles’ speeches with this question in mind: how are we to 
understand Pericles’ exhortation in the Funeral Oration in light of his more prudential 
remarks elsewhere? For we want to know, above all, whether Thucydides means for us to 
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take seriously the suggestion that noble action on behalf of, and immortalized by, the city 
will alone satisfy our deepest longings. It is entirely possible that, despite his praise of 
Pericles, Thucydides would not agree with Arendt that human fulfillment is to be found 
through grand politics. For it is not clear “which Perikles” Thucydides admires: “the 
prudent strategist,” who details Athens’ advantages in war in his first speech, “or the 
adventurous imperialist,” who exhorts his citizens to pursue immortal glory in the 
Funeral Oration (Gomme 1951, 75).  
My suggestion is that the beautiful rhetoric in the Funeral Oration has the same 
practical political purpose that all his other speeches have, namely, to shore up the 
flagging resolve of the citizenry in carrying out Pericles’ cautious war strategy. But, as 
the foregoing has shown, Pericles employs two methods to instill confidence: he appeals 
to the Athenians’ noble trust in virtue, and he engages in “unheroic” calculations of their 
superior resources. We see this same rhetorical strategy effectively deployed later by the 
Athenian Demosthenes. In Demosthenes’ speech at Pylos, the general begins by 
exhorting his troops not to engage in “calculating” or “reckoning up” (µηδεὶς . . . 
ἐκλογιζόµενος) the urgent threat they are facing, but instead to embrace the danger with 
“good hope” (εὔελπις: IV.10.1). And yet, after this opening exhortation, Demosthenes 
immediately turns to a careful calculation of those Athenian resources that will 
compensate for their deficiency in numbers, a calculation that constitutes the bulk of the 
speech (IV.10.2-5). In C.W. Macleod’s words,  
 
The orator [Demosthenes] exploits the urgency of the situation to exclude 
consideration of its difficulties and to awaken an unthinking courage in his 
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audience; at the same time those factors which favour the Athenians allow him to 
create a rational confidence. The speech is effective because it appeals both to 
instinct and reflection. (Macleod 1983, 61) 
 
In the same way, the singularity of Pericles’ purpose unifies his separate appeals to both 
“unthinking courage” and “rational confidence.” What is remarkable, however, and what 
Arendt overlooks, is the extent to which Pericles attempts to teach or instill “rational 
confidence,” even though he simultaneously depends on awakening an “instinct[ual]” or 
“unthinking courage” in the citizenry. No account of Pericles is complete that does not 
account for both his rationalism and his regard for the noble, as well as the connection 
between these.  
In the next chapter, I will show how Pericles’ first speech, defending his war 
strategy, broadly follows the same format as Demosthenes’ speech: it combines prudent 
arguments to instill “rational confidence” with appeals to the Athenian regard for the 
noble to instill “unthinking courage.” I will then take up the Funeral Oration, which 
celebrates the Athenian capacity simultaneously to hold or balance these two 
contradictory understandings of courage. Throughout, my intention will be to show that 
Pericles’ war strategy is prudent and therefore provides a solid ground for “rational 
confidence.” Yet, each of his speeches betrays Pericles’ perceived need to encourage the 
adoption of his practical plan by extraordinary rhetoric. There are three related reasons in 
particular why “rational confidence” alone is not sufficient: the instability of human 
judgment in the face of strong passions; the difficulty of enduring private pain on behalf 
of the common good; and the problem of chance. Each of these hurdles encourages 
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Pericles to engage in ennobling rhetoric that inspires an “unthinking courage” in support 
of Athens’ wavering confidence. What each of these cases reveals more generally is the 
enduring tension between rational foresight and love of the noble. Arendt’s emphasis on 
the love of the noble ignores this tension insofar as it ignores Pericles’ concern with 
prudent or rational action.    
The purpose of this analysis is not, however, to undermine Pericles’ appeals to the 
noble as “mere” rhetoric. Pericles consciously and effectively permitted the growth of an 
Athenian self-understanding that combined these two conceptions of courage, a self-
understanding we see play out in the remainder of the narration. That self-understanding 
is, I will argue, fundamentally incoherent as Thucydides’ presents it. But it is not for that 
reason a Periclean fabrication or an anomalous imposition on the Athenian people. 
Indeed, as Thucydides will remark in a later episode, “it is the habit of human beings to 
give over to uncritical hope whatever they long for, and to reject with autocratic reason 
whatever they do not accept” (IV.108.4). Part of the purpose of the subsequent analysis 
will be to show how Pericles’ self-contradictory rhetorical strategy does not produce so 
much as reflect the inconsistent “habit” of human beings as such. Pericles is attempting to 
appeal to the aspiring Athenian “realist” who, despite his realism, always harbors a deep 
regard for the noble, however confused that might be.  
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Chapter 3 
Pericles’ War Strategy 
 
 
Pericles’ first recorded speech begins with the claim that he is repeating himself 
(I.140.1; cf. I.127.3), which draws attention not only to Pericles’ consistency but also to 
Thucydides’ selectivity. It was apparently unnecessary to report Pericles’ earlier speeches 
on the subject. Moreover, Thucydides summarizes the strategy detailed in this speech 
twice, once explicitly declining to report Pericles’ actual words (II.13.1-9; II.65.7). 
Because the same strategic advice is reproduced elsewhere, shorn of the rhetorical 
trappings present in this iteration, it is likely that this account of Pericles’ strategy offers 
something more robust than those summaries. On this occasion, Pericles’ oratory is as 
important as the substance of his recommendations. 
Pericles’ strategy for the war, in brief, is to gather all of the residents of Attica 
behind the walls of Athens every spring in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the 
Spartans in the field. The Athenians will rely on their superabundance of wealth, their 
access to the sea, and their empire abroad to satisfy their daily needs, while hunkering 
down in the city and waiting for the Spartans to realize that their invasions by land cannot 
harm Athenian power in any substantial way. To the extent that Pericles is recommending 
this plan, the speech is a clear and sensible example of Pericles’ calculating approach to 
war. He provides an impartial and comprehensive account of the strengths and 
weaknesses of Sparta and Athens, and advises war only on the reasonable foundation that 
Athens’ strategic resources outweigh Sparta’s.  
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But the peculiarity of the speech is that the recommended war strategy is clearly 
in tension with the rhetorical accoutrements that Pericles deploys in his speech, a 
peculiarity that has not been lost on commentators. As Simon Hornblower points out, 
Pericles begins and ends his oration by encouraging the Athenians to exhibit resolution 
and boldness even beyond what their power (i.e., their resources) warrants (Hornblower 
1987, 54). In Pericles’ words, “our fathers stood up to the Medes even when they had 
abandoned their possessions, though they began without so much [as we have now]; and, 
by resolution [γνώµῃ] rather than by fortune, and more by boldness than by power, they 
beat back the barbarian” (I.144.4). Yet, Hornblower notes, “the argument of the central 
part of the speech”—the specific strategic recommendations—rests on the “prudent 
calculation of, precisely, material resources” (1987, 54). The disparity in tone if not 
outright contradiction between these parts of the speech has led some to claim that the 
central part is a late “Thucydidean” insertion, while the exhortations that frame it are 
most likely remnants of an early, faithfully reported “Periclean” speech (ibid.).  
Recourse to speculation about the composition of the work, however, is 
unnecessary. The speech itself and the surrounding context explain the apparent 
contradiction. The speech is a response to the present disposition of the Athenians as 
much as it is a repetition of Pericles’ strategic recommendations. Remember, as we know 
from the very first line of the speech, Pericles is giving the same advice that he gave 
earlier (I.140.1)—advice that was at one time persuasive and adopted as the common 
policy. That advice is now being questioned by the demos. If Pericles intends to retain his 
leadership and see his policy enacted, his only option is to “repackage” that advice. The 
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recommendations remain the same; Pericles alters only the means by which he 
encourages their adoption. 
But this alteration points to the fundamental problem that Pericles faces as a 
democratic leader: being intelligent and being persuasive are distinct capacities.36 The 
intelligent statesman can be rendered impotent by the inability to speak well, and the 
persuasive speaker can galvanize support even for unintelligent or unjust policies. 
Pericles himself stresses the importance of this fact. As he claims in a striking moment of 
self-praise in his third speech, “I suppose myself no less suitable than another to know 
what is needful and to explain these things,” which sets him apart because “knowing but 
not teaching clearly is the same as if [the knowledge] had not even been conceived” 
(II.60.5-6).37 Communicating persuasively is as crucial in democratic politics as knowing 
what is needful. That Pericles happens to have both of these capacities is one reason why 
                                                
 
36 Clifford Orwin’s useful discussion of this theme in the Mytilenian debate has 
influenced my analysis here (1984, 321, passim). See also Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric 
1395b26-32. 
37 Rusten suggests that Pericles here uses litotes to soften his self-praise (1986, 199). “I 
am no less suitable…” means, effectively, “no one is more capable than I am…” This 
passage also in some ways supports Arendt’s bold claim that one’s thoughts lack reality if 
they are unspoken. However, one could easily, and perhaps with more justification, 
understand Pericles to be simply remarking on the uselessness of ideas that are not clearly 
articulated, rather than their unreality, especially since he is here discussing the role of a 
statesman whose ideas are meant to have a practical application. 
 	   76	  
he is an effective leader. Pericles’ war strategy speech, to return to our present concern, is 
therefore as much a statement about the obstacles that Pericles faces in persuading his 
fellow citizens to accept his intelligent advice as it is a recapitulation of that advice.   
   The specific obstacle that Pericles faces is the variability of the judgments 
(γνώµαι) of the people, which are influenced by their passions—passions that in turn vary 
according to circumstances or fortune. “I know,” Pericles states, “that human beings are 
not in the same temper when they are persuaded to go to war and when they undertake it 
in fact, but that they change their judgments [γνώµας] according to their circumstances 
[or misfortunes: ξυµφορὰς]” (I.140.1).38 Present, felt sufferings, for instance, are often 
more persuasive than distant, hoped-for or expected goods. Consider, for example, 
Pericles’ comment in his third speech, after the plague has brought such great suffering to 
the city: 
 
                                                
 
38 Pericles’ statement concerns ἄνθρωποι (“human beings”), which can mean “people” 
generally but can also have a pejorative connotation, meaning mere “human beings” as 
opposed to “men” (ἄνδρες). “Men” are characterized by a courage or manliness 
(ἀνδρεία). The primary meaning of ὀργή, (“temper” here) is “natural impulse,” 
“disposition,” or “temper” generally, though it frequently has the more specific meaning 
“anger.” Here, since Thucydides is contrasting two passions—how people feel when they 
choose to go to war and how they feel when they are actually engaged in war—it makes 
sense to use the more general meaning. Elsewhere I have translated the same word as 
“anger.”   
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[T]he apparent incorrectness of my argument [or reason: λόγον] lies in the 
weakness of your resolution [γνώµης], since the pain is now felt by each of you 
[ἑκάστῳ] but the manifestation of the benefit for all of you [ἅπασι]39 is still far 
off; and since this great and sudden reversal has fallen upon you, your mind 
[διάνοια] is too downcast to hold fast to what you know [ἔγνωτε]. (II.61.2) 
 
It is important to recognize that Pericles is not simply placing the good of the whole over 
the good of the individual. When he says “the benefit for all of you” he means not only 
the good of Athens but also what is good for each and every citizen.40 This is an 
exaggeration, but it is exactly in line with the highest goal of his strategy. The best-case 
scenario of Pericles’ refusal to engage the Spartans on land is a war in which there are no 
Athenian casualties. Pericles is claiming here that the long-term common good is 
identical to what is good for all individually and without exception (ἅπασι), but that the 
prospect of that great common good is being eclipsed by the short-term fears or pains 
suffered by each individually (ἑκάστῳ). The primary opposition, then, is not between the 
individual good and the common good but between a short-term individual good 
(freedom from suffering) and a long-term individual good (the survival of the city and of 
oneself). Though Pericles does not hesitate to ennoble the empire by drawing attention to 
                                                
 
39 Pericles uses the emphatic form of “all” here: ἅπασι, “quite all.” 
40 Forms of πᾶς without the article mean “everyone,” i.e. the whole and each part. See 
Smyth 1174c, where he translates such forms of the adjective as “all (conceivable)” and 
“every conceivable.” 
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the lives lost in its pursuit (II.41.5, II.64.3), it does not follow that he himself is unsparing 
of Athenian lives. His over-scrupulous attention to the preservation of Athenian lives is 
precisely why his strategy smacks of cowardice, as I discuss below (see II.21.3).  
To return to the argument, Pericles suggests that the immediacy of the passions 
engenders short-sightedness, or the inability to hold fast even to what one “knows.” He 
therefore cannot simply state the necessary or expedient policy, even when it is in 
everyone’s interest. He must also establish among the citizenry the disposition to act in 
accordance with that judgment. Doing what is needful or necessary requires courage (cf. 
Burns 2016), but the courage to face up to rational necessity need not be simply rational 
itself; one can be persuaded by means other than reason. Thucydides decides to report 
this war strategy speech, rather than an earlier one because only now is Pericles’ 
leadership seriously being called into question, and therefore it is here that his capacity to 
say what is needful is most on display (cf. I.139.4). 
Pericles’ rhetorical strategy here rests on the ambiguity of the word γνώµη—“that 
untranslatable combination of intelligence, planning, and resolve,” as W. Robert Connor 
puts it (1984, 55). Pericles’ opening remarks are a defense of resolve—of sticking to the 
policy through thick and thin. It is both a defense of his own resolve and a call upon the 
resolve that he expects from his fellow citizens. That Pericles himself is determined to 
maintain the policy of refusing concessions to Sparta is no great surprise. He acts in 
accordance with the terms of the treaty still in force, which stipulates that the two cities 
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settle their differences through arbitration rather than arms (I.140.2, I.144.2).41 
Concession on even a small point (such as the Megarian decree) under the threat of force 
would therefore render moot the treaty establishing peaceful legal equality between the 
cities, which would call into question Athens’ sovereignty and so weaken her empire. It 
also cannot be overlooked that the treaty was especially beneficial to the Athenians, since 
it shielded them from Spartan opposition while expanding and solidifying their empire.  
More importantly, Pericles understands that the Spartan demands are symptoms 
of a deeper motive and that minor concessions would therefore do little to forestall 
Sparta’s aggression (I.140.2-5). Pericles presents the war as inevitable, and Thucydides 
has prepared the reader to accept this judgment by emphasizing the compulsion of fear 
that Sparta felt in light of Athens’ growing power (I.144.3 with I.23.6 and I.88.1; see also 
Romilly 1963, 113; and Kagan 1991, 224f.). The fact that Sparta sent several embassies 
with several demands does not change the underlying circumstances that led Pericles to 
refuse concessions in the first instance. Pericles is resolute, then, because no decisive 
consideration has changed. As Lowell Edmunds observes, “gnome, as Pericles uses the 
word of himself, comes to mean not simply ‘policy’ but to have the normative sense, too, 
of ‘policy based on reason’” (1975, 9).42 Pericles’ far-sighted plan recognized the 
inevitability of war and anticipated that it would be long and arduous. He overlooked no 
event that could be planned for. With respect to Pericles, then, γνώµη means “intelligent 
                                                
 
41 See also I.78.4, I.85.2, I.145.1 and VII.18.2 for the Athenian offer of arbitration. I.66 
implies that the treaty still held at this point (cf. II.7.1). 
42 The influence of Edmunds will be evident throughout this section (esp. 1975, 7-23).  
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judgment,” which is the source of his rational confidence. Resolution is only a byproduct 
of his superior foresight, his clear knowledge of what the situation demands.  
Yet, the understanding of γνώµη that Pericles offers to his fellow citizens is quite 
different. He asserts that “human beings” are more passionate than rational. The present 
shift in opinion among the people indicates only that the Athenians are becoming 
apprehensive as the war approaches, not that they have a reasonable objection to the 
policy they earlier decided on in common. It is noteworthy that Pericles here implies that 
the Athenians are mere “human beings” (ἄνθρωποι) as opposed to “men” (ἄνδρες). In the 
Funeral Oration, Pericles praises the fallen soldiers for exhibiting the “virtue of a man” 
(ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν) and for their “manly goodness” (ἀνδραγαθίαν: II.42.2-3). As we have 
seen, that virtue consists in their capacity to know what is needful and to do it even in the 
face of great danger. Hence, Pericles’ praise of the Athenians for their manliness there is 
in direct contrast to his censure of Athenians for their “humanness” here. It is 
characteristic of a human being to be irresolute. Unlike the steady judgment of men, the 
γνώµας—or “ignorant … thoughts”43—of human beings change with their fortunes 
(I.140.1).  
                                                
 
43 Pericles remarks that “it is possible for the happening of things to proceed no less 
ignorantly [or irrationally: ἀµαθῶς] even than the thoughts [διανοίας] of human beings” 
(I.140.1). It is a remarkable line, not least for the application of ἀµαθῶς to occurrences of 
chance, though it is not entirely clear what he means by this. I will have more to say 
about this passage in what follows. For the present, it suffices to note Pericles’ 
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Pericles is exhorting his fellow citizens, then, to emulate him—to act like men 
and once again support the decision earlier resolved on.44 Like him, they should “hold 
fast to the same judgment” (I.140.1).45 He offers them the following alternative: they can 
either stick to their resolutions even in the event of some failures or forfeit their claim to 
intelligence in the event of success (I.140.1). By suggesting that resolution is an 
indication of intelligence—an intelligence that makes one superior to one’s fallible 
passions—and that irresolution is therefore an indication of weakness in the face of those 
passions, Pericles frames resolution as an attractive quality to exhibit—whether or not 
one has the intelligence to back it up. Resolution itself is a mark of superiority or 
strength. Intelligence in this case is not the grounds of resolution. Rather, the claim to 
intelligence appears to be a reward for resolution in the event of success—resolution 
especially in the face of wavering judgment, i.e., in the face of the lack of a clear 
understanding or intelligence. In other words, while Pericles’ resolution is the unheroic 
conviction of his calculations, compelling only insofar as they are rational, the Athenians’ 
resolution is based on a noble resistance to doubt, compelling because it evokes pride, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
implication that the thoughts of human beings proceed haphazardly like chance, since 
they are unlearned or irrational.    
44 This exhortation appears in a speech that precedes the Funeral Oration, so his remarks 
here anticipate rather than state the distinction that I have made explicit. However, in this 
speech he does go on to exhort these “human beings” to act like “men” at I.143.5. 
45 Cf. LSJ s.v. ἔχω C.  
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hopefulness, strength, and trust in resolution as a virtue in the face of the dangerous 
unknown.   
Thus Pericles reasserts his leadership over Athens by turning the mounting 
reservations of the Athenians into self-doubt concerning their own ability to assess the 
situation correctly. He turns their fear of having been too easily persuaded in the first 
place (the germ of mistrust in Pericles’ leadership) into a fear of their own susceptibility 
to persuasion and therefore a greater awareness of their need for leadership.46 In return 
for unwavering support of his leadership, Pericles offers them a claim on the very 
intelligence they have come to feel they lack. While Pericles’ resolution rests on his 
rational confidence in his own knowledge or foresight, the resolution of the Athenians 
rests ultimately on doubt or ignorance—it is boldness in the face of the lack of 
knowledge or foresight. The ambiguity of γνώµη captures both possibilities.  
Still, we should not overlook what is at stake in Pericles’ rhetorical acrobatics 
here. He shores up Athenian resolve by appealing not to their pride simply, but 
specifically to their pride in deserving praise. What the Athenians are concerned about 
most of all, it follows, is not success simply, but success that is attributable to their 
foresight and intelligent policy—they wish to be able to claim responsibility for their 
prudent actions.    
 
                                                
 
46 Orwin notes a similar rhetorical strategy in Cleon’s speech at Mytilene: “If Cleon 
establishes his kinship with [the people] by articulating their distrust of others, he must 
establish their need of him by appealing to their distrust of themselves” (1984, 317-318). 
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Pericles’ Self-promotion 
But why should the Athenians trust Pericles, rather than someone else? Leading 
his fellow citizens to mistrust their own judgment might make them aware of their need 
for advice, but it would not single out Pericles as the people’s advisor. Moreover, the 
suspicion that they are themselves incapable of judging the merits of a proposed policy 
would seem to inculcate a general distrust in leadership as such, at least insofar as they 
would be more aware of their susceptibility to clever speech. This is the situation that 
arises at the time of the Mytilenean debate, during which both Cleon and Diodotus 
comment on the problems of clever speech and public suspicion in Athens (cf. Orwin 
1984). Indeed, it is the situation that arises more generally in Athens after the death of 
Pericles (II.65.8-12), and we might even hold Pericles responsible for this, to some 
extent.  
However that may be, Pericles is well aware that sowing mistrust among the 
Athenians regarding their own judgment must be accompanied by efforts to make himself 
trusted in ways that do not depend on their clear comprehension of the advice he gives. 
Moreover, since he is here seeking to recommit them to a policy that they have already 
adopted, it is useful that he can speak of his advice as their prior resolution. And his 
emphatic statement that his mind has not changed, paired with his articulation of the 
causes of such a change in the demos, is itself calculated to show the people the strength 
of his intelligence. His resolution makes him appear free from the passions that make 
one’s judgment fail, even if the people do not see clearly the grounds of his confidence.  
Moreover, when Pericles later praises his own capacity for leadership he includes, 
in addition to his capacities to know and explain what is needful, his patriotism and 
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incorruptibility (II.60.4-7; see also II.65.8). Again, it is important that these virtues are 
manifest. Pericles goes out of his way to show the people that he is incorruptible and that 
he is concerned with the good of the city more than with his own immediate or obvious 
interest. For instance, before the first Spartan invasion, Pericles anticipates that 
Archidamus might provoke suspicion of him by preserving his property while laying 
waste the rest of Attica beyond the city walls, which would suggest to the people that 
Pericles had secretly secured his own exemption from the common suffering. To ward off 
this suspicion, Pericles proclaims in the assembly that his property will become public 
should it survive intact (II.13.1). Thus, Pericles is not just incorruptible; he anticipates 
suspicion and makes public demonstrations calculated to preserve his image of 
incorruptibility.  
Not only do Pericles’ active attempts to preserve his image testify to the 
dependence of his influence on the public perception of his character, but Sparta’s tactics 
reveal that the Spartans, too, knew this about Pericles. Before the outbreak of the war, 
Sparta demanded that the Athenians exile Pericles on account of his hereditary 
connection to an ancient curse (I.127.1). Their demand, Thucydides affirms, was not 
made out of piety or from any expectation that Pericles would actually be exiled. Rather, 
the Spartans hoped that the accusation would expose Pericles to slander from within the 
city (I.127.2). The tactic—unsuccessful in the event—was intended to undermine the 
purity of his reputation and thereby discredit him as an advisor to the Athenians.    
Pericles’ dependence on reputation reveals that his intellectual capacity alone is 
insufficient for effective leadership. Again, it requires more than rational speech to be 
persuasive. Good leadership also requires manifest deeds that testify to the character of 
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the speaker and the truth of his words (cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1172b15f.; 
Cicero, De Officiis, II.31-38 and II.75-77). “Deeds,” of course, must include “speech 
acts,” such as those just mentioned. It is the act of advocating the same policy (in 
speech), and the act of declaring his land public (in speech) that bear witness to his 
confidence and his devotion to Athens. Likewise, in the dramatic “action” that opens the 
Funeral Oration, we “see” Pericles submit to the funeral law before our very eyes, even 
though his judgment seems to oppose it. He advertises his scruples that it is a bad law, 
only then to submit to it on the grounds that obedience to law is “noble” (II.35.3). These 
are deeds calculated to persuade Pericles’ listeners that Pericles himself is trustworthy. 
They are not arguments establishing that his plan is in fact sound. Hence, when 
Thucydides gives his own account of the “cause” (αἴτιον) of Pericles’ success in directing 
the affairs of the city (in contrast to the decline in leadership that followed that 
statesman’s death), he explains that Pericles was superior to his successors not only 
because of his power of judgment (δυνατὸς … γνώµῃ) but also because he had the power 
of reputation (δυνατὸς … ἀξιώµατι) and because his “most incorruptible” character was 
“manifest” (or “conspicuous”: διαφανῶς, II.65.8). 
Indeed, intelligence in the absence of such visible “proofs” of these other 
admirable qualities is a cause for suspicion rather than confidence, as the necessity of 
such proofs suggests.47 Diodotus chastises the Athenian democracy in the years just after 
                                                
 
47 Cicero writes in De Officiis, II.34: “wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire 
confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and 
clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, justice combined with 
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Pericles’ death for depriving the city of “obvious benefits” on account of their envy and 
their suspicion that even speakers saying “the best things” might ultimately be seeking 
personal gain (III.43.1). “Because of our over-shrewdness, in this city alone is it 
impossible to do good plainly, without deceit. For the one offering some good openly is 
met with the suspicion that somehow in a concealed way he will acquire more [for 
himself]” (III.43.3). Regarding this difficulty, Clifford Orwin remarks:  
 
For so long, then, as audiences fall short of wisdom—for so long, in other words, 
as they are in need of advice—wisdom will be neither sufficient nor necessary to 
a given speaker's success at persuading them … plain good advice, in the absence 
of whatever it takes to foster trust, remains at the mercy of the calumnies of 
opposing speakers. (1984, 321)  
 
Pericles is superior as a leader at least as much because his conspicuous nobility places 
him above suspicion as because he is intelligent.     
Accordingly, in his introductory remarks to the Funeral Oration, Thucydides 
draws to our attention the insufficiency of intelligence as a claim to rule in democratic 
regimes. To be chosen orator at the Funeral Oration is an elective honor decided annually 
by the people. “A man [is] elected by the city, who in judgment [γνώµῃ] is held to be not 
                                                                                                                                            
 
practical wisdom will command all the confidence we can desire … wisdom without 
justice will be of no avail at all” (Miller, trans., 1913, 203). 
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unintelligent and [who] in merit [ἀξιώσει] is preeminent” (II.34.6).48 In that speech, 
Pericles claims that “inconspicuous merit” (ἀξιώµατος ἀφανείᾳ) is no hindrance to 
advancement in the city because Athens honors only “virtue” and the capacity “to do 
something good for the city”: they elect officials according to true merit rather than 
according to lot or rank (II.37.1).49 All Athenians, we are told, are capable, if not of 
constructing policy, at least of passing judgment on it (II.40.2). Yet, as his rhetorical 
                                                
 
48 First, ᾑρηµένος—αἱρέω in the middle voice—has the political sense of “choose by 
vote” or “elect to an office” (LSJ, s.v. αἱρέω B.II.3). Second, Pericles uses litotes. “Not 
unintelligent” means “especially wise” (Rusten 1986, 138). Finally, I do not follow 
Edmunds in making a distinction between ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωµα. Edmunds concludes from 
the fact that ἀξιώµατος ἀφανείᾳ seems to be used synonymously with πενίαν (II.37.1) 
that ἀξίωµα has the more precise definition of “‘rank in society based on wealth,’” while 
ἀξίωσις has a more general meaning (1975, 53-54). But this distinction does not hold up. 
In II.65.8, for instance, Thucydides uses the two words interchangeably. He remarks that 
Pericles had the power of merit (δυνατὸς … ἀξιώµατι) and then immediately clarifies: his 
“power according to merit [δύναµιν … ἐπ᾽ ἀξιώσει] allowed him to contradict the 
people…” See also Gomme 1956, 110; and Rusten 1989, 138.  
49 The interpretation of ἀπὸ µέρους is controversial. Some argue that it refers to rotation 
in office (Rusten 1989, 145-146; Hornblower 2003, 300-301). Others argue that it refers 
to election according to rank (Mynott 2014, 111 n5; LSJ, s.v. µέρος I.2). Regardless of 
how we translate it, Pericles is arguing against both alternatives: Athenians elect officials 
according to true ability rather than according to lot or rank, according to Pericles. 
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strategy in his first speech makes clear, Pericles must doctor his image because most 
Athenians cannot judge the merits of his policy, or at least cannot hold firm to their 
judgments about its merits. It is precisely because he demonstrates his good character 
“conspicuously” (διαφανῶς: II.65.8) to reveal his “merit” (ἀξιώσει: II.34.6; II.65.8)—i.e., 
because he does not suffer from “inconspicuous merit” (ἀξιώµατος ἀφανείᾳ: II.37.1)—
that Pericles is able to use his great capacities in the service of the city (cf. Edmunds 
1975, 54-55).  
 The unity of the citizens in their devotion to the common good of Athens, then, is 
due in large part to Pericles’ ability to foster trust in him as the only person capable of 
conceiving the right policy for Athens. He is the only one who knows what is needful for 
Athens. Hence, even when they were most angry with him, the Athenians were still 
“persuaded by his speeches [λόγοις] regarding public affairs” and, after punishing him, 
“they again elected him general and entrusted to him all matters, … [in particular] those 
of the city that were most pressing, believing him to be most worthy” (II.65.4). And it is 
worth noting that even when they are persuaded “by his speeches [or reason],” they still 
find it necessary to punish him, as if Pericles’ singular capacity to see the rational 
necessity of enduring the hardships of war is somehow morally blameworthy. If they 
were persuaded that Pericles’ strategy and everything it entailed were necessary, they 
would see that he is not to blame for their decision to implement his plan. And though we 
might be tempted, with Pericles, to encourage the citizens to take responsibility for the 
common decisions, it is not entirely unreasonable for them to feel as though Pericles 
misled them. For however prudent his plan is, his attempts to ennoble the adoption of that 
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plan have surely obscured the real pain of implementation with the irrational hopefulness 
that attend the people’s unthinking courage.  
 
The Problem of Chance 
 The refusal of the Athenians to listen to reason—their inability to hold fast to their 
determinations in the face of great suffering—is linked to a greater obstacle to the 
persuasiveness of intelligent policy that we have so far ignored. Pericles attempts to 
foster resolution not only because he doubts that his fellow citizens will judge correctly in 
the throes of their individual passions, but also because they will have good reason to 
doubt the certainty of Pericles’ foresight. They will see and feel the failures or limitations 
of his planning. As Pericles himself says, he seeks the support of the people “even if in 
some way we fail” (I.140.1). He admits, then, that failure does not imply error and 
therefore that intelligence does not guarantee success. For, as Pericles says, “it is possible 
for the happening of things to proceed no less irrationally [or ignorantly: ἀµαθῶς] even 
than do the thoughts of human beings” (ibid.). The irrationality of events places a 
necessary limit on human foresight and human responsibility, and this makes judging the 
wisdom of policy much more difficult than Pericles’ exhortations at times suggest.50 
                                                
 
50 See Gomme 1950, 453; Hornblower 2003, 227, for the irony of the use of ἀµαθῶς. The 
question is whether events are unforeseeable or whether they are unteachable, meaning 
that they do not conform to the plans of men but adhere to their own logic. In the latter 
case they may be in principle foreseeable though they tend always to elude us and 
therefore appear stupid or “ignorant.” In either case, the ambiguity of the phrase is well 
 	   90	  
If Pericles here admits the existence of chance—of events that in principle cannot 
be accounted for or anticipated by human reason—then his own confidence becomes all 
the more remarkable. For if there are no rational grounds for absolute confidence, 
cautious skepticism regarding the reach of human foresight would seem to follow 
(consider Hermocrates’ advice to the cities of Sicily at IV.62.4-63.1; Connor 1984, 124; 
IV.17-20). The point here is not only that chance poses a necessary limit to human 
planning but also that the awareness of or belief in chance limits the confidence one can 
have in even the most intelligent plan. Chance justifies doubts in the efficacy of planning 
and gives rise to hopes of success even contrary to rational expectations (e.g. V.102-104 
and VII.61.3). Skepticism of rational human foresight can therefore tip the balance in 
favor of hopeful but imprudent actions rather than burdensome but well-grounded 
strategies. Hence, Pericles follows up his admission of the power of chance with a 
statement deployed against skepticism, in tone if not in meaning. “On account of this”—
the awareness that events may proceed irrationally—“we are accustomed to blame 
whatever happens contrary to reason [παρὰ λόγον] on chance” (I.140.1). Pericles thus 
                                                                                                                                            
 
wrought. Pericles is attempting to gesture toward the problem of chance in such a way 
that places the bulk of the blame on the stupidity of human beings and therefore 
encourages confidence in prudential foresight rather than in wishful thinking, as will 
become apparent in what follows. Edmunds writes: “Pericles is not making an ironic 
comment on the fickleness of fortune, but, as the last clause of the prooemium shows, on 
the general tendency of mankind to blame tyche for their bad luck when they should, 
Pericles implies, blame themselves” (1975, 16 n17).     
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quietly notes that there are limits to human foresight while at the same time 
emphasizing—even ridiculing—the appeal to chance as an excuse for poor planning. As 
Edmunds writes, “Pericles describes adversity in terms of human planning, which thus 
becomes the criterion. Adverse luck is then understood as that which was unplanned, 
badly planned, or contrary to plan . . . In this way Pericles trivializes chance, while yet 
admitting its existence” (1975, 17). The listener is left with the impression that chance is 
no excuse for failure, even though the clear meaning of the statement is that sometimes, 
in fact, chance is an excuse for—because it is the cause of—failure. 
Thus, Pericles implies or encourages contempt for chance, giving the impression 
that he, at least, does not require the excuses that fortune affords because his plans are not 
made ἀµαθῶς, ignorantly. But, once again, his intention is not to make the Athenian 
people understand the grounds for his confidence but only to render them more resolute 
in the execution of his plan. His acceptance of responsibility despite chance is meant to 
show that chance does not frighten him; it suggests that his planning is stronger even than 
fortune. He does, of course, follow this opening exhortation with a detailed account of the 
superiority of Athenian materiel and preparation, which suggests that he wishes the 
citizens to understand the basis of his confidence in Athenian strength. Or, to use 
Macleod’s language once again, he wants to augment the effectiveness of his speech by 
combining appeals to “unthinking courage” with arguments in support of a “rational 
confidence,” as Demosthenes does (1983, 61). Pericles’ enumeration of Athens’ superior 
resources is a powerful rhetorical support for the resolution he wishes to inspire, and the 
fact that he does not leave it at the calculation of material resources alone suggests that 
the unadorned account is insufficient in the present circumstances.  
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I earlier noted Pericles’ definition of “disdain,” in his third speech, which he 
distinguished from “pride” by the former’s grounding in intelligent calculation (II.62.3). 
Now I must note the qualification to Pericles’ statement there. Pericles asserts that 
disdain is more certain than pride, since disdain implies steady foresight based on the 
calculation of resources while pride rests only on one’s trust in (empty) hope (II.62.5). 
But Pericles prefaces his remark there by noting that this is true only if one supposes 
“equal fortune” (ibid.)—i.e. if the effects of fortune are equal on both sides and hence 
moot (Rusten 1989, 203; Gomme 1956, 172-173). He concedes that “self-confidence will 
also arise even in a coward from fortunate ignorance [ἀµαθίας]” (II.62.4). Presumably, 
then, despair can arise even among the disdainful whose foresight is unsuccessful due to 
misfortune, even if there is no error in planning. Barring the intervention of chance, there 
is no folly in confidence grounded on a calculation of the superiority of resources. But 
insofar as chance is a factor—or is perceived to be a factor—confidence based on such 
calculations may well appear foolish. Indeed, the Corinthians seem to evoke this line of 
thought when they argue that disdain belongs to the unintelligent, by which they mean 
those who have an irrational overconfidence in human planning. And Gomme remarks 
that Pericles’ phrasing is “purposely borrowed for this unique context, because folly and 
arrogance are the usual accompaniments of contempt” (1956, 172). 
Whether or not Pericles himself harbors an irrational overconfidence in reason, he 
at least recognizes that the effects of chance limit the confidence he can expect his 
prudence to inspire in others. Because chance prevents success and failure from tracking 
exactly to good and bad planning, Pericles’ rhetoric must compensate for fortune’s 
tendency to dispense confidence unjustly. That is, by means of speech, Pericles corrects 
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fortune’s tendency to encourage those who plan poorly and discourage those who plan 
well. It is for this reason that Pericles must overstate the capacity of virtue—resolution 
and boldness—with which he ends his speech. He does so not because he thinks that 
virtue can conquer chance, but because he knows that chance will cause irresolution even 
in the execution of the most intelligent plan—in this case a plan that requires above all 
steadfast resolve. If the people believe that fortune rules in human affairs then they will 
not share Pericles’ confidence in foresight, and they will therefore be more likely to 
indulge their irrational fears and desperate hopes. Thus Pericles frames his otherwise 
prudent, relatively cautious, and carefully calculated plan in rhetoric that pushes beyond 
prudent calculation and beyond caution. He intends only to encourage the confidence in 
his foresight that he believes his plan merits and requires.  
 We can now appreciate the rhetoric of Pericles’ closing exhortation. He there 
urges his fellow citizens to live up to the example of the Athenians who fought off the 
Persians. They succeeded “by γνώµῃ rather than by fortune, and more by boldness than 
by power” (I.144.4). Translators invariably understand this occurrence of γνώµη to mean 
“wisdom” (or an equivalent), though these same translators use “resolution” (or an 
equivalent) earlier in the speech.51 Their emphasis on intelligence is no doubt an attempt 
to capture something of Pericles’ evident prudence and his encouragement of Athenian 
                                                
 
51 Compare I.140.5 and I.144.3 in the translations by Crawley, Hobbes, Mynott, and 
Jowett, for instance. Hornblower agrees that there is a dual meaning here—“there is 
probably a suggestion of ‘resolution’, i.e. moral strength, as well as intellectual power”—
though he opts for the translation, “not by good fortune but by wisdom” (2003, 231).  
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deliberation. Indeed, Pericles clearly believes that one ought to depend on intelligence 
rather than chance. But this destroys the parallelism of the exhortation. The exhortation—
as commentators have not failed to note in the case of the line “more by boldness than by 
power”—pushes beyond the prudent strategy Pericles has just finished outlining. This 
second pair of terms is clearly meant to inspire trust in virtue rather than in the “prudent 
calculation of . . . material resources,” as Hornblower put it (1987, 54). The first pair 
ought to be translated similarly. Even if γνώµη is supposed to evoke the intelligence of 
his plan, Pericles’ exhortation to his fellow citizens is not first and foremost to be wise 
but to be resolute, precisely because they are not wise. While Pericles might believe that 
in most cases intelligence can outwit fortune, here he needs his fellow citizens to believe 
that it is resolution, as a moral virtue, that can conquer fortune.  
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Chapter 4 
Athenian Virtue in Pericles’ Funeral Oration 
 
 
As I have presented it so far, Pericles’ rhetoric combines calculations meant to 
inspire rational confidence with appeals to the Athenian sense of nobility meant to 
encourage them to act on those calculations. This argues against Arendt’s claim that the 
primary task of the city is to inspire Athenians to overcome their narrow self-interest and 
lose themselves in the pursuit of glory on behalf of Athens. Rather, the devotion that 
Pericles wishes to inspire by his appeals to nobility is in the name of prudence, not glory.  
This interpretation begins to sound like the “Aristotelian” account of the Funeral 
Oration mentioned earlier, according to which Pericles’ rhetoric is intended to habituate 
Athenians to act reasonably in pursuit of their “ultimate or long-term values”—which are 
“materialistic, and even hedonistic”—through “habits of courage” rather than through 
clarity of thought (Balot 2001, 510-515). But we must note that the equivalent to 
Aristotelian habituation in Thucydides is “laborious training” or “toil,” and this is the 
method by which “other” cities instill virtues in the citizenry (II.39.4; cf. I.84.3 and 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1103a14-b25). According to Pericles, Athens is the 
exception. He claims: “we are willing to face danger with ease of spirit rather than with 
laborious training, and with manliness not so much by laws as by ways of life”; and 
again, “we are manifestly not more lacking in courage than those who are always toiling, 
and in both these things and in yet still others our city is worthy of wonder” (II.39.4; see 
also Nicomachean Ethics 1104a30-35). The wonder of the Athenians is precisely that 
they are not habituated in the Spartan sense.  
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Athenian virtue, in the best case, appears to have its foundation in nature (cf. 
Laws 642d). Indeed, this seems to be the implication of stating that the Athenians do not 
require habituation. Athens aspires to be a city in which the flourishing of natural virtues 
is encouraged and rewarded, insofar as individual growth is not subject to constraint and 
honors and offices are granted according to true capacity rather than good birth or other 
conventional distinctions. This, at any rate, appears to be the goal toward which Pericles’ 
praise of Athens points. Thus, Pericles envisions the city as a place peculiarly suited to 
draw out what is most resplendent in human beings, as Arendt would argue. But, for him, 
what is most resplendent is not self-sacrifice in the name of immortal glory, but the 
capacity to face up boldly to what is needful (τὰ δέοντα): to have the courage to act 
prudently, without succumbing to illusion or false hope.   
 
The City in Speech 
Pericles’ Funeral Oration presents a perfected account of Athenian citizenship. 
There is, consequently, no need to apologize for the Athenian way of life. Unlike the 
Athenian envoys at Sparta, who excuse Athenian imperialism on the grounds that the 
Athenians were “compelled” to acquire their empire by universal and inescapable human 
motivations (I.75.3, I.76.2), Pericles here in effect denies that Athenians ever require the 
excuse of necessity. The only compulsion that Pericles recognizes in the Funeral Oration 
is that which subjects feel under the weight of Athenian superiority (II.41.4). The central 
idea of Pericles’ Funeral Oration is that the Athenians are “worthy of wonder” (or 
admiration: θαυµάζεσθαι, II.39.4; also II.41.4) because they face the most difficult 
actions by choice rather than by necessity. They are compelled neither by law nor by 
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habituation nor even by the inexorable forces of human nature. Their actions are free and 
self-consciously chosen and hence worthy of praise. Pericles therefore speaks of virtuous 
Athenian citizens as “knowers of what is needful” (γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα: II.43.1) who 
willingly act on that knowledge. Hence, Pericles’ praise of the fallen is primarily an 
encomium of the Athenian way of life, their practices, and their regime (II.36.4 with 
II.42.2), because it is through these things that Athenians became praiseworthy 
individuals.  
Pericles asserts that Athens’ tempered democracy fosters this excellence. The 
Athenians manage the city for the majority rather than the few, and though all are equal 
before the law, honors or offices are awarded according to merit. No one is barred on 
account of poverty or low birth from distinguishing himself. There is, as we might say, 
equality of opportunity. It is therefore a democracy, but modified so that excellence is 
duly honored (and used) and consequently dignity is unequally distributed (II.37.1). It is a 
democracy with an aristocratic element; it recognizes that virtue has a just claim to 
distinction (Gomme 1956, 109; Rusten 2001, 143; Edmunds 1975, 47-55).  
Most importantly, though they are tolerant in private life (II.37.2), the one thing 
Athenians do not tolerate is indifference to politics. There is universal participation—in 
the best case, at any rate. Those who do not formulate policy are at least eager and able to 
pass judgment both on proposed policies and on elected officials (II.40.2). Hence, 
excellence rules in the city not through aristocratic institutions so much as by democratic 
choice (Edmunds 1975, 53). The private freedom to pursue one’s interests is paired with 
the political freedom of autonomy. Each and all are responsible for the public matters of 
the city, and by taking that responsibility seriously each is afforded the opportunity to 
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develop his capacity for reflection and judgment. Through deliberation prior to action, 
Athenians become capable of deliberate action. It is by this practice that Athenians learn 
to act in accordance with choice rather than necessity. The hope of Pericles’ perfected 
democracy is that unity will arise spontaneously or naturally since, through public 
deliberation, all can become “knowers of what is needful” (II.43.1) or, at the very least, 
capable electors and overseers of those who rule.  
If this seems overly ambitious, it is worth reflecting that it does not differ 
significantly from the hope of enlightened democratic politics at the heart of our own 
political experience, what Walter Lippmann once called “[t]he ideal of the 
omnicompetent, sovereign citizen” (1925, 39). It is this vision of a politically enlightened 
public that leads some to argue for mandatory voting. And we often justify universal 
education with such a goal in mind. We believe that democratic citizenship requires 
education because citizens must deliberate and decide responsibly, and many even share 
the faith that more prudential policy will emerge from deliberation among informed 
citizens than from experts.52 Perhaps more importantly, many of us also share the view 
that the full flourishing of the individual’s capacity to act deliberately is the foundation of 
true moral excellence, if not the peak of virtue itself.   
                                                
 
52 The prominence of this view is indicated by James Surowiecki’s bestseller, The 
Wisdom of Crowds (2005). For an ancient treatment of this, consider Aristotle’s 
assessment of the claim that the many should be authoritative in the city or at least share 
in deliberation and judgment (Politics 3.11). 
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To return to Pericles: his foil, it becomes clear as the speech progresses, is Sparta. 
The most memorable exhibition of Spartan virtue, the event that established that city’s 
renown, was the resistance mounted by the Spartan force at Thermopylae. Herodotus 
reproduces the laconic epitaph dedicated to those fallen soldiers: “Stranger, report to the 
Lacedaimonians that here we lie, obedient to their commands” (Herodotus 7.228.2). In 
his epitaphios, Pericles calls on his listeners to doubt whether this Spartan obedience is 
truly worthy of praise, for obedience is required only when there is a separation between 
those who judge and those who act. Pericles perhaps fails to do justice to the Spartans—
Sparta is also a republic, after all. But his claim about Athenian virtue is clear: only those 
whose excellence in action is paired with understanding can justly be said to act with the 
moral freedom that warrants praise. As Rusten observes, “The admonition ‘stand your 
ground and do not yield’ is the oldest commandment of the Greek hoplite. But for 
Thucydides’ Athenians it is the product not of blind obedience, but reasoned reflection” 
(1986, 66-67; see also Edmunds 1975, 67). Athenian institutions, unlike those at Sparta, 
foster the understanding that would make their boldness truly praiseworthy. Of course, 
this also means that the freedom of Pericles and his perfected Athenians is in some 
tension with the lawful obedience that Sparta celebrates and that all regimes to some 
extent require. 
 
Athenians and Spartans Abroad 
Pericles suggests that all Athenian citizens learn to judge what is needful through 
political participation (II.40.2). And he suggests that this participation will produce a 
body of men who are capable of wholly independent thought and action, and who are 
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therefore individually “self-sufficient”53 and “most versatile” (II.41.1). It is because of 
this prudent versatility that, in the best case, they can be cautious when caution is 
required and bold when boldness is required. However, the individual self-sufficiency 
that Pericles praises also points beyond the city. It is an aspiration that transcends 
citizenship. If one were truly self-sufficient he would be independent of the city.54 But the 
education in deliberation that produces these self-sufficient citizens, as Pericles presents 
it, is clearly political. The citizen learns through political participation how to judge what 
                                                
 
53 The phrase τὸ σῶµα αὔταρκες can literally mean “a body that is self-sufficient” 
(Collins and Stauffer 1999, 27), and in that sense it echoes the praise of acting with one’s 
body rather than calculating with one’s mind that we have already noted. But here the 
phrase is also used to describe “a self-sufficient individual” in contrast to the “most self-
sufficient” city of II.36.3. See Rusten: “in this passage it [σῶµα] designates the individual 
as opposed to a larger group . . . just as Pericles has declared his city to be αὐταρκεστάτη 
(36.3), so also are her citizens the most self-sufficient individuals” (Rusten 2001, 159). 
The reason for the perhaps labored construction here is to echo the challenge to self-
sufficiency that the plague will pose shortly (II.51.3). The rapid breakdown of bodily 
integrity makes abundantly clear our dependence on the body, and hence the limits that 
the body poses to complete self-sufficiency. See also Solon’s discussion of happiness and 
self-sufficiency (Herodotus 1.32), as well as Aristotle’s (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b6-
21).  
54 This independence need not mean total alienation from the city. One might not depend 
on the city and yet wish to be with other human beings. 
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is needful—that is, what is needful for Athens. Hence τὰ δέοντα is frequently and 
justifiably translated as “duties,” as in one’s duties as a citizen of Athens.55  
 Still, Thucydides means for us to consider the supra-political standard toward 
which Athenian citizenship points. He shows this most clearly with his eulogy of 
Themistocles. After recounting the final years of the Athenian statesman’s life, 
Thucydides presents this portrait of him:  
 
For Themistocles exhibited the most enduring natural strength, and he was worthy 
of wonder [or admiration: ἄξιος θαυµάσαι] especially in excelling others in this: 
with his individual intelligence—this [alone], without learning anything prior or 
after—regarding immediate things, he was the most able judge [γνώµων] with the 
least counsel, and regarding future things, he was the best diviner of the most 
distant event. And whatever he was engaged in he was able to explain, and those 
things of which he was without experience were not beyond his ability to judge 
[κρῖναι] sufficiently; he foresaw56 most of all what was better and what worse in 
                                                
 
55 Edmunds 1975, 60; Mynott 2014, 115; Strassler 1996, 115. 
56 Προεώρα.  Thucydides uses two terms for “foresight”: προοράω/πρόοψις and 
προνοέω/πρόνοια. Both can be used to capture the English meaning of “foresight,” i.e., 
conceiving of future events. But they also differ in the same way that ὁράω and νοέω 
differ, the former referring more to physical sight, the latter to mental perception. Hence, 
προοράω and πρόοψις can also have the more literal meaning of perceiving something 
with the eyes, with the prefix having either a temporal meaning (perceiving Y before X, 
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whatever was obscure. In sum, with his natural capacity to speak, he became with 
little preparation most able to extemporize whatever was needful [τὰ δέοντα]. 
(I.138.3) 
 
Themistocles appears fully to manifest the peak of Athenian virtue. Yet this encomium 
does not celebrate Themistocles the Athenian. In the immediate context it is an 
explanation of his ability to thrive among barbarians, beyond the walls of Athens, after 
his native city ostracized him and then attempted to arrest and punish him in exile 
(I.135.2-3).  
The whole episode, in fact, is largely meant to distinguish the “most illustrious” 
man of Athens from that of Sparta precisely by comparing how each fared when divorced 
from his native city (I.138.6). The ablest Athenian thrives abroad. On account of his 
extraordinary individual capacities, Themistocles learns the Persian tongue, becomes the 
most important Greek advisor ever to attend the barbarian king (I.138.1-2), and is granted 
his own governorship in that foreign land (I.138.5). It is a story of the general utility of 
the virtues, including the natural capacities, that Athens cherishes most of all. 
Thucydides’ praise of Themistocles in exile forces us to wonder whether the public realm 
is indeed the “proper place for human excellence,” as Arendt claims (1998, 49), or 
whether human excellence transcends those bounds. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
for example at V.8.3) or a physical meaning (perceiving X right in front of me, for 
example at 4.34.3).   
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The Spartan Pausanias, on the other hand, quickly discovers his inability to 
exhibit Spartan virtue outside of Sparta. He, too, gains the audience of the Persian king. 
But while the king’s desire to rule Greece is an asset that Themistocles successfully 
exploits (I.138.2), for Pausanias it is the catalyst that liberates his own debilitating 
“longing for rule over the Greeks” (I.128.3; cf. I.95.3). That desire, augmented by the 
hope of Persian assistance, overpowers him until he is “no longer able to live in the 
established way” (I.130.1), and he thereafter refuses to be the equal (ἴσος) of those 
around him (I.132.2). He casts off the “measured dress” of the Spartans and takes on the 
ostentatious garb of the Persians, signifying his abandonment of the more general 
practice at Sparta of living as equals (ἰσοδίαιτοι: I.6.4). Moreover, try as he might, he is 
“not able to hold back his plans” (I.130.2). He reveals his grand designs through his 
flamboyance, his aloof manner, and his increasing tendency to become angry and harsh 
in his presumed superiority. “On account of this not least,” Thucydides informs us, “the 
allies turned to the Athenians” (I.130.2; cf. I.95.1, 96.1). Pausanias’ longing leads him to 
betray both the Greeks in general and his own Spartan citizens in particular, and the latter 
both to the enemy abroad—the Persians (I.128.7)—and to the enemies at home—the 
Helots (I.132.4). He manages to arouse the anger and suspicion of the entire Greek world 
before forcing his own city—the city most reluctant to condemn one of their own—to 
take his life (I.132.2 and 95-96; I.132.4 and 95.5; I.134.3). It is a story of the utter failure 
of Spartan virtue beyond the walls of Sparta. 
Pausanias is therefore the model of lawlessness for the Spartans (I.132.2 and 4). 
He is the example of Spartan degeneracy and, consequently, he is the embodiment of 
what Spartan law attempts to protect against and the justification for their insularity 
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(I.95.7). Themistocles, on the other hand, exhibits a kind of human excellence that 
requires no particular home. For that reason, Themistocles, too, is lawless in a sense—
and not only because he is literally a fugitive from the law.57 He embodies a lawlessness 
belonging to the highest manifestation of Athenian virtue.58 As Pericles presents it, 
Athenian virtue rests on the capacity to judge and do what is needful rather than the 
readiness to defer to what is lawful. The tension between judgment and law is for this 
reason a prominent sub-theme in the Funeral Oration, and Pericles himself embodies that 
tension.  
                                                
 
57 There are two terms in Greek that can be translated as “lawlessness”: ἀνοµία, which 
literally means to be “without law,” and παρανοµία, which literally means to be “beyond 
law” or “contrary to law.” Παρανοµία describes Pausanius’ condition, capturing both the 
fact that his physical existence beyond the reach of Spartan law led to his corruption, as 
well as his own sense of being beyond or above the lawful equality practiced in Sparta. It 
is worth pointing out that Alcibiades’ superiority also led him to lead a life of παρανοµία 
vis-à-vis Athens (cf. VI.15.4). Àνοµία describes freedom from law or the absence of law, 
such as was the state in Athens during the plague (II.53.1).       
58 One could argue that Themistocles is not “lawless” but a “law unto himself.” But this 
would still have to be understood as constituting an independence from the laws of 
Athens rather than an internalization of those laws. It is precisely because of the example 
of Themistocles that Edmunds’ stress on the Athenians’ “inner sense of shame”, “proper 
fear,” and “knowledge of their duty” (1975, 59-60) does not quite capture the heights of 
Athenian virtue.      
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Pericles’ Qualified Lawfulness 
Pericles delivers the Funeral Oration in observance of an ancestral law (II.35.1; 
II.34.1; II.46.1). But it should be emphasized that his observance of the law stands in 
dramatic tension with his own assessment of what is needful or appropriate. Pericles 
demonstrates this by explicitly refusing to praise the law and then proceeding to articulate 
precisely why the law in question is not praiseworthy.  
He begins his oration by questioning the adequacy of speech to do justice to 
deeds. He is astonished that deeds should be honored with words rather than with more 
deeds, and he notes the risk of entrusting the reputation of these men to his ability to 
speak (II.35.1). He then wonders whether he will be able to satisfy the expectations of his 
listeners, and he expresses his fear that his words will arouse envy and, with it, 
incredulity (II.35.2). Finally, despite these worries, he submits to his obligation (χρὴ) to 
offer his praises, “since these things were thus sanctioned as noble by the ancients” 
(II.35.3).  
This is in many ways a standard opening for a public speech of praise. As Nicole 
Loraux has documented, Gorgias, Lysias, and Pindar offer similar preambles to their 
orations (1986, 236-9), as does Socrates’ Aspasia in Plato’s Menexenus. These tropes 
serve to gain the goodwill of the listener. The speaker’s final submission to the law, 
emphasized by the preceding difficulties, is “only to prove all the more his fidelity to the 
city” (ibid.). Raising the problem of envy and expressing his wish to fulfill the 
expectations of his listeners is the speaker’s acknowledgement that the city is final 
arbiter. And denigrations of speech gain the goodwill of the listener by expressing the 
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humility of the speaker and directing attention to the actions being praised. Consider 
Lincoln’s famous phrase in the Gettysburg Address: “The world will little note, nor long 
remember what we say here; while it can never forget what they did here.”59 
But despite Pericles’ adherence to these standard tropes, his use of them is 
peculiar. His denigration of speech is neither spoken as praise of the fallen nor as an 
expression of humility. The inadequacy of speech for Pericles stems not only from the 
incommensurability of words and deeds but also from the nature of democratic political 
assemblies. As Pericles explains, because the assembled crowd comprises at least two 
types of people, each with distinct expectations and desires—those who know the fallen 
and their deeds and wish to have them praised adequately, and those who do not know 
them and are more prone to envy—no single speech can satisfy both parties (II.35.2). 
Pericles’ denigration of speech, then, actually lays the groundwork for his denigration of 
the funerary law in particular and even of law as such. Because democratic political 
assemblies are heterogeneous, it is impossible to make a speech that is appropriate for all 
parties. The funerary law is fundamentally flawed because it is impossible to fulfill. Law 
as such, since it is general and therefore not tailored to particulars, is open to the same 
criticism. Law must at the very least be supplemented by judgment to suit present, 
particular circumstances.  
With this consideration, the distinctions that Pericles tacitly sets out at the 
beginning of his speech take on deeper significance. Pericles opens the Funeral Oration 
                                                
 
59 Though for Lincoln, as for Pericles, what was best remembered in fact was of course 
the speech.   
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by opposing what “the many” praise as noble (οἱ µὲν πολλοὶ…ἐπαινοῦσι…ὡς καλὸν) to 
what seems “to me” to be the case (ἐµοὶ δὲ…ἐδόκει: II.35.1). His own opinion is likewise 
set off, in his final pledge of subordination, from the established opinion of what is noble 
(ἐδοκιµάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν: II.35.3). He thus asserts that his judgment concerning 
what is needful in the circumstances is superior to what is held to be noble by both law 
and prevailing opinion. More importantly, his assertion is persuasive because it is 
justified by his reasonable criticism of the law in question: a single speech is necessarily 
ill suited to a heterogeneous audience. Accordingly, though he proves himself dutiful in 
practice, he remarks that he will do his duty only “to the greatest possible extent [ὡς ἐπὶ 
πλεῖστον],” i.e., not completely (II.35.3).    
It is notable, however, that his attempt to fulfill the law indicates his seriousness 
about lawfulness or nobility even as he critiques it. Indeed, the tension between prudent 
judgment and noble lawfulness is the same tension at the heart of Athens’ “realism,” 
which is based on and never wholly free from their seriousness about the noble. This 
movement toward clarity of judgment through critiquing, without fully abandoning, the 
human regard for the noble is perfectly in keeping with the main theme of the oration, 
and therefore it is an aptly chosen introduction to this speech. With his opening 
deprecation of the noble practice of offering praise, Pericles is announcing a new 
criterion for what is praiseworthy: it is praiseworthy to act prudently, according to one’s 
knowledge of what is needful, rather than in obedience to law or established practice—
and prudence includes the need to defer to established practice in certain circumstances. 
He is, again, offering an alternative to the Spartan idea of the virtuous citizen. As the 
Spartan king Archidamus remarks of his own city, “we are of good counsel because we 
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are educated with less learning than to disdain the laws and, through discipline, with 
more moderation than to disobey them” (I.84.3). Let the Spartans be praised for obeying 
the law, Pericles responds; Athenians will be praised for obeying their judgment.  
As Pericles’ speech progresses, he drops the distinction between his own 
judgment and common opinion and speaks instead in the first person plural: “we.” Being 
true to the genre, he adopts his role as the voice of public opinion (Loraux 1986, 236-9). 
But even in the opening gambit his antagonism was not toward the many simply, but 
toward the many speakers before him who had observed the law “already [ἤδη],” i.e., in 
the past. And he also distinguished his opinion specifically from the opinion established 
“by the ancients” (τοῖς πάλαι: II.35.1). His antagonism, it becomes clear, is toward what 
is old or traditional. The superiority of present judgment over deference to tradition or 
law that is implicit in his early statements requires in turn that he elevate the present 
generation in general—it implies the triumph of “us, now” over those who came before.  
Hence Pericles’ “praise” of the older generations, again a familiar trope of much 
encomiastic literature, is also unusual. Rather than presenting the past as a golden age 
that the present generation ought to emulate, Pericles interprets the past in light of the 
present acme of Athenian excellence. The oldest generation was worthy of praise for 
freely bestowing the land of Attica on succeeding generations, Pericles states (II.36.1). 
And “those, our fathers, are yet worthy of still more praise” for acquiring more (II.36.2). 
But the present generation has accomplished the most: “and we ourselves—these ones 
here now, having established ourselves and still being most of all in our prime—we have 
augmented these things beyond [what we inherited], and we have prepared the city in all 
ways to be most self-sufficient, both in war and in peace” (II.36.3). It is the remarkable 
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capacity of the present generation that deserves the highest praise. With this introduction, 
Pericles turns to the way of life that has made the present city great, which constitutes the 
majority of his praise of the fallen (II.36.4; II.42.4).       
In refashioning these common features of encomiastic oratory, then, Pericles is 
illustrating the very tension between deference to what is held to be noble (law or 
tradition), on the one hand, and free judgment, on the other, that is at the heart of 
Athenian political life. He is attempting both to defer to the established practices of 
funerary oration while at the same time using those practices to convey a new 
understanding of the true greatness of the Athenian as precisely one whose judgment 
renders him to the greatest extent free from tradition or law.  
 
Glory as the Greatest Good 
Though Pericles praises the deliberateness of the Athenians, he does not go so far 
as to suggest that they are simply calculative or that their moral freedom leads them to 
fail to satisfy the needs of the city. They choose to serve the city because it is noble to do 
so. But they do not choose to do what is noble because it appears to be their own good in 
any straightforward or simple way. To say simply that they prefer glory above all else 
would be to deny that they see the pursuit of glory as risky or self-sacrificial—that is, as 
noble. But “Pericles is emphatic in portraying [Athens’ imperial] splendor and the 
willingness [of individual Athenians] to devote themselves to it as noble, by which he 
means first and foremost that it transcends mere ‘calculations of advantage’” (Stauffer 
and Collins 1999, 6). Our admiration for the soldier’s choice is elicited by its paradoxical 
appearance: the choice is remarkable precisely because it entails real risk of real sacrifice 
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of other important goods. “The longing for the other things [the things of prosperity] does 
not cease […] indeed, the soldiers’ choice to seek vengeance in the face of this longing is 
more impressive than if they should have ceased to have had any concern at all for these 
other objects” (29; cf. Rusten 1986 and 2001, 166). We fail to appreciate the beauty of 
Pericles’ praise if we conclude that he is attempting to make death choiceworthy by 
making the attainment of glory appear simply advantageous. While it is undeniable that 
Pericles equates noble courage with individual happiness (II.43.4), it is also important to 
acknowledge the tension between the nobility of self-sacrifice and the advantage of self-
interest that pervades the speech. Thus, though Michael Palmer’s interpretation of 
Pericles’ speeches is excellent in most respects, he goes too far in his assertions regarding 
the role of glory in the Funeral Oration. Palmer writes:  
 
What Pericles is trying to maintain is that to die in defense of the city is not really 
a private loss but a gain, because one thereby wins the greatest glory, and glory is 
a greater good than wealth or safety. Pericles attempts to solve the problem of 
how the city can ask its citizens to die for it by denying the sacrificial character of 
the death, by denying that the tension between the public good and the private 
good is indissoluble. (1982, 830)  
 
As I have already argued, Pericles does not diminish the sacrificial character of these 
soldiers’ actions. Arendt, too, rightly notes that dying for glory is remarkable because the 
urgency of life is, in fact, urgent. Achilles’ choice is difficult, and his plight is moving, 
because both he and the reader know that by choosing glory he is sacrificing a long life. 
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Pericles’ emphasis on the clarity of thought and awareness of risk evident among the 
soldiers—at least in his telling—is similarly meant to make their sacrifice more 
remarkable. Hence, if it is the case that Pericles makes glory appear to be a greater good 
than wealth or safety, this is complicated by the fact that glory also appears to be 
something noble, which means that it must risk or sacrifice other true goods. Indeed, in 
the Funeral Oration, the “apex of glory” comes to sight only with the sacrifice of life 
(II.42.4). And as Pericles says in the exhortative peroration of his first speech, “for both 
cities and individuals, the greatest honors come from the greatest risks” (I.144.3).  
According to Pericles’ Funeral Oration, then, this strength of soul—which unites 
understanding and boldness in the capacity willingly to face up to what is needful, even 
or especially when it requires the risk of harm to oneself—constitutes the peak of human 
excellence. And this is what he claims to be unique to Athenians in the best case if not 
(always) in fact.  
 
The Practical Intention of Pericles’ Funeral Oration 
Michael Palmer is only one of many who have concluded that the intention of the 
Funeral Oration is to convince Athenians that their own greatest good consists in 
sacrificing themselves on behalf of the city. Arendt, of course, is another great advocate 
of this reading. And Pericles’ speech offers much support for this interpretation. He 
claims that in some cases otherwise unexceptional men “became good” by dying in 
defense of Athens (II.35.1; II.42.2); that they died at the “peak of fame” (II.42.4); that in 
return for their sacrifice they received—individually—“ageless praise” (II.43.2); that 
being honored brings more delight than does wealth (II.44.4); that “softness” is more 
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painful than “unfelt death” (II.43.6); and that the courage they exhibited constitutes true 
human happiness (II.43.4). And in the midst of this he explicitly exhorts his listeners to 
emulate these men who lost their lives because they faced the dangers of war without 
hesitation (II.43.4). It is no wonder that Arendt takes Pericles’ speech as the archetype of 
the human aspiration to immortality through grand acts of political devotion.   
I cannot and do not wish to deny that Pericles’ intention must be in part to prepare 
his fellow citizens for the possibility that they, too, may be asked to make the “ultimate 
sacrifice.” Indeed, Pericles’ own defensive strategy did not eschew offensive military 
action altogether; he recommended avoiding only hoplite battles in Attica and efforts to 
expand the empire. Athens continued to pester the Peloponnesians with her navy in order 
to prevent or truncate Sparta’s depredations in Attica (I.142.4; II.23.2-24.1, 58.1-3); the 
siege of Potidaea was at that time still unresolved, requiring men to serve there (II.58.1); 
and the maintenance of the empire would require Athenian forces to suppress rebellions 
among the island cities (e.g., Mytilene: III.2-3).  
Still, the primary purpose of Pericles’ appeals to noble sacrifice is not to 
encourage more men to fight and die for Athens. Pericles’ praise of Athenian virtue 
suggests that, in the best case, the Athenian citizen is not expected to die nobly for 
Athens; rather, he is expected to do whatever is necessary on her behalf, motivated by his 
own knowledge of what is needful. Here discretion really is the better part of valor. This, 
of course, may require boldly risking one’s life. But it is important that this does not 
always require such boldness. It requires more general virtues: prudence, which may at 
times recommend boldness but at other times caution; and resolution, or the ability to 
stick to one’s judgment even in the face of the most terrible things. This may seem like an 
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over-subtle or insignificant distinction. But it is significant in this case. It means that 
Thucydides’ Pericles differs from Arendt’s. For Thucydides’ Pericles praises, above all, 
the mental clarity and rational confidence of the fallen Athenians, rather than their 
desperate longing for immortal praise. Moreover, by praising these soldiers for choosing 
to do what was needful even at the risk of sacrificing their lives, Pericles is in fact 
preparing the Athenian people for a very different sacrifice. His intended effect is to 
ennoble the sacrifice of property for the sake of life precisely because Athenians are too 
willing to sacrifice life for the sake of property. To see this, we must consider the broader 
context in which this speech takes place.   
 
The Speech in Context 
As we have noted, Pericles offers his Funeral Oration at the end of the first year 
of war in accordance with the laws of the city in order to commemorate those who lost 
their lives in battle (II.35.1, 35.3; II.46.1; II.34). The men whom he is commemorating 
are few: Athens suffered losses in only one skirmish during the first year of the war, in 
which “not many” cavalry were killed (II.22.2). Yet the circumstances of these losses are 
important.   
The war officially commenced with a Spartan invasion of Attica, led by the 
Spartan king Archidamus. His plan was to engage the Athenians on land, knowing that a 
single pitched land battle would favor the Spartans and hoping that one decisive blow 
would end the war. Pericles foresaw this Spartan strategy and advised the Athenians to 
abandon their homes and farms in the country and move into the fortified city, where they 
could defend themselves without facing the Spartans on the field. With their store of 
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resources and access to goods through her naval empire, Athens would be able to weather 
the Spartan invasions indefinitely. The strategy was to avoid the decisive battle that the 
Spartans were seeking, which the Athenians would likely lose because of their inferior 
skills in hoplite warfare, and turn the war into one of attrition, which the Athenians would 
likely win because of their superior resources (I.141.6; II.13.2-8). Archidamus’ invasion 
in 431 B.C.E. was the first of many attempts to draw the Athenians out of the city and 
force them to fight on land.  
Archidamus’ strategy relied on two observations about human nature. First, he 
knew that young men tend to be eager to fight (II.20.1). Thucydides confirms that this 
was indeed the case in both Sparta and Athens. Enthusiasm for the war was high at the 
outset, since “there were many youths in the Peloponnese and many in Athens, who 
welcomed the prospect of war on account of their inexperience” (II.8.1).60 Second, 
Archidamus knew that painful perceptions are more poignant than theoretical 
considerations. As he informs his troops, “anger [or passion: ὀργὴ] seizes all those 
suffering the sight of something they are unaccustomed to at the moment [when they see 
it] and when it is right before their eyes; and it is those consulting their reason least of all 
and their spiritedness most of all who enter into action” (II.11.7).61  
                                                
 
60 Literally, “who accepted the war not unwillingly,” though this is awkward in English.  
61 The construction of the sentence is awkward and possibly corrupt, though the sense is 
clear. See Rusten 2001, 112-113. The phrase I have translated “right before their eyes” is, 
literally, “in the eyes” (ἐν τοῖς ὄµµασι). Note the echoes of Pericles here: action goes 
together with a kind of blindness or ignorance that is incompatible with reason.  
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Counting on these natural human tendencies, Archidamus planned to disrupt the 
Athenians’ reasonable caution and prompt them to act in a fit of rage at the sight of the 
destruction of their homes outside the city walls. Accordingly, he chose to occupy the 
largest deme close enough to the city to be visible—Acharnae—and “making camp and 
remaining there a long while, he ravaged it” (II.19.2). He expected that this visible 
destruction would encourage the Acharnians, who were pent up in the city, to clamor for 
war, which would in turn, he hoped, rile up the significant number of young men in 
Athens and draw the whole city into a land battle. Failing that, the attack would at least 
create division among those trapped within the city, since the Acharnians would likely 
lose their motivation to assist in any future action after watching the rest of the Athenians 
stand idly by as the Acharnian lands were destroyed (II. 20.2-5).  
Archidamus could not have predicted more accurately the effect his actions would 
have on the Athenians. On seeing the Spartans occupy Acharnae, the Athenians “no 
longer considered it endurable.”  
 
[It] appeared terrible to them, the land being ravaged in plain sight, something 
which the youths had never before seen—nor had the elderly except during the 
Persian Wars—and it seemed [better] to them and to the others and most of all to 
the youths to go out against them rather than witness [this]. (II.21.2)  
 
The Athenians “had been stirred up in all ways” (II.21.3), and in their anger at Pericles, 
they forgot his earlier advice entirely. Quite the contrary, “they reproached him as a 
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coward62 for not leading them out although he was a general, and they held him to blame 
for [or as the cause of: αἴτιόν] all that they were suffering” (ibid.).     
Just prior to this episode, Thucydides prepares us to understand the shrewdness of 
Archidamus’ offensive strategy (and the difficulty of Pericles’ defensive strategy) by 
detailing the hardship of the Athenians in abandoning their homes and moving within the 
walls of Athens. The majority of Athenians, Thucydides tells us, had always been 
accustomed to living in the country (II.14.2). Though Theseus had long ago unified the 
region politically, the Athenians nevertheless continued to live in more or less 
autonomous settlements outside the walls (II.16.1). Pericles’ defensive strategy required 
“leaving behind both their homes and their hereditary temples—which had always 
belonged to them in accordance with the former constitution [πολιτείας]” (II.16.2). To the 
Athenian citizen, moving into the city required him to change his very “way of life”: “it 
was nothing other than forsaking his own city” (ibid.). 
The only thing that prevented Archidamus’ strategy from being entirely 
successful was Pericles’ refusal to allow the assembly to meet. He stopped the Athenians 
from convening because he feared that they would act in anger [ὀργῇ] rather than with 
judgment [or resolve: γνώµῃ] and on that account make the great mistake of abandoning 
his strategy and confronting the Spartans in the field, as Archidamus wished (II.22.1). 
Having temporarily delayed that imprudent action, Pericles sent out the cavalry, not so 
                                                
 
62 ἐκάκιζον means to abuse or reproach. But the reproach is implicitly that one is “bad” 
(κακός), meaning morally bad generally and cowardly in particular (cp. I.105.6 and 
V.75.3.)  
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much to prevent the Spartans from ravaging Attica as to prevent them from falling upon 
lands “close to the city,” i.e., within sight of those who could not stand to see it (II.22.2; 
cf. III.1.2). It was during this operation that those few soldiers over whom Pericles 
delivers his Funeral Oration died.    
 
The Boldness of Inaction 
This context of the Funeral Oration makes implausible the suggestion that 
Pericles is attempting to encourage others to emulate these soldiers by dying nobly for 
their city. Indeed, these soldiers died precisely because the Athenians were too eager to 
risk their lives on the battlefield. The only deaths in the first year of the war resulted from 
Pericles’ desperate attempt to shore up the flagging Athenian resolve to stay within the 
city by removing the painful vision of destruction that caused those passionate clamors 
for engaging the Spartans. That is, these men died because the Athenians—whom 
Pericles is praising for their resolution in the face of the most terrible things—failed, on 
account of the terrible sight of their burning homes, to stick to their resolution not to fight 
the Spartans.  
The political purpose of the Funeral Oration, then, is not to encourage more men 
to seek a noble death. It is rather to encourage the noble resolve that Athenians admire 
but apparently lack. The Athenians should emulate the fallen soldiers’ fortitude, not their 
fate. The beautification of citizen virtue, the glimpse of eternity, and the celebration of 
resplendent glory in Pericles’ speech are not primarily in the service of mustering the 
martial spirit. As in the case of the contests and sacrifices that the Athenians hold 
throughout the year, his oration is meant to “drive away pain” and provide “rest for the 
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mind” (II.38). He wishes to draw the attention of Athenians to the longest possible view 
of things, a vision that he hopes will inoculate them against the immediate force of the 
passions. 
The political purpose of the Funeral Oration, then, which is identical to the 
purpose of all Pericles’ speeches, is to reinvigorate Athenian commitment to his cautious 
and defensive—but prudent—war strategy. In his final speech, Pericles again urges the 
Athenians to pursue “everlasting remembrance” through actions that bring “momentary 
brilliance and future fame” (II.64.5). But Thucydides informs us that Pericles’ intention 
there was “to turn their minds toward what was more soothing and less fearful” (II.59.3; 
cf. II.65.1) so that they might be more willing to stick to his advice (II.65.2; also II.65.8-
9). They required this boost of spirit not to inspire them to go out and fight but to stay in 
and endure, because “they were pained by their sufferings, the people because although 
having little to begin with they lost even this, and the affluent because their beautiful 
country possessions—both buildings and expensive furnishings—were being destroyed” 
(II.65.2). The Funeral Oration’s beautification of Athenian moral strength is meant 
primarily to ennoble that sacrifice, the pain of which would otherwise drive them to risk a 
much more permanent sacrifice. For, as he exhorts his fellow citizens in his first speech, 
“you ought not (χρὴ) to make your lamentation over houses and land, but over bodies; for 
these do not supply men, but men these” (I.143.5; cf. II.62.3). 
 
Pericles’ Refounding  
It has recently been suggested that Pericles’ strategy amounts to a refounding of 
Athens on a new political order, and that the Funeral Oration facilitates this refounding 
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by offering the Athenians a new self-understanding. The image of the perfected Athenian 
in the Funeral Oration, according to this reading, is meant to ease the outrage of those 
who might otherwise “rebuke the Periclean strategy as a surrender of Athenian manhood” 
(Templar 2015, 159). There is something to this. The Athenian movement into the city 
entailed a radical political change for the majority of Athenians. To repeat, “for each it 
was nothing other than forsaking his own city,” meaning his deme outside Athens’ city 
walls (II.16.2). Pericles’ strategy required that the Athenian people give up not just their 
homes and temples and way of life but even the hope that they might yet preserve these 
through bold action. They were asked to act instead on Pericles’ “cowardly” call to hide 
behind the walls of Athens indefinitely (II.21.3),63 and even, perhaps, to give up their 
lands and become entirely dependent on the navy. It would not have been surprising if 
these Athenians responded to the prospective abandonment of their homes as the Melians 
did in their fateful hour: “to submit straightaway leaves no hope for us; but with action 
we may still hope to stand upright” (V.102.1). Even if Pericles’ strategy is merely 
“tactical” (Palmer 1982, 826), it is a tactic that demands an apparently permanent 
transformation of the city based on the premise that preserving the old order is hopeless. 
                                                
 
63 Rusten notes that “at least two comedies appear to have branded Pericles openly as a 
coward, and probably belong to this year” (1989, 128). He refers to Hermippus’ Moirai 
and Cratinus’ Dionysalexandros. The year in question is 431 B.C.E, the year of the first 
Spartan occupation of Attica, when, according to Thucydides, the Athenians “reproached 
[Pericles] as a coward for not leading them out although he was a general” (11.21.3). See 
my discussion of this line above.  
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Thucydides calls attention to just how radical this transformation is by stressing the 
people’s inability to submit fully to Pericles’ plan, evidenced by the long delay between 
their resolution to adopt his recommendation and their enactment of it, which they finally 
carry out only on the eve of the invasion. Unlike Pericles, the Athenians outside the walls 
are never so confident that their hopes must be abandoned and that such a transformation 
of the city is necessary. 
As we have seen, the Athenian refusal to give up the hope that they might yet 
preserve their demes is both the strategic weakness that Archidamus seeks to exploit and 
the strategic weakness that Pericles fears will undermine his plan. Indeed, Pericles 
testifies to the power of this hope—a power that seems to outstrip even his own power of 
speech—when he states that he would order the people to raze their own homes, “if I 
believed I could persuade you” (I.143.5).64 His subsequent remark is telling. He fears 
Athens’ “mistakes” more than Sparta’s plans (I.144.1). He means specifically that he 
fears that the Athenians will take unnecessary risks, such as attempt to extend the empire 
during war or, as the immediate context of the remark suggests, confront the Spartans in 
defense of their ancestral homes (I.143.5). On the other side, Archidamus encourages the 
Spartans not to destroy Attica indiscriminately or completely. He wants to preserve the 
Athenian lands in order to preserve Athenians’ hopes. Such hopes make unspoiled lands a 
“hostage” that he can exploit (I.82.3-5; but cp. I.81.6). He, like Pericles, recognizes that 
                                                
 
64 Recall also that at the peak of the Athenian clamor to go out and defend their homes, 
Pericles managed the situation by refusing to call an assembly (II.22.1). There, too, we 
see that he is aware of the limits of his capacity for speech.  
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the Athenians would be more difficult opponents if their lands were destroyed, since they 
would then be forced to think of themselves as “islanders”: they would be liberated from 
attachments beyond the “shores” of the walled-city (Taylor 2006). Archidamus does not 
want the necessity of pursuing Pericles’ plan to become plainly evident to the Athenian 
demos. Pericles, conversely, wishes they would burn their homes themselves because the 
Athenian resistance to becoming “islanders” is a resistance to reason, insofar as his plan 
represents what is rational. Their attachments beyond the walls of the city encourage the 
Athenians to entertain irrational hopes that those lands can yet be preserved. This 
resistance to reason, as we saw, is the theme of Pericles’ first speech and is connected to 
the people’s awareness that fortune always prevents absolute confidence that adherence 
to a given plan will lead to success.  
What is perhaps more remarkable than the Athenian refusal to heed Pericles’ 
advice is Pericles’ own confidence in that advice. Indeed, as I noted in discussing his first 
speech, Pericles appears open to the possibility that chance might remain a problem: even 
the best-laid plans can fail, and even poor plans succeed. Moreover, how does he know 
what is needful? What constitutes his own clarity of thought as distinguished from the 
muddled, irrationally hopeful thinking of the Athenian people? The key to Pericles’ 
clarity of thought proves to be his rejection of the divine, as the next chapter will show.  
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Chapter 5 
Rational Confidence and Pericles’ Theology 
 
 
Scholars often pair Pericles’ evident rationalism with his doubtful piety. He has 
been hailed as a leader of the Greek Enlightenment, as a founder of secular politics, and 
as a rational humanist; he has been described as agnostic, atheistic, impious, and free 
from vulgar superstition (Nichols 2015, 48; Orwin 1994, 20; Kagan 1991, 10, 23, 165-
171; Edmunds 1975, 39; Ehrenberg 1954, 91-98; Plutarch 6.1-3). Yet Pericles’ final 
position on the gods is still contested. According to some, Pericles denies the influence of 
the divine in human affairs because he envisions an Athens that satisfies the highest 
human longings and therefore needs no gods (Orwin 1991, 20). Along these same lines, 
J.J. Pollitt states that in Periclean Athens the “gap between men and gods vanishes” 
(1972, 87. Cf. Kagan 1991, 165-166). Whether through the apotheosis of Athens or the 
sufficiency of human politics at its peak, the suggestion is that Pericles’ political project 
attempts to make gods superfluous.  
Others have suggested that Pericles gives voice to a new and even unique piety. 
For instance, C.J. Herington writes, “to the Pericleans . . . Athena is Athens” and 
therefore devotion to Athens is devotion to Athena. Consequently, “every thinking 
Athenian who had been fired by the Periclean ideal ‘believed’ in Athena” (Herington 
1955, 56; cf. Kagan 1991, 170). More recently, Mary Nichols has suggested that Pericles 
embodies “genuine piety,” which consists in recognizing “the limits of the human in 
 	   123	  
relation to the divine” (Nichols 2015, 111).65 Plutarch was perhaps the first to defend a 
version of Nichols’ claim. After noting some of the benefits that Pericles derived from 
Anaxagoras, Plutarch adds that, as a result of spending time with that philosopher,  
 
[Pericles] seems also to have become superior to fear of daimonic things 
[δεισιδαιµονίας]—that [fear] which is produced by astonishment at things above66 
among those who, being ignorant of the causes of these things and excited about 
daimonic things, are agitated on account of their inexperience […]—for natural 
reason frees one from timidity and inflamed fear of daimonic things by producing 
stable reverence [εὐσέβειαν] with good hopes. (“Life of Pericles” 6.1)  
 
Plutarch suggests that vulgar piety is mere superstition while Pericles’ rationalism 
belongs with “reverence.” Moreover, Pericles is hopeful and steady because he knows the 
                                                
 
65 It is not entirely clear what Nichols means by “genuine piety.” I suspect that she means 
that Pericles is not an atheist; rather, he believes that there may very well be gods but not 
ones that intervene in human affairs, at least not in any rational or predictable way.  
66 The word µετέωρος is used to describe things that are raised or up high (such as an 
acropolis) or that are taken up (such as arms). It can also mean, as in this case, “things in 
the heaven above,” but in the naturalistic sense of “astronomical phenomena” (LSJ s.v. 
“µετέωρος” A.II). Meteors, for instance, are µετέωρα. For this reason it is also used to 
describe a person who is absent-minded—one whose “head is in the clouds,” as we 
would say (ibid., A.III.5).      
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causes of things, which frees him from the vicissitudes of those whose fearful superstition 
makes them so excitable. Plutarch explains that this rational freedom from superstition 
does not entail a rejection of divine ends or limits. The “naturalist” (ὁ φυσικός) 
complements the “diviner” (ὁ µάντις) because natural reason understands the causes that 
explain how phenomena occur, while divination understands the divine ends that natural 
phenomena signify (ibid., 6.2-3). Nichols, too, defends the combination of reason and 
piety: “piety does not lie in ceding the human capacity to deliberate, judge, and act to 
divine forces”; it only circumscribes the realm of human knowledge and action within its 
bounds (2015, 111). For Nichols, the limits of human action are divine because they are 
“beyond reason,” a definition of the daimonic that she borrows from Pericles (ibid.; see 
II.61.3 with II.64.1-2).  
 But Pericles’ political speeches and actions betray his thorough rejection of the 
divine. He rejects the claim that divine signs should be sought in natural—or even 
daimonic—phenomena, despite Plutarch’s suggestion that such a view of the divine does 
not preclude rational politics. Whether what we are left with can be called “genuine 
piety” will have to be considered later. But it is already difficult to see how that “piety” 
could amount to anything more than a genuine appreciation of the fact that chance—mere 
chance, which is daimonic only insofar as it is “beyond reason” (παράλογος: II.61.3 with 
II.64.1-2)—can disrupt even the best-laid plans. To put it another way, Pericles’ 
acknowledgment of “daimonic” limits to human action is at the same time a rejection of 
the idea that there are purposive or divine limits to human action. This rejection of the 
divine appears to be in the service of his desire to see the world as it truly is, which for 
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him means to accept that natural necessity and chance—rather than divine wish or will—
govern the world.  
 
The Absence of Gods 
 Pericles’ rejection of the divine first comes to sight negatively: it is conspicuous 
that he almost never refers to the gods. The exceptions only make the case stronger. 
Pericles explicitly refers to divine things three times. He mentions Athena once, but his 
remark is hardly pious. He suggests to the Athenians that, should they run out of war 
funds, there is plenty of available wealth among their sacred items and in their 
sanctuaries (II.13.4). Should they become truly desperate, there are some forty talents of 
gold on the statue of Athena that could be removed and used (II.13.5). He does say that 
they would be required to replace whatever gold they use, but, unlike Nichols, I read this 
as a concession to his audience’s piety more than a disclosure of his own (cp. Nichols 
2015, 111). As Lowell Edmunds notes, the Athenians never resort to this expedient in the 
course of a 27-year war that destroys and impoverishes the city, which reveals “the 
difference between Pericles’ and the people’s views” (1975, 38).  
 In the Funeral Oration, Pericles makes what appears to be a pious remark on 
Athenian lawfulness. He says: “in public affairs we most of all do not transgress the law 
on account of our fear (or awe: δέος), being always obedient . . . both to those [laws] set 
down in order to benefit people being treated unjustly and to those [laws] that, although 
they are unwritten, bring undisputed shame” (II.37.3). According to Hornblower, the 
appellation “unwritten” may have been understood to mean “divine” (2003, 302-303). 
This is not an unreasonable reading. As Hornblower points out, Xenophon has his 
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Socrates draw out of Hippias this same commonsense understanding of the phrase 
“unwritten laws” in the Memorabilia (4.4.19). And Sophocles’ Antigone states explicitly 
that unwritten laws come from the gods (Antigone 450-470). But if this is the significance 
of Pericles’ statement, then we are tempted to conclude that the allusion is ironic. For 
immediately after speaking of unwritten laws, Pericles makes a second explicit reference 
to the divine that is as casually irreverent as his comment about the statue of Athena. 
Pericles states that among the great goods available to Athenians are public competitions 
and sacrifices, which provide “much rest to the mind” (II.38.1). The gods do not inspire 
fear but ease. In Pericles’ understanding, religious devotion is one of many ways in which 
Athenians relax from their habitual frenzy of activity. It is the public equivalent of the 
“fine estates” that they delight in privately, which “every day drive away pain” (ibid.).  
 In his third speech, Pericles explicitly refers to the divine for the third and final 
time. He says there that the plague was a “daimonic thing,” and that daimonic things 
must be borne “of necessity,” since they cannot be anticipated (II.64.2). This is a clear 
denial of the pious claim that daimonic events—events that are unanticipated because 
they appear to be exceptions to the natural course of things and are for that reason 
“beyond reason” (II.61.3 with II.64.1-2)—ought to be interpreted as indications of divine 
favor or disfavor. For the pious view holds that suffering such misfortunes is neither 
necessary nor unpredictable: suffering can be avoided by heeding the will of the gods, as 
revealed in prophecies and daimonic omens, and therefore people can expect their 
fortunes to correspond to their piety or justice rather than their calculations. This is the 
implicit view of those who saw the plague as a divine punishment of the Athenians 
(II.54.1-5) and the explicit view of the pious Melians (V.104.1). As Clifford Orwin 
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remarks, to insist that the plague must simply be borne of necessity is to “reject the divine 
admonition it allegedly conveys” (Orwin 1994, 20). Indeed, it is against this background 
that we have to consider the Athenians’ perpetually wavering judgment. If fortune makes 
them doubt the dependability of human foresight, is this not in part because they believe, 
implicitly or explicitly, that one’s fortunes do not always correspond to one’s calculations 
because they correspond to one’s justice or nobility?  
 
The Rejection of Prophecy 
 This brings us to Pericles’ implicit dismissal of prophetic interpretation more 
generally. Just before Pericles’ third speech, in which he asserts that the proper response 
to the daimonic plague is to endure, Thucydides notes that the affliction fulfilled two 
prophecies. First, there was an ancient prophecy that a plague would come with a Dorian 
war (II.54.2-3). Second, at the outbreak of the war, the oracle of Delphi said that the god 
would support the Spartans if they fought with all their might (I.118.3, II.54.4-5).  
 Thucydides dismisses the first prophecy with the explanation that the people 
recalled the words of that prophecy only on account of the evil they were suffering 
(II.54.2). Moreover, there was a disagreement over whether the prophecy said “plague” 
(λοιµός) or “famine” (λιµός). The present agreement that a plague was prophesied only 
reveals the inclination of human beings to “fashion their memories according to what 
they suffer [or experience: ἔπασχον]” (II.54.3). While scholars agree that this reveals 
Thucydides’ rationalistic approach to prophecies, few note the significance of placing this 
remark just before Pericles’ implicit rejection of the prophetic interpretation of the plague 
on the same grounds. Thucydides primes the reader here by suggesting two possible 
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interpretations of that daimonic event: either prophecy can explain great misfortunes, or 
great misfortunes explain our openness to prophecy. The one accords with the pious 
understanding of the plague, shared by the Spartans and much of the Athenian demos; the 
other interpretation Pericles will go on to embrace in his subsequent speech. And 
Thucydides’ stated reason for dismissing the prophecy—the tendency of human beings to 
fashion their thoughts according to their present sufferings—is a clear echo of Pericles’ 
understanding of human beings. In his first speech, Pericles states that the central 
problem he faces as a democratic statesman is that the people “change their minds 
according to their misfortunes” (I.140.1), a claim that he repeats in his speech about the 
plague (II.61.2). We should therefore not overlook Thucydides’ use of “Periclean” 
reasoning here.  
Perhaps the author is signaling his ultimate agreement with Pericles on this 
question. But he is also elaborating on Pericles’ criticism of the Athenian demos. For 
Thucydides here draws a connection that Pericles had not drawn, namely, that the 
people’s openness to prophecy is connected to their variability of judgment. When we 
read Pericles’ third speech after Thucydides’ “Periclean” commentary on the first 
prophecy, we are prepared to see that Pericles’ repeated rebukes of Athenian inconstancy 
are also rebukes of Athenian piety (or superstition). The inability of the citizens to hold 
fast to their judgments in times of misfortune is connected to their tendency to understand 
those misfortunes as signs of divine disfavor. The constancy of Pericles’ own judgment, 
conversely, rests on the conviction that misfortunes are merely chance setbacks that must 
be weathered “of necessity” (II.64.2), and hence never divine warnings that must be 
heeded. Fortune or chance discloses nothing significant to human calculations.  
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 Thucydides is more generous with the second prophecy—that the god would 
support the Spartans in the present war if they fought with all their might. He remarks 
that Athens was the city most affected by the plague, while the Peloponnese was virtually 
free from it; and that it struck right after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica, as if it 
were fighting on their behalf (II.54.5). Indeed, by tradition plagues were held to be “evil 
arrows” of divine vengeance used by Apollo, the Delphic god (cf. Iliad 1.8-12, 380-385). 
And although Thucydides notes that at the time there was speculation that the Spartans 
were eager to break off their campaign because of the plague—suggesting a lack of 
confidence in their divine immunity—he confirms that this was in fact “the greatest” 
Spartan foray into Attica, both in terms of the duration of their occupation and the extent 
of its devastation (II.57.1). Thus, Thucydides defends the view that the plague squarely 
opposed Athens’ defensive efforts and supported Sparta’s vigorous attack. Thucydides 
himself, then, may be more willing to entertain the prophetic interpretation of the plague 
than his treatment of the first prophecy suggests. Even if he ultimately agrees with 
Pericles, his remarks on the second prophecy are an often-overlooked qualification to his 
confident dismissal of the first. 
 But Thucydides also dismisses an oracle earlier in his account of Pericles. 
Pericles’ war strategy required that the Athenians move behind the walls of the city in 
order to weather the annual Spartan invasions, as we have noted. Since the majority of 
Athenians lived outside the city walls, this meant that the city quickly became 
overcrowded. The Athenians took up residence wherever they could find space, 
occupying uninhabited lands, sanctuaries, shrines, public towers, and even the 
Pelargicum, a sacred area beneath the acropolis (II.17.1, 3). Occupation of the 
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Pelargicum was forbidden by an ancient curse and discouraged by a Delphic oracle: “the 
Pelargicum is better unworked” (II.17.2). Thucydides playfully remarks that the oracle 
was correct, but not as one would expect: “For misfortune did not come to the city on 
account of the unlawful occupation”; rather, the misfortune of war brought about “the 
necessity of the occupation” (ibid.). Inhabiting the Pelargicum did not cause the war as a 
divine punishment but was caused by the war as its necessary consequence. And yet, as 
the prophecy states, it would indeed be better if the land were unoccupied, since this 
would mean that the cause necessitating occupation—the misfortune of war—did not 
exist.  
Thucydides’ doubts about the oracular prohibition are evident. He appears 
confident that the relevant causes are natural necessities rather than divine beings that 
enforce divine laws. But focusing on what this reveals about Thucydides again distracts 
from the significance of the episode in its context. Thucydides’ interpretation of the 
unlawful occupation of the Pelargicum is his final comment on why the relocation that 
Pericles’ war strategy required was hard on the Athenians (II.14.2). Thucydides’ 
commentary on the difficulty of relocation begins with a digression into ancient Athenian 
history: the unification of Athens under Theseus. The point is apparently to draw 
attention to Theseus’ decision to leave largely independent the various villages that 
participated in the unification, only requiring that they recognize Athens as the common 
political center and that they all contribute to a common fund (II.15.2). Thucydides then 
adds that Theseus also instituted the Synoikia, a religious festival celebrating Athenian 
unification, and he remarks that “the Athenians still even now put on the festival for the 
goddess at the public expense” (ibid.). The statement appears to be a digression from the 
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digression. Thucydides was recounting the long independence of Athenian villages, 
despite political unification, presumably to make us feel the full weight of abandoning 
that independence. What is the relevance of the festival? Scholars suggest that the line is 
an interpolation. Indeed, the entire digression is thought to be rich with interpolation, 
since it is rich with “antiquarian material” about ancient traditions that are apparently 
superfluous to Thucydides’ narrative (Hornblower 2003, 265-267). Why, for instance, 
does Thucydides go on to tell us about yet another ancient festival that certain Athenians 
“still even now” observe (II.15.4)? And why do we need to know about the spring from 
which the ancients drew water for “the most worthy things,” and which Athenians use 
“still even now […] for weddings and other sacred things” (II.15.5)?     
The relevance of these comments, however, is not hard to see. Thucydides is 
drawing attention to the endurance of sacred institutions because, even though Theseus’ 
unification of Athens was politically expedient (it allowed him to hand down to posterity 
a city that “had become great”: II.15.2), expediency was not the only critical support to 
his political reform. The endurance of the attending religious devotion speaks to Theseus’ 
political wisdom in instituting a festival to sanctify his reforms. More generally, 
Thucydides may be suggesting that political expediency is insufficient on its own to 
institute lasting change (cf. Coulanges 1956, 130-132).  
This prepares the reader to doubt the prudence of Pericles’ dismissive view of 
religious festivals. Like Pericles, Theseus sought to make Athens a “great city,” and, like 
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Pericles, he combined capacity with intelligence (II.15.2).67 But Theseus recognized that 
what constitutes a city or a people is its common devotions. Pericles appears at best 
indifferent to the sacred practices of the Athenians, and at worst destructive of them.68 
Thucydides’ emphasis on the centrality of religious devotion to the life of the city is 
meant to illuminate the political dangers of Pericles’ irreverent war strategy. As 
Thucydides presents it here, the sacred is literally the central and defining feature of the 
city: he “proves” where old Athens was situated on the implicit premise that cities are 
build around places of common worship, hence one can discern the location by the 
concentration of temples in that area of the city (II.15.4-6). This argument again implies 
the persistence of the sacred—the temples remain despite changing political 
circumstances, such as the growth of the city. But more importantly his statements 
establish sacred places as the defining feature of “a city.” 
It should be no surprise to the reader, then, when Thucydides says in the 
immediate sequel that for a country dweller to abandon his village and move into the city 
was “nothing other than forsaking his own city,” for it required him and his fellow 
citizens to leave behind “both their homes and their hereditary temples—which had 
                                                
 
67 Pericles speaks of himself, at least, as σύνεσις (I.140.1; cf. II.62.5), while Thucydides 
says that he is δυνατός (I.127.3; I.139.4). Thucydides attributes both of these qualities to 
Theseus (II.15.2).  
68 Pericles is not wholly unaware of the political necessity of common devotion. His 
exhortation to gaze upon the power of Athens and become “lovers” of her appears to be 
his alternative (II.43.1).  
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always belonged to them in accordance with the former constitution” (II.16.2, my 
emphasis). Pericles acknowledges the great difficulty of the sacrifice that he is asking 
them to make, but he apparently does not realize that this is due to anything more than 
their attachment to property. For Pericles’ statements about the Athenian sacrifice focus 
only on the abandonment of their homes and fail to note the abandonment of their sacred 
places (I.143.5; II.62.3). Thucydides’ emphasis on the enduring attachment of people to 
their sacred places and practices is therefor meant to stand in contrast to Pericles’ silence 
on that score. And Thucydides offers that contrast not because of a casual interest in the 
provenance of such things but because it is this attachment that makes Pericles’ plan so 
difficult in practice: moving within the walls necessitated abandoning what was most 
sacred to Athenians in the country. It is therefore also no surprise to the reader that the 
people were so angry with Pericles for refusing to let them fight: not to fight was indeed 
to abandon their homes, but it was also to forsake their temples and gods.  
To return to the point: Thucydides’ own dismissive interpretation of the prophecy 
about the Pelargicum is not just a playfully irreverent aside. It is the culmination of a 
general statement about the difficulty that the Athenian concern for the divine posed to 
following Pericles’ plan. This prophecy is noteworthy because it reveals that Pericles’ 
plan forced the Athenians not only to offend their own gods, by abandoning their local 
temples, but also Athens’ gods, by squatting on sacred land. It required deserting the 
places that piety would have them occupy and defend, and occupying and defending a 
place that piety would have them leave deserted. In Pericles’ view, both the war and his 
strategy were necessary (II.61.1). But his prudential calculations only established the 
necessity of those actions by denying that pious considerations have any place in 
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prudence. For no pious person would believe that offending or placating the gods is 
irrelevant to prudential considerations. 
Indeed, Pericles’ whole career as an Athenian political leader rests on a rejection 
of the political significance of the gods. For, as the Spartans are quick to point out, 
Pericles is the descendent of an accursed family (I.127.1). To redress an ancient offense 
and lift the curse, Athens ought to cast Pericles and his family out of the city (ibid.). In 
fact, Pericles’ ancestors were already cast out twice, though in both cases they returned 
(I.126.12).69 The Spartans were not so naïve as to hope for Pericles’ exile (I.127.2). They 
knew, apparently, that considerations of political prudence had as much traction with the 
Athenians as piety, and so they knew that the Athenians would not drive out their best 
general at such a crucial moment. However, the Spartans did hope to sow suspicion that 
the war was partly due to Pericles’ unfortunate ancestry (ibid.). Hence, although the 
Spartans doubted that the piety of the Athenians would be sufficient to exile Pericles, 
they believed that the Athenians took the curse seriously. The Spartan plan assumed that 
the Athenians would “in part” interpret the war as a divine punishment rather than as a 
political necessity (ibid.). Pericles—the accursed one himself—implicitly rejects this 
view by staying in the city and leading Athens into the war.  
This episode encourages the reader again to wonder whether Athenian seriousness 
about the divine undermines Athenian confidence in the necessity of war. For the war 
                                                
 
69 It is worth noting as well that the Spartans were behind one of the past purifications of 
Athens (I.126.12). Thucydides is surely suggesting that they had political motivations in 
the earlier case, just as he explicitly says they do on this occasion (I.127.1). 
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might be avoided by lifting the curse, i.e., by exiling Pericles. And after suffering two 
invasions and the plague, the Athenians do indeed blame Pericles as the cause of their 
misfortunes (II.59.1). They blame him in large part, surely, because he was the chief 
proponent of the war. But might they also blame him because his contempt for the gods 
makes Athens deserve such punishments?  
 
Prudence and Fortune 
The foregoing evidence suggests not only that Pericles is less pious than the 
Athenians at large but also that his impiety is central to his prudence. As Thucydides 
remarks in passing, the prospect of the war led to extensive planning on both sides 
(II.8.1). But it also led to an abundance of oracles and prophecies, and to a heightened 
scrutiny of such incidents as might prove prophetic, such as an earthquake on Delos at 
that time (II.8.2-3; cf. I.22.3). This suggests that openness to prophecy comes with 
uncertainty about the future—the paralogos of war, as more than one Thucydidean 
character will call it (I.78; VII.61). Pericles’ judgment, however, appears to be 
unperturbed by the uncertainty that comes with war and indifferent to the attending 
abundance of prophecies. The stability of his judgment is in part due to his rejection of 
the idea that considerations of the divine have any relevance to the certainty or 
uncertainty of the future. Specifically he rejects the view that occurrences of fortune—
events that appear “beyond reason”—reveal divine sanctions or admonitions.   
It is for this reason that Pericles ridicules both human judgment and chance when 
the Athenians begin to doubt their decision to go to war. The deepest meaning of 
Pericles’ statement that fortune is “ignorant” (ἀµαθής) is that there is no will or intention 
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behind it (I.140.1): it does not signify divine approbation or prohibition. The statement is 
a rejection of the view voiced by the Melians, who claim that fortune is “from the gods” 
and that they have every reason to hope for their share of it, “since we are pious men 
making a stand against those who are not just” (V.104.1). In Pericles’ view, fortune is 
indifferent to moral desert, which is why daimonic things must—and can—be borne “of 
necessity” (II.64.2).  
Pericles’ view of fortune is therefore at once hopeful and somber. The hope that 
Pericles encourages in the Athenians comes from the recognition that chance setbacks 
need be nothing more than temporary obstacles. A setback does not signify divine 
opposition, and hence the proper response to it is not to acquiesce or repent but to 
persevere. That Athens often refuses to yield to misfortune suggests that Pericles’ attempt 
to encourage the adoption of this view of fortune was to some extent successful: 
Athenians refuse to allow misfortune greater significance than it deserves (II.64.3; 
VIII.1). Moreover, this understanding of fortune perhaps allows Athenians to face up to 
their own apparent injustices without fear of cosmic retribution (at least when they are 
not suffering), which is why Pericles does not hesitate to boast about Athens’ good and 
evil deeds, her offensive attacks on other Greek cities, and even her seeming “tyranny” 
over the empire (II.41.4; II.39.2; II.63.2). But that hopefulness is bought at a steep price. 
For to assert that exceptions to the natural course of things are not indications of a 
divinity that rewards the pious and punishes the impious is also to assert that there are no 
purposeful exceptions to the natural course of things. It is to assert that there is no way to 
secure for oneself an exception to natural limits. It is to embrace the thought that the only 
forces beyond human action governing the world are natural necessity and “ignorant” 
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chance. Hence, the same reasoning that might encourage Athenians to endure misfortune 
forces them also to accept the ultimate misfortune: that “all things by nature decline” 
(II.62.3). Pericles’ view of fortune or chance thus entails this “theology”: there are no 
gods that limit our ambitions to less than we are able to attain, but there are also no gods 
that can satisfy our longings for more than the limits of necessity or chance allow.             
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Chapter 6 
Unthinking Courage and the Athenian Thesis 
 
 As I illustrated in chapters two, three, and four, Pericles’ speeches are unified by 
his persistent attempt to encourage the Athenians to see or at least act on “what is 
needful.” His own steady foresight is constantly contrasted with their variable judgment, 
and we have just seen that his steadiness depends on his claim that the world operates 
(almost) entirely in predictable, necessary ways. But this last assumption does not require 
rejecting the idea that there are gods who intervene in human affairs. Gods might act in 
predictable ways, and therefore foresight is not impossible even in a world governed by 
the divine. For instance, the Melians hope or expect that the gods can be counted on to 
reward piety and to protect against injustice.70  Insofar as Pericles denies that there are 
gods that intervene on behalf of justice, as we have just seen, he aligns himself with the 
Athenian envoys at Melos, who believe that the hopes and expectations of the Melians 
                                                
 
70 This view would suggest that the gods are themselves bound by nature and therefore 
not omnipotent. Moreover, the suggestion is not just that the gods are bound by natural 
laws in the physical world, but by their own natures. For instance, we might say that it is 
in Zeus’s nature to reward the just, which would imply that the idea of justice is prior to 
Zeus’s recognition of the just and that his nature compels him to reward those that he 
recognizes as just. Only then could one be completely confident in one’s foresight that 
the just will be preserved and the unjust will suffer. A god capable of acting arbitrarily 
would solve the problem of subordinating the divine to nature, but at the expense of the 
possibility of reliable human foresight. 
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are foolish. Although Pericles’ position will prove to differ from that of the envoys, the 
envoys’ explicit denial of the role that gods play in human affairs is the clearest account 
available in Thucydides’ text that can justify Pericles’ remarkable confidence in human 
reason. It is likely, then, that Pericles accepts some version of the Athenian argument so 
boldly expressed by those envoys to Melos.  
 
The Melian Dialogue     
The dialogue between Athens and Melos happens in the sixteenth year of the war, 
when the Athenians arrive at the island-city of Melos in full force with the simple goal of 
compelling the islanders to submit to Athenian hegemony of the “watery part of the 
world” (Taylor 2009, 78). There is no explicit mention of any Melian offence other than 
that of being an island free from Athenian subjugation. As such, however, Melos belies 
the Athenian claim to be “masters of the sea” (V.97; see also Taylor 2009, 115f.). The 
dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the leaders of Melos that precedes Athens’ 
attack on the island-city is therefore revealing, since it is in part meant to explain or 
justify what looks to be an unprovoked and hence unjust attack on a neutral island. 
Indeed, the Athenian argument has come to be one of the most important contributions to 
political theory, as the oldest extant articulation of what is now called “political realism.” 
That is, it is an extended debate about whether concerns of justice have or ought to have 
any bearing on relations between foreign powers. 
The fundamental Athenian claim is that everyone is compelled to pursue what 
appears to him to be advantageous, including rule over others, and therefore that “by a 
necessity of nature those rule wherever they are able” (V.105.2). That is, it is impossible 
 	   140	  
not to pursue one’s advantage, and so it is impossible for those who are truly capable of 
gaining what they desire to curb the exercise of their power in its pursuit. The claim 
expressed so baldly on Melos is first made by some other Athenian envoys at Sparta, 
before the outbreak of the war (I.75.3, 76.2). Those envoys begin with the 
uncontroversial moral claim that what is done by compulsion is not morally considerable: 
we neither praise nor blame what is done by necessity. For example, what is done out of 
fear is morally excusable because everyone recognizes that mortal fear sometimes 
necessitates and hence justifies actions that are otherwise morally blameworthy, such as 
committing acts of violence against others. What is innovative about the Athenian 
argument at Sparta is that the speakers extend this ordinary moral reasoning beyond fear 
to other psychological “compulsions”: the desires for honor and advantage (ibid.). They 
conclude that all actions taken to attain what appears good derive from compulsive 
passions that have the same force as fear and that are therefore morally excusable by the 
same argument. In support of their claim they observe: “no one yet, when he happened to 
be able to acquire something by strength, has turned away from having more because he 
preferred [justice]” (I.76.2). The Athenian understanding extends the realm of necessity 
so broadly as to make considerations of justice irrelevant, and they thereby “explode the 
ordinary moral horizon” (Bartlett 2001, 85). But the argument is not for that reason 
unpersuasive. Simply put, the claim is that even when we seem to be acting most 
selflessly, we are still ultimately motivated by considerations of self-interest insofar as 
we only pursue these things because we consider them good.  
Following this reasoning, the Athenians on Melos insist that their dialogue with 
the Melians proceed by considerations of advantage alone, “setting aside justice” (V.90) 
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as well as all other “noble expressions” (V.89). The Athenians claim to be speaking “as 
knowers” to knowers, who know “that considerations of justice adjudicate in human 
speech when there is equal necessity [i.e., among those of equal strength]; but that the 
preeminent do what they can and the weak yield” (V.89). Only when equality of strength 
renders force moot do considerations of justice have any sway. In the present 
circumstances, the preponderance of strength on the Athenian side makes the question of 
justice superfluous. The Melians should consider only the most expedient means to 
preserve themselves.         
The Melians in effect confirm that they are “knowers” in the Athenian sense when 
they agree to this demand, noting that the Athenians have “compelled” them to argue on 
Athenian terms (V.90). But they also accept the Athenian position more fundamentally 
when they choose not to claim that standing fast against Athenian superior strength is 
simply just or noble or pious, even (or especially) if it is dangerous. They could simply 
admit that they choose to do what is noble and accept the consequences rather than doing 
what is advantageous. Instead, they argue that their justice, piety, and nobility constitute 
rational grounds to hope that their resistance will in fact be advantageous in the end 
(V.104). That is, they believe that noble resistance to unjust aggression is the best means 
of self-preservation. Hence, the question at the heart of the debate between the Athenian 
and Melian representatives is not whether one should do what is right even when it is 
disadvantageous. The question is whether justice (and piety) or the naked pursuit of self-
interest is a better means to securing one’s advantage. In other words, is Periclean 
foresight, based on a clear understanding of practical necessities and material resources, a 
better or worse predictor of success than Melian foresight, which is based on an 
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understanding of who is in the right and who in the wrong? The Melians concede from 
the very beginning that their “irrational” refusal to bow to Athenian military superiority 
does not rest on the belief that it is better to die in the right than to live in the wrong; 
rather, they claim that doing what is right is the surer path to their preservation. Hence, 
they claim that their decision is in fact rational, even or especially on the Athenian 
premise that what is rational is what actually conduces to one’s own advantage. One 
might wish, at this point, to note the destruction of Melos as decisive evidence in favor of 
the Athenian position: the Melians did not, in fact, preserve themselves even though they 
acted nobly. But it is worth noting, as many scholars have, that neither did the Athenians 
preserve themselves (e.g. Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, 17). For Thucydides arranges his 
text such that immediately after the slaughter of the Melians, the Athenians suffer their 
own defeat in Sicily, “the greatest reversal [of fortune] to befall a Greek army” 
(VII.75.5). Perhaps, then, the Athenians were punished for the injustice of their attack on 
the pious Melians after all.  
However that may be, by admitting that they, too, believe themselves to be 
pursuing their self-interest by the best means available, the Melians bear witness to the 
fundamental Athenian insight that all human beings always seek their own advantage: 
even the greatest risks are entered into only with the hope or conviction that those risks 
are in fact safe. In other words, the Melians in effect concede that justice, piety, and 
nobility are only instrumental. Their final statement confirms that this is their true 
position.  
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Our opinion is no different than it was at first, Athenians, nor in one short 
moment will we be robbed of the city that we have inhabited in freedom for 700 
years now, but trusting in fortune from the gods, which has preserved us up to 
now, and in vengeance from human beings—the Lacedaimonians—we will 
attempt to preserve ourselves. (V.112.2) 
 
The Melians are just as confident in the rational foundation of their foresight as are the 
Athenians. Because they are “pious men making a stand against those who are not just” 
(V.104), they have reason to expect that they will receive assistance from the gods, in the 
form of good fortune, and from human beings, the Spartans, whose regard for justice will 
lead them to avenge those who are wronged. The Melians concede, then, that they are 
seeking self-preservation, and they claim that their endeavor is “not altogether irrational” 
because their justice permits them to hope that human and divine assistance will correct 
the imbalance in power that would seem to put them at a disadvantage (V.104). They are 
unmoved by the Athenian arguments, and they are willing to stake their lives on the 
expectation that their justice will preserve them. Such high stakes make it unlikely that 
the Melians are stating their position in terms of advantage only because the Athenians 
ordered them to do so. This appears to be their genuine belief. 
 The Melians’ de facto acceptance of the premise that all human beings seek their 
own advantage, however, is fatal to their pious hopes. For their own rational pursuit of 
preservation rests on the premise that there are beings in the world, gods and men, who 
can be counted on to protect and reward the noble against the ignoble. It is easy enough, 
then, for the Athenians to point out that, because the Melians agreed on the priority of 
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self-interest in human affairs, it is unreasonable for them to expect the Spartans to put 
themselves at any great risk to become the saviors of Melos. The Spartans’ own abiding 
concern with self-preservation will make it unlikely that they will court unnecessary 
dangers to defend the cause of justice (V.105.3-111). However, if the Melians are correct 
in believing that acting nobly is in fact instrumental to self-preservation, because it is the 
best way to assure divine assistance, then perhaps they could count on Spartan piety to 
bring the Spartans to their aid. For the Spartans, too, might defend justice in the hope or 
expectation that they would thereby make themselves worthy to receive divine good 
fortune.  
Dispensing with the Melians’ expectations of divine assistance is somewhat more 
difficult, and it is this argument that is of particular interest to us. Recall that we are 
attempting to understand why Pericles is so confident that fortune does not come from the 
gods and that considerations of divine intervention should be disregarded in prudential 
calculations; and we turned to this dialogue because we here get the clearest Athenian 
argument against the rationality of such pious hopes. That argument also rests on the 
Athenian insight that by nature all human beings are compelled to seek their own 
advantage, broadly understood. The Athenian envoys make this argument: 
 
For we hold, both as it seems regarding the divine and as has always been clear 
regarding humanity, that by a necessity of nature those rule wherever they have 
the power; and we neither laid down the law nor were we the first to be subject to 
it once it had been laid down; but we are subject to it—we found it in existence 
and when we leave it behind it will be in existence forever—and we know that 
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both you and others, having come into the same power as ours would act in the 
same way. (V.105.2) 
 
If indeed it is the case that human beings “by a necessity of nature” always seek their 
own advantage, then no human being can be blamed for securing his advantage in 
whatever way he can—by ruling when he has power, for instance, or by arguments from 
justice when he does not. There is no moral high ground in the Athenian view. No one 
seeks justice, nobility, or piety as an end in itself; all seek these as instrumental goods in 
the natural human pursuit of advantage. Thus, the Athenian premise, which the Melians 
accept, denies that there is any morally significant difference between the greedy 
imperialism of the Athenians and the noble resistance of the Melians. Both are seeking 
their advantage, albeit by different means. And neither can be blamed or praised for this, 
since both are simply driven by the same natural necessity. It is this claim that destroys 
the grounds on which Melian confidence rests. For precisely if there are gods who care 
about justice—as the Melians insist and the Athenians do not explicitly deny—then for 
this very reason they will refuse to intervene on behalf of the Melians, who just like the 
Athenians are acting in accordance with the law of self-interest to which all human 
beings are subject (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, 18).  
 
Pericles and the Athenian Thesis   
 The Athenian dismissal of the possibility of divine intervention, then, rests on the 
insight that human beings are subject to the natural, exculpatory compulsion to pursue 
what they perceive to be their self-interest. One cannot be blamed for his subjection to the 
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laws of nature. And more importantly, one cannot expect to be praised and rewarded for 
noble sacrifices that are not, in fact, sacrifices. As Robert Bartlett remarks, “the greatest 
sacrifice undertaken with the expectation of receiving the greatest reward ceases for that 
very reason to be a sacrifice. If this is correct, such ‘sacrifice’ cannot reasonably claim to 
merit the extraordinary intervention needed to fulfill in every case that expectation” 
(2001, 101). Insofar as “noble” sacrifices are undertaken for the sake of reward, to that 
extent they are not noble and do not deserve to be rewarded. Pericles’ confident 
indifference to prophecy and prophetic fortune reveals that he, too, grasps this insight, 
and that he understands human actions in terms of the natural compulsion to seek one’s 
advantage rather than in terms of free, noble choices that are rewarded by “fortune from 
the gods” (V.112.2)—and that he believes this despite his encomium praising the noble 
choices of the Athenian dead in the Funeral Oration.  
 If this is the case, then we must conclude that Pericles’ rejection of fortune as a 
divine sign entails the rejection of the noble as an end that is simply choiceworthy in 
itself. This means also a rejection of Arendt’s understanding of the highest peak of 
political life. For in Pericles’ speeches, noble action went together with hopes for future 
prosperity—hopes that are under this understanding irrational. But if this is the case, why 
does Pericles at times encourage rather than censure the Athenians for their “trust in 
virtue,” as the Athenians do the Melians (for example at V.111.3)?  
The Athenians on Melos, in fact, differ from Pericles in some important respects. 
The Athenian envoys believe that fear is the strongest deterrent, that being hated is a sign 
and source of strength, and that being lenient is a sign of weakness, which invites revolt 
(V.95, 97). In these respects, the Athenian envoys on Melos have more in common with 
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Pericles’ successor Cleon than with Pericles himself. The Athenians are angry with the 
Melians for a perceived injustice (as was Cleon with the Mytilenians: compare V.8971 
and III.37-40), and they, too, wish to make an example of their enemies simply because 
those enemies refuse to acknowledge Athenian superiority (compare V.95, 97, 99 and 
III.37.2, 40.1-2, 4, 7; also read V.116.4 in light of III.36.2). While the Athenians on 
Melos claim to be acting simply on cold calculations of their own interest, those 
calculations are based on the assumption that fear will teach their enemies to act 
rationally. And the Athenians seem frankly indignant—even morally indignant—that the 
Melians would dare to prove that assumption wrong. The Melians refuse ever to act 
“rationally,” insofar as it is not rational not to seek safety or preservation by trusting in 
otherworldly means. They will not turn their hopes to what is “manifest”—the necessity 
of submission in the face of overwhelming Athenian strength—but insist on placing their 
hopes in the “immanifest”—“divination and oracles and other such things that cause ruin 
by means of hopes,” as the Athenians put it (V.103.2). The Athenians punish the 
obstinacy of the Melians accordingly.  
Of course, that the Athenians are compelled to carry out their punishment of the 
Melians suggests that the Athenian envoys (and Cleon) are simply wrong about the 
compulsive force of their threats.72 The Athenians threatened the Melians on the premise 
                                                
 
71 See Hornblower 2010, 232, for the suggestion that this comment implies that the 
Melians did something to provoke the Athenians.  
72 Indeed, Cleon himself notes that Mytilene did not heed the example of its neighbors, 
which Athens subdued by force (III.39.3). Why, then, is he so confident that making an 
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that fear would by necessity compel obedience; the fact that they are forced to follow 
through on this threat betrays their foolish hopefulness about the effects of their show of 
force. Hence, the crucial difference between the Athenian envoys and Pericles is that the 
former have an unfounded confidence in the priority of human fear, which Pericles does 
not share. To put it another way, even if all are compelled to pursue what they perceive to 
be their interest, there is a great difference between those who do so through cold 
calculation based on the “manifest” and those who do so by means of hopes in the 
“immanifest.” The envoys on Melos do not acknowledge, presumably because they do 
not feel, the strength of the human longing to pursue self-interest by means of the latter.    
The speaker that most clearly presents the variation on the Athenian thesis that 
takes seriously human hopes in the immanifest is Diodotus, an otherwise unknown 
Athenian citizen whose timely speech preserves the rebellious Mytilenians from suffering 
a fate that would have rivaled the slaughter of the Melians. And it is telling that, while the 
Athenians on Melos fail to persuade the Melians to act “rationally” by threatening them 
with “the most terrible things” (τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν: V.93), Diodotus argues that it would 
be irrational for the Athenians to expect such “rational” fear from the Mytileneans on the 
grounds that no one adequately considers the risks when their decisions concern “the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
example of Mytilene will serve to prevent other rebellions—especially if, as he also 
argues, their revolt was the result of “human nature” coupled with an Athenian error of 
judgment (III.39.3-5)? 
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greatest things” (περὶ τῶν µεγίστων73), such as the political freedom that both Mytilene 
and Melos seek (III.45.3). Our desire for the greatest things outweighs our fear of the 
most terrible things. Hence, Diodotus’ expectations are grounded on his observation that 
human irrational or noble longings are stronger than prudent human fears, which is 
precisely opposite to the expectations of the Athenian envoys at Melos. This is the 
primary difference between these otherwise very similar situations.  
Indeed, the similarities between these two episodes are striking, and they invite us 
to compare the two accounts. Like the interlocutors at Melos, Diodotus and Cleon agree 
on the primacy of expediency over justice when considering affairs between cities 
(III.40.4, 44.1-2). And Cleon, “the most violent citizen” of Athens, argues that exacting 
vengeance on the rebellious island-city of Mytilene will serve Athenian interests because 
it will make Athens look strong and induce fear in other, would-be defectors, a thought 
the Athenians at Melos will later echo (III.36.6, III.40.7; compare V.95). But in 
anticipation of the Melians’ persistent “irrationality,” Diodotus counters Cleon’s position 
by arguing against his policy of deterrence on the grounds that the fear of death is not 
sufficient to curb human beings in the pursuit of the most resplendent goods, such as 
freedom and empire (III.45). What is important about Diodotus’ understanding for our 
purposes is that this is also the implicit view of Pericles, who encourages the Athenians to 
overcome their fears by extolling the Athenian empire and its devotion to freedom, both 
individual freedom and the freedom of city as a whole. He is confident that the grand 
                                                
 
73 Compare I.76.2, where the Athenian envoys at Sparta call fear, honor, and interest, the 
“greatest things” (τῶν µεγίστων). 
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hopes of freedom and empire will outweigh the immediate pains of war. Indeed, he is 
more than willing to fuel those desires and hopes that encourage the Athenians to “take 
risks” from “inadequate means,” as Diodotus puts it, despite encouraging them in his next 
breath to base their decisions on a careful accounting of their resources.  
 
Diodotus and Pericles  
 Diodotus’ argument is worth looking at more carefully. Unlike the Athenian 
envoys at Melos, Diodotus accepts that human hopes are stronger than human fears—that 
the anticipation of “the greatest things” carries more weight than the anticipation of “the 
most terrible things”—and yet he agrees with the envoys that indulging those hopes leads 
to ruin. 
 
In every instance, hope and eros—the one [eros] leading, the other [hope] 
attending; the one [eros] thinking out the plan, the other [hope] supplying the 
resource of fortune—are most harmful, and these immanifest beings are stronger 
than visible terrors. In addition to these, fortune contributes no less to the 
inducement: for there are times when, coming unexpectedly, she leads one to take 
risks—even [someone] from among those with inadequate means—and cities no 
less, especially concerning the greatest things, freedom or rule over others, and, 
when all are together, each irrationally esteems himself something greater [than 
he is]. (3.45.6) 
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Diodotus’ language is striking in light of the dialogue on Melos. Diodotus, too, speaks of 
the strength of immanifest forces, and he suggests that these lead human beings to trust in 
the gifts of fortune. According to Diodotus, however, these forces are not gods but 
desires and the hopes that may attend those desires. In addition, he identifies fortune as 
the factor that allows us to discount future obstacles or failures, which explains why we 
permit ourselves to anticipate good things rather than bad ones. In light of the uncertainty 
of the future, we gravitate toward what is more attractive. And despite the absence of 
gods in this account, one wonders whether Diodotus is implying that even without 
explicit reference to the divine, human beings tend to understand the gifts of fortune in 
terms of rewards and punishments for the deserving—that is, as rewards for those willing 
to make the greatest sacrifices or take the greatest risks on behalf of something great or 
noble or beneficent (cf. IV.65.4).   
Diodotus also squarely opposes the criticisms of the Athenians on Melos. He does 
not blame people or cities for acting on their longings “irrationally,” for “in every 
instance” these “immanifest beings,” when present, are “stronger than visible terrors.” If 
this is the case, then, the Athenian envoys at Melos are themselves too hopeful in 
thinking that their enemies—even those with obviously “inadequate means”—would 
buckle at the sight of manifest Athenian superiority. Despite all their attention to human 
psychological compulsions, the Athenian envoys on Melos are compelled to recognize 
that the Melians choose not to submit to the compulsion of fear. Because they choose to 
resist, the Melians are not only foolish, they are also an affront to Athenian superiority. 
And their offence is not only that they refuse to acknowledge Athens’ manifest 
superiority of strength, but also that they belie the Athenians’ superior understanding of 
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human nature. Such hubris deserves to be punished. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
Athenian destruction of Melos appears more vengeful than strategic (Pangle and 
Ahrensdorf 1999, 24). Athenian pride more than Athenian interest is on the line. For their 
own sense of nobility may rest, ironically, in the sense of danger they feel in rejecting 
what is traditionally held to be noble, and they are aggravated by the Melians’ dramatic 
refusal to acknowledge the Athenians’ noble resistance to that siren song.  
However that may be, the Athenian reaction is revealing. Their decision to punish 
the Melians reveals the error in their judgment: they overestimate the compulsive force of 
their manifest superiority of strength and they underestimate the compulsive force of the 
Melians’ hopes in the immanifest. Diodotus’ variation on the Athenian thesis is not 
subject to this error. He denies that the strong should ever expect the ready submission of 
the weak, for even the weak are prone to overestimate their chances of success, especially 
when they are in a crowd—i.e. when they constitute a city—or when they believe that 
fortune might intervene on their behalf (III.45.6). Human beings err “by nature,” 
Diodotus claims (III.45.3). They are always driven to take risks because all circumstances 
(ξυντυχίαι) give rise to passions (ὀργαί) that “lead them into danger” (III.45.4). Poverty, 
“by necessity,” leads to desperate boldness, while prosperity leads to arrogant hubris 
(ibid.). Neither circumstance produces passions conducive to moderation; both cause 
human beings to take risks against their better judgment. Indeed, the passions that drive 
the Mytileneans in their resistance to Athenian imperialism are on this reading no more 
blameworthy or exceptional than the passions that lead Athens in her imperialistic 
suppression of such revolts.  
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Moreover, Diodotus argues, because human longings always outpace prudent 
human fears, the Athenians should not attempt to rule by becoming an object of fear, 
even if their superior strength is overwhelming and manifest. This will only drive other 
cities to act in envy and desperation. Rather, Athens ought to rule by preserving in other 
cities the hope and expectation that their superiors will be merciful or just (III.46). Hence, 
Athenians should not present themselves as “realists,” indifferent to considerations of 
justice, even and precisely if they are. They could better suppress rebellion and acquire 
allies by demonstrating their abiding concern for justice, as the Spartans do when 
Brasidas appears to make good on their claim to be the “liberators of Hellas” (for 
example at IV.108.2). Indeed, most of the Greeks supported Sparta rather than Athens at 
the outset of the war because they believed that Sparta was fighting for their liberty 
(II.8.4).74  
What Diodotus recommends as Athens’ strategy for leadership in the Greek 
world, Pericles enacts in his leadership of Athens. He recognizes that arguments from 
self-preservation are not sufficient to motivate the Athenians to adopt his war strategy. 
Rather, he appeals to their grandest hopes—for freedom, for empire, for immortal fame—
                                                
 
74 There is much debate about Thucydides’ assertion that the truest cause of war was the 
growth of the Athenian empire and the fear this caused in Sparta (I.23.6). However, 
setting aside the nuances of the debate over who was to blame for the war and why, there 
is one obvious implication of the remark: Thucydides is declaring from the outset that 
Sparta went to war from a self-interested concern for self-preservation, not, as they 
presented it, from a noble desire to defend Greek liberty.    
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rather than to their fear of death. Indeed, the very grandeur of these hopes is attractive 
precisely because they show the Athenians’ noble disdain for such fears. As others have 
noted, the Athenians’ “grand imperial ambition is itself a sign of their noble superiority to 
calculations of safety and risk” (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, 25). Pericles himself 
moderates the Athenians’ envy and fear of his own ambition by presenting himself as an 
obdurate patriot—as one whose concern for the common good is unsullied by timidity or 
self-interest or inconstancy—and therefore as someone who would never sacrifice 
Athens’ collective ambitions to his own. His own noble disregard for self-interest makes 
him trustworthy. This is what most distinguishes him from Alcibiades, and that difference 
is what most prevented Alcibiades from being able to lead the Athenians as Pericles had 
(consider VI.15.4).  
Finally, Pericles understands the forces against which he contends to be natural 
human passions—rather than gods—that are implacably hopeful and always subject to 
changing circumstances. In all of these ways, Pericles betrays the fact that his view of the 
world (and the role of humans in it) is distinctly Athenian and more precisely Diodotean. 
The key difference, then, between Pericles and Diodotus, on the one hand, and the 
Athenian envoys on Melos, on the other, is that the former account for and accept the 
human attraction to noble deeds and the consequent eagerness to forego immediate 
interests in the name of goods that appear to exist beyond oneself. Both Pericles and 
Diodotus understand this phenomenon as an “erotic” compulsion that transcends 
“calculation” (compare II.43.1 and III.45.5). Hence, Pericles urges the Athenians to take 
risks “trusting in virtue” rather than calculation, as lovers of their city. And Pericles 
encourages rather than censures the Athenians for their “trust in virtue” because he 
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recognizes that the longing to deserve rewards for nobility from the “immanifest” is a 
stronger force in the human soul than prudent fears or the concern for safety. For just like 
the Melians, the Athenians—despite insisting that everyone is compelled to pursue his 
self-interest—also claim to deserve praise and rewards for their noble superiority to 
calculations of self-interest.  
 
The Athenian Envoys at Sparta 
Consider again, for instance, the Athenian envoys to Sparta, who voiced the 
Athenian argument just before the war broke out, long before the exchange on Melos 
took place. At that early conference among the Peloponnesian allies, the Athenians (who 
happened to be in Sparta on other business) asked to speak to the assembly with the 
intention of preventing war. Despite explicitly claiming that they were not there to defend 
their imperialistic activities, they do offer what amounts to a defense or explanation. In 
acquiring their empire, they were “thoroughly compelled” by the three strongest motives: 
fear, the desire for honor, and the desire for advantage (I.75.3). Moreover, that they were 
“conquered” by these forces is nothing out of the ordinary: it is human nature, and 
anyone else in the same position would and will suffer the same. “It has always been 
established that the weak are held down by the strong,” the Athenians assert, anticipating 
the later statement by the Athenians on Melos (I.76.2; cp. V.105.2). 
The envoys’ account of Athenian imperialism at first appears to stand in stark 
contrast to Pericles’ understanding of the Athenians, at least as presented in the Funeral 
Oration. Pericles, recall, recognizes that to praise the fallen soldiers he has to show that 
the actions in question issued from choice, that they were intentional (Aristotle, Art of 
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Rhetoric 1367b22-28). His claim, then, that the Athenians and their city are “worthy of 
wonder” (or admiration: ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυµάζεσθαι)75 for their way of life is accordingly a 
bold assertion of human freedom (II.39.4). This understanding is flatly denied by the 
defenses of Athenian imperialism propounded by the Athenians abroad—at both Sparta 
and Melos, as well as at Camarina76—according to which the Athenian empire resulted 
from laws of nature, which compel humans as humans to act as they do. According to this 
account, the Athenians have accomplished “nothing to be wondered at” (θαυµαστὸν 
                                                
 
75 The primary meaning of θαυµάζω is “to wonder at,” and it covers the same range as 
the English word “wonder,” from things that are simply curious or unexplained to those 
that are amazing or beyond belief. For instance, it is used to describe perceptions that 
lack immediately apparent explanations, as in “The Corcyraeans … were wondering why 
the Corinthians were backing water” (I.51.2; see also I.95.5, IV.111.2). But it is also used 
to describe the admiration one feels in the presence of something truly remarkable, as in 
“the king, it is said, was amazed at [Themistocles’] intelligence” (I.138.1; see also 
III.38.1). Unlike the English “wonder,” the Greek term also describes the honors that 
superiors expect from their inferiors, as in “to be honored in the appropriate manner” 
(I.38.2; see also VII.63.3). It is also noteworthy that θαυµάζω is the word used by Plato 
and Aristotle to describe the wonder that is the beginning of philosophy (Aristotle, 
Metaphysics 982b12f.; Plato, Theaetetus 155D).  
76 Euphemos defends Athenian imperialism to the Sicilians at Camarina, eschewing 
“noble phrases” and appealing principally to the compulsion of fear and considerations of 
safety (see, for example, VI.82.2). 
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οὐδὲν), since they have in no way deviated from “the way of human beings” (τοῦ 
ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου: I.76.2). Hence, while Pericles praises the Athenians for “utterly 
compelling” (καταναγκάσαντες) every land and sea to become accessible to them through 
their boldness, the Athenian envoys claim that the Athenians themselves were “utterly 
compelled” (κατηναγκάσθηµεν) by human nature to pursue such bold undertakings 
(II.41.4, I.75.3). The latter claim questions the assumption of human freedom on which 
deliberate choice and praise are predicated.  
But as the Athenian envoys at Sparta proceed, it is not at all clear that they are 
able to accept the consequences of their stated understanding of human nature. They 
claim twice that they were overcome by the three greatest things—fear, honor, and 
advantage—but their second statement includes a small but telling retrenchment. On the 
first occasion, they claim that they were “utterly compelled,” κατηναγκάσθηµεν, the root 
meaning of which is “necessity,” ἀνάγκη. In the second iteration they claim that they 
were “conquered,” νικηθέντες, by the three greatest things, a term that suggests these 
human “compulsions” should be understood in terms of relative strength, as something 
against which we fight and to which we often—though perhaps not always—succumb. 
This shift away from an absolute claim about necessity toward a claim of relative strength 
paves the way for the Athenians’ surprising next claim, namely, that the “necessities” at 
work in the human soul are, paradoxically, not quite absolute—at least not for Athenians. 
For the Athenians’ argument is not only that they are blameless for their imperialism but 
in fact that they are also worthy of praise and of their rule over others. They have a just 
claim to rule not according to human law, perhaps, but according to their superiority as 
rulers. And their superiority consists in the strength to overcome or resist those very 
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selfish forces that “conquer” the human soul and excuse what would otherwise be called 
injustice. Their unique strength, they go on to claim, allows them “to be more just in 
ruling over others than would accord with their present power” (I.76.3). 
The point, it is worth stressing, is not that they could be more unjust than they in 
fact are, but that they should be more unjust than they are, according to their own 
understanding of human nature. That is, they should not even be capable of the justice 
they practice because their strength over other cities (and hence their capacity to pursue 
their interest regardless of what justice dictates) ought to preclude it. Consider the same 
construction at II.50.1: The plague was “too difficult for human nature [to bear]” 
(χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν), i.e., it was beyond human endurance. The 
Athenian claim about their justice, strictly translated, should read similarly: they rule in a 
way that is “too just for their present power [to permit]” (δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν 
ὑπάρχουσαν δύναµιν).77 The formulation is designed to be paradoxical. We are meant to 
understand the Athenian position on human compulsion as setting an absolute limit on 
the extent to which the strong are able to practice justice: the powerful cannot act in 
accordance with what is said to be just because human beings are by nature too 
psychologically weak to pursue justice when they are fully capable of pursing interest at 
                                                
 
77 See Smyth 1079: “After a comparative, ἢ κατά with the accusative . . . denote[s] too 
high or too low a degree” (1984, 281). Jeremy Mynott’s translation captures the meaning 
well: “people deserve special credit if in following human nature and ruling over others 
they still behave with more sense of justice than their power would allow them to do” 
(2013, 47). 
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the expense of justice. The claim must be this strong for it to be exculpatory, as the 
Athenians insist it is. In light of this, the Athenian regard for justice that they go on to 
claim appears truly wonderful, even incredible.  
The position, then, is that one would only be worthy of praise for justice, and 
hence worthy of rule, if he were more just than one could reasonably expect a powerful 
human being to be. The Athenians claim that they are “worthy” of rule because 
Athenians are in the crucial respects stronger than human nature. And if they fail to live 
up to justice in every respect, it is excusable on account of “universal” human weakness. 
The envoys thus propose the thesis regarding human nature that by natural necessity all 
pursue their apparent advantage but that the Athenians are worthy of praise because they 
have carved out a narrow swath of moral freedom with such extraordinary strength of 
soul as to resist those very natural compulsions.  
In light of these considerations, the envoys go on to reveal the injustice of the 
blame they have received from those subject cities that complain of their treatment in 
Athenian courts. While those cities criticize the Athenians’ claim to be more just than 
they have to be as a failure to be completely just, the Athenians contend that being more 
just than they have to be is a remarkable triumph of human moral freedom in the name of 
justice (I.77.1-5). The Athenians alone continue to observe considerations of justice even 
when they know that this practice causes them harm, that is, even when it contradicts the 
principle that everyone pursues his own self-interest (I.76.4-77.5; cf. II.39.1, 40.5). Thus, 
the Athenian allies’ false assumption that humans are simply free moral agents leads both 
to unjust blame and to the failure to give just praise to those who exhibit the strength of 
soul necessary to exercise true moral freedom—those who “are worthy of praise” 
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(I.76.3). The Athenian envoys’ account of human nature is meant to correct these false 
assumptions. They thus intend to reveal themselves to be both blameless of injustice and, 
in fact, worthy of praise and rule.  
Despite my attempt to interpret the passage generously, it is hard not to conclude 
that the Athenians at this early stage in the war simply want it both ways: they excuse 
themselves from blame by appeals to natural human necessity while at the same time 
claiming that they deserve honor for their noble and just use of human freedom. That is, it 
appears to be impossible for them fully to face up to their espoused “realism” and accept 
what follows, namely, that just as no one can be blamed for pursuing his interest so can 
no one reasonably claim to be morally superior and hence more deserving than others.  
Like the Melians, then, the Athenians at Sparta seem unable simply to cast off 
“noble expressions” in light of their clear apprehension of the full meaning of the insight 
that everyone is compelled to pursue his self-interest. Like the Melians, the Athenian 
envoys consider themselves to be peculiarly worthy on account of their noble 
indifference to calculations of mere self-interest. The Melians, however, easily admit that 
their readiness to suffer harm—even to suffer “the greatest things”—is connected to their 
belief that their noble devotion to justice and piety is something good insofar as it secures 
them their future good fortune; the Athenians, on the other hand, insist that their regard 
for justice is praiseworthy precisely because it does not serve their own interests. Indeed, 
in the example above, the Athenian envoys imply that it would be much easier for them 
to rule by force than by law, but that they endure the hardship nonetheless, in the name of 
justice (I.77.1-6; cf. Bruell 1974, 28). This, for them, is a noble triumph over self-interest.  
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This leaves us with the impression that the Athenians are confused. They are 
unapologetic “realists,” who contend that all humans by nature are compelled to pursue 
their self-interest, while at the same time understanding themselves to be noble precisely 
because they sometimes forego their self-interest in the name of higher goods, such as 
justice or liberality or empire or glory. We are even encouraged to wonder whether there 
is really much difference between the Athenian “trust in virtue” and Melian piety. Can 
the Athenians really be so devoted to noble action without harboring some hope that the 
world will compensate their risks and sacrifices with good fortune? Is this not the true 
reason for their variability of judgment, and Pericles’ consequent need to appeal to their 
regard for nobility rather than to their self-interest? As Pangle and Ahrensdorf have 
concluded,  
 
by claiming that they deserve the rewards of empire and glory, [the Athenians] 
imply that they believe and hope […] that the world is such that ultimately human 
beings get what they deserve and hence that the world is fundamentally just. 
Consequently they must believe as well, albeit implicitly and half-consciously, 
that there are gods or divine powers who ensure that human beings are rewarded 
in accordance with their deserts. (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, 23)  
 
If indeed we “somehow sense” that living up to noble demands “in turn demands 
recognition or compensation” (Bartlett 2001, 99), is it possible not to hope and even 
expect the world to compensate us accordingly? And is this not, at heart, a form of piety 
that requires supernatural beings to intervene in the natural course of things on our 
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behalf, even if we are not fully conscious of these pious hopes? If this is the case, then the 
Melians appear to see more clearly where their regard for the noble points than do their 
Athenian challengers. They see and accept that their noble disregard for immediate self-
interest goes together with a trust in piety and justice that requires supernatural beings to 
reward their risks and sacrifices. The Athenians at Melos and Sparta appear, by 
comparison, “half-conscious” or confused.   
But however confused these Athenians may be, and however much Pericles’ 
rhetoric encourages (or did not discourage) that confusion, to say that they are “half-
consciously” pious distracts from their intellectual seriousness about the human concern 
for nobility. For what is most striking about the Athenian regard for nobility is their 
thoughtful and self-conscious refusal to allow true nobility to be merely instrumental to 
self-interest, as the Melians are so quick to admit is the case for them. Hence, the 
Melians’ solution is problematic from the Athenian point of view not only because it is 
incoherent—insofar as it rests on the expectation of rewards for “sacrifices” that are not, 
in fact, sacrifices, precisely because they are made in the expectation rewards—but also 
because it conflates nobility with advantage, which is what the Spartans do and what the 
Athenians intentionally refuse to do (V.105.4). The Athenians are not “realists” because 
they are simply blind to or unaware of their concern for justice and nobility; rather, as 
Robert Bartlett concludes, “the Athenians were forced to abandon justice altogether 
precisely on account of their respect for justice understood as something different from 
and higher than mere self-interest” (Bartlett 2001, 84). 
Pericles, more than anyone, attempts to satisfy without conflating both Athens’ 
self-interest and the Athenians’ abiding concern for the noble, which is why his speeches 
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vacillate between these two poles and why he presents the image of the perfected 
Athenian that he does. Pericles’ perfect citizen combines the noble disregard for danger 
with clear-sightedness or knowledge. To repeat: “He would justly be judged strongest of 
soul who knew most clearly the terrible and the pleasant things and did not turn away 
from danger on account of these” (II.40.3). To strive toward that vision of human 
perfection means never to lose sight of what is truly good and bad, but also never to 
suppress one’s aspiration to nobility. Precisely because the Athenians take seriously the 
insight that the noble is at once one’s highest self-interest while at the same time, 
paradoxically, being characterized by the sacrifice of self-interest, they are inclined to 
prize their clear-sightedness about the priority of self-interest over traditional 
understandings of nobility: they insist that insofar as courage is sacrifice for the sake of 
reward it is unheroic and unworthy of reward. Pericles encourages them, for that reason, 
neither to count on the “rewards” of good fortune nor to be agitated by the “punishments” 
of bad fortune—these will not come from superintending and just gods. But according to 
the same insight, the Athenians are also attracted to a purified form of nobility—one 
unsullied by blindness to their own self-interest. However, Pericles does not go so far as 
to expect the Athenians fully to give up their regard for the noble, if only because it may 
well be psychologically impossible to do so. Instead he promises them immortal fame, 
not so much because this is an end in itself or because it is a useful ruse but because it 
satisfies the ineradicable human longing for the noble without precluding the capacity to 
see the world as it truly is. That is, it is only when one faces up to the fact that noble risks 
and sacrifices are real risks and sacrifices—because there are no supernatural beings to 
compensate for them—that one can begin to face up to what the manifest situation 
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requires rather than placing one’s trust in immanifest forces that keep the justice ledger in 
balance. Even if one is ultimately seeking fame, there is a vast difference between those 
who do so trusting in their own lights and those who do so trusting in divine assistance.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to clarify Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles 
and his Athens. The hope animating it was that such an investigation will help us 
understand the modern attraction to robust citizenship, which we find in antiliberal 
thinkers such as Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition, Arendt explicitly attempts to 
recover the Periclean understanding of the ends of politics, the starting point of the 
present analysis. The most important distinction that emerged between Arendt’s Pericles 
and the Pericles that we encounter in the pages of Thucydides concerns their different 
understandings of what action is truly praiseworthy. For Arendt, true action issues from 
the peculiar human capacity to create new beginnings. She therefore celebrates what is 
new, novel, unconstrained by morality or even prudence, and which for these reasons can 
only be measured on the scale of “greatness.” The modern world, Arendt argues, does not 
participate in “action,” so understood; we lack, or have buried, the longing for immortal 
fame that leads to those remarkable human deeds that deserve to be remembered and 
which can therefore constitute a “reality” or narrative that transcends our limited 
existences.  
Pericles would reject this understanding. For however much Pericles contributed 
to the greatness of Athens, at the heart of his understanding of praiseworthy action is not 
a simple admiration for fame or glory, but a problem. Pericles sees that the noble actions 
that win fame are praiseworthy only when they are deliberate or freely chosen, and so he 
concludes that deliberation or clarity of purpose is essential to nobility. And though this 
leads Pericles to remark that clear-sighted courage would be truly praiseworthy, it is not 
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at all clear whether martial courage and clear thinking can ever be fully compatible. 
However that may be, Arendt ignores this aspect of Pericles’ thought, presumably 
because her explicit purpose is to leave “the activity of thinking” behind so that she can 
recover the vita activa from the obscurity it has fallen into as a result of the rise of 
philosophy (1998, 5, 17). Her project presupposes that the concern characteristic of the 
vita activa “is not the same as and is neither superior nor inferior to the central concern of 
the vita contemplativa” (1998, 17), and she imposes that assumption on Pericles.  
The Pericles whom Thucydides presents, however, does not maintain that strict 
division between action and thought. Indeed, he is the only character in Thucydides to 
use the term “philosophy” (II.40.1). And my intention throughout has been to show that 
one cannot understand Pericles’ statesmanship without seeing that his concern with 
political virtue is bound up with a concern for contemplative virtue. That is, if what is 
most praiseworthy is noble action undertaken in full consciousness of one’s actions, as 
Pericles suggests, then precisely those who are most serious about deserving praise must 
begin to consider what full consciousness or self-knowledge requires.    
Part of that full consciousness, for instance, would have to include the knowledge 
of one’s own motivations. And as the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians 
reveals, the Athenians take this concern seriously. For, as the Melians show, people tend 
to risk their manifest self-interest with the pious hopes that they will thereby secure their 
self-interest by other means—that they will be rewarded by superintending gods who are 
concerned with justice. The Athenians reject this view of the gods for the very reason that 
gods who care about justice would find no morally significant distinction between the 
frank self-interest of the Athenians and the “pious” or convoluted self-interest of the 
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Melians. According to the Athenian understanding, the human priority of self-interest 
(broadly understood) precludes the possibility of divine intervention in the sense of either 
reward or punishment. For Pericles, the clarity of thought he encourages includes facing 
up to this insight and seeing the world in terms of natural necessity and ignorant chance. 
Only then can one aspire to his stability of judgment, since that stability is based on the 
reasoned conviction that there are no intelligible exceptions to the natural course of 
things. But, to repeat, this insight comes from an abiding seriousness about what truly 
deserves to be rewarded or praised.   
If it is the case that Pericles’ exhortation to the Athenians to aspire to deserve 
praise is of a piece with his statement that to be truly praiseworthy is to face risks with 
eyes wide open (I.140.1 with II.40.3), then the thrust of Pericles’ statesmanship would 
point in a different direction than the one Arendt’s understanding suggests. Arendt’s 
singular focus on glory leads her to praise what is novel indiscriminately. Her 
understanding of action, in the words of one commentator, “can no longer find measure 
in fixed and determinate goals; politics, dominated by the thirst for recognition or glory, 
becomes an end in itself, unguided and unrestrained by any fixed purpose” (Pangle 1990, 
50). Pericles’ statesmanship, on the other hand, is animated by a problem that points in 
the direction of cultivating one’s capacity to see the world as it truly is, which includes 
considering what actions are really choiceworthy and praiseworthy, if only because one 
can take full responsibility for one’s actions and deserve praise only after confronting 
such questions. That thoughtfulness about action leads Pericles to be less reckless than a 
statesman of the Arendtian stamp would be, and it leads him to praise a form of 
citizenship that should be characterized more by prudence than by boldness. Whatever 
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excesses and difficulties the Athenians’ confused or inconsistent “realism” led them to, it 
is the genuine concern with seeing the world as it truly is that is lost in Arendt’s reading 
of Pericles’ vision for Athens. Indeed, if we wish, with Arendt, to “think what we are 
doing,” we would be best served by returning directly to Thucydides in order to recover 
the problem that animated Pericles’ thought. 
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Appendix:  
On “The Needful” (τὰ δέοντα) 
 
 
Because it was difficult to recall or recover precisely what was said during the 
war, Thucydides famously states in his remarks on method that his practice was to put 
into each speaker’s mouth the words that were τὰ δέοντα—needful or appropriate—in the 
given circumstances, according to his own judgment and sticking as closely as possible to 
the overall intention of what was said (I.22.1). It is mainly in light of this claim that 
Thucydides’ ambiguous use of τὰ δέοντα has attracted scholarly attention. And it is 
indeed not immediately clear what Thucydides means by the phrase. As Colin MacLeod 
remarks, “τὰ δέοντα is a notion as complex as rhetoric itself is complex” (1983, 52).  
Of course, MacLeod’s point is not that τὰ δέοντα is a difficult phrase to parse but 
that determining what the rhetorical situation demands—what words are needful or 
appropriate—is a complex and difficult task. That is, MacLeod is suggesting that τὰ 
δέοντα is a semi-technical term referring to rhetorical necessity, and as such “it 
corresponds to what Aristotle in talking of drama calls τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρµόττοντα 
[what is possible and suitable]” (ibid.). According to Aristotle, it belongs to the political 
person and the rhetorician to be able to say things that are plausible and appropriate in a 
given situation (Poetics 1450b4-6). Following this line of thought, many scholars 
conclude that τὰ δέοντα refers to forms of speech or methods of argumentation that 
would have been expected under the circumstances, “the right strategy in each case 
according to current rhetorical theory” (Woodruff 1993, xxii). Pericles, for example, 
employs many standard tropes in his Funeral Oration, and by employing the tropes of that 
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genre, Thucydides constructs a speech that appears appropriate to that context (Loraux 
1986, 236-9). Indeed, as is frequently noted, all of the debates and speeches in the history 
reflect Thucydides’ deep knowledge of formal rhetoric. Thucydides, then, is claiming in 
I.22 to have employed “the best arguments that could be found to support the ξύµπασα 
γνώµη [overall intention] of the speaker” (Marchant 1912, 169). And while this approach 
can be taken too far,78 most scholars agree that Thucydides’ substitution of τὰ δέοντα for 
the actual words of speakers refers to his practice of saying what was “as apt and 
effective in its situation as possible” (Macleod 1983, 52; cf. Winnington-Ingram 1965, 
70). 
But as Darien Shanske points out, Macleod is “too dogmatic in limiting the sense 
of ta deonta” to rhetorical necessity (Shanske 2006, 158). Though Macleod himself notes 
that τὰ δέοντα “partly … refers to the content of a speech which gives the ‘necessary’ 
advice in any given circumstance,” he all but ignores the specific content of the speeches 
and focuses only on their generic forms. Surely that is because in I.22 Thucydides is 
speaking about his historiological method with respect to the speeches, in explicit 
                                                
 
78 See, for instance, Shanske’s critique of Ostwald, who attempts to argue that we can 
have confidence that Thucydides’ speeches accurately recreate what was actually said 
because he knew what was “demanded” by “factors objectively inherent” in the situation 
(Shanske 2006, 157). Gomme criticizes those who argue that Thucydides employs the 
“‘ideal argument,’” since this would often conflict with Thucydides’ self-professed 
commitment to sticking as closely as possible to what was actually said (Gomme 1950, 
140).  
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contrast to his method with respect to the deeds of the war. He does not, that is, admit to 
recounting deeds in his history that were not known to have happened based on what 
actors should have done in a given situation, as he does with speeches, and so we must 
conclude that what was actually done curtails Thucydides freedom to tailor the advice of 
a recreated speech to what he judged was needful in the given situation. Perhaps Macleod 
judged, with Gomme, that the content of the speeches was more or less set, and that 
Thucydides provided only “the words, the style, that is the literary quality (as opposed to 
the historical content)” (Gomme 1950, 141). 
But if we adhere too rigorously to this interpretation then we overlook two 
important facts. First, the limitation of actual deeds on Thucydides’ freedom to 
reconstruct speeches is less restrictive than first appears. Actions are ambiguous and 
admit of alternative, sometimes contradictory, explanations. Consequently, it matters a 
great deal what debates preceded Athens’ last minute decision to spare many of the 
Mytilenians, for instance, or what arguments justified their decision to destroy Melos. By 
reconstructing the relevant speeches, Thucydides is in effect interpreting the deeds. And 
that interpretation dramatically changes our understanding of the facts themselves, 
insofar as we distinguish between, say, intentional and accidental conquests.79 Indeed, 
what Thucydides’ speeches reveal about the speakers is not so much that they were fluent 
in the latest rhetorical trends as that they grasped both what to do and how to persuade 
their audience to do it.      
                                                
 
79 For the most dramatic example of this in Thucydides’ text, consider the debate over 
Demosthenes’ success at Pylos—was his success due to planning or fortune?  
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Second, by claiming to know τὰ δέοντα, Thucydides is not just explaining his 
method. He is placing himself in the ranks of Pericles and Themistocles. For among the 
words that Thucydides writes into the speeches of his characters are these, spoken by 
Pericles: “I believe that I know no less than anyone80 both what is needful [τὰ δέοντα] 
and how to explain these things” (II.60.5). And in his praise of Themistocles, Thucydides 
writes that Themistocles was by nature “most able to extemporize whatever was needful 
[τὰ δέοντα]” (I.138.3). In both cases τὰ δέοντα refers the rhetorical capabilities of these 
statesmen and to their extraordinary practical judgment and foresight. Knowing τὰ 
δέοντα, then, refers not only to knowledge of rhetorical necessity, but also to knowledge 
of practical necessity, or prudence. Consequently, MacLeod’s remark that τὰ δέοντα is 
“as complex as rhetoric itself is complex” should be emended to read, “τὰ δέοντα is a 
notion as complex as effective speech and action are complex.” Indeed, Thucydides 
surely admires the Athenian capacity to say what is needful (τὰ δέοντα…εἰπεῖν: I.22.1). 
But the Athenians were also known, Thucydides points out, for their capacity to do what 
is needful (τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι: I.70.8). Hence, when Thucydides praises Pericles for being 
most capable in both speech and action, he means that Pericles is most able to “say as 
well as do τὰ δέοντα” (Winnington-Ingram 1965, 70). 
 
                                                
 
80 Litotes: “no less than anyone” is the equivalent of “more than anyone” (Rusten 1989, 
199). 
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